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This thesis is a contextual study of the work of Orkney theologian John Oman (1860-
1939), with reference to personal freedom as the unifying principle.  Oman’s early 
life in Orkney, his philosophical awakening in Edinburgh and his wide reading of 
European thought are the contexts explored. From these contexts emerges a theology 
that is eclectic in nature and which finds coherence in the principle of personal 
freedom. Oman’s concept of freedom is defined theologically, metaphysically and 
personally; this is followed by discussion of its application to the specific subject 
areas of Christology and Ecclesiology. The priority that Oman gives to personal 
freedom results in a distinctive theology of Christ and the Church. Thus, the 
uniqueness of Christ lies in the freedom which he exemplifies in humanity; and the 
Church is a community of freedom transcending institutional expression. The thesis 
concludes that Oman’s sui generis theology is the outcome of the heritage of 
freedom gifted in various contexts. However, this heritage of freedom was 
radicalised by Oman, as he developed his own theological vision. 








This thesis explores two related aspects of the theology of John Oman: context and 
unifying principle. 
The context of Oman’s life and thought has received only summary attention in 
previous studies. Oman himself gives little aid to the reader because of his minimal 
use of reference and footnote text. However, with detective work a picture emerges 
of Oman as a discerning interpreter of the theological and philosophical traditions of 
Europe from the Reformation through to the early twentieth century. The more 
immediate imprint of his Orkney roots and Scottish education are, also, significant to 
any contextual evaluation of his work. The net result is a complex theological 
narrative drawing upon many and varied ideas, but, always having the stamp of his 
own individuality.  
The second and related theme is the principle of personal freedom that stands at the 
centre of Oman’s work. Oman exercises an amazing personal freedom in the 
marshalling of diffuse ideas into a coherent whole. He is prisoner to no school of 
thought and the mark of personal creativity is the main characteristic of his work. 
Oman’s radical freedom is predicated upon freedom at the heart of reality. The 
universe is not impersonal process but a work of love; God’s sovereign love works in 
all and through all. The ability to consciously participate in the loving purposes of 
God is the image of God in humanity; and the participation of the natural in the 
supernatural signifies the sacramental nature of the universe. 
Starting from this ontology, Oman recognises no imperative greater than the voice of 
God speaking through experience and no calling higher than to experience freedom 
in the love of God. To speak of personal freedom is to speak of what belongs 
supremely to God and derivatively to humanity. The outcome is a radical theology 
respectful of tradition but not determined by it, a cruciform spirituality that trusts in 
God’s love when the world denies it and a faith that welcomes freedom as, at once, a 
gift and a challenge. At the Cross the love at the heart of the universe suffers in order 




Oman’s unifying principle of personal freedom has, therefore, a large remit, bringing 
coherence to complexity and unity to difference, not just in his work but in a spiritual 
universe.  
Scriptural references are taken from the 	ew Revised Standard Version of the Bible 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Thesis Outline 
The first three chapters are investigative, probing spheres of belonging and the 
genesis of ideas. Chapter one focuses the importance of Oman’s Orkney roots. In 
previous studies, Stephen Bevans refers to Oman’s Orkney heritage,
1
 but otherwise it 
has been peripheral in Oman scholarship. In this thesis, Bevans’ biographical 
summary is widened and deepened. The nature of the United Presbyterian Church, its 
confessional liberalism, its ecclesial reality in Orkney, its main theologian, John 
Cairns: these, it is argued, were seminal influences upon Oman.  
Chapter two deals with an unexplored area in Oman’s background, that is, with his 
philosophical awakening. At seventeen, Oman came to Edinburgh University to 
study medicine; but his study took a new direction through the impact of the trial for 
heresy of William Robertson Smith. This point is well documented by Oman himself 
and in Oman scholarship. Significantly, however, after the trial Oman turned to the 
study of philosophy and, so, began a formative period in his intellectual 
development. Oman’s, hitherto unidentified, teachers of philosophy – Henry 
Calderwood, Alexander Campbell Fraser and Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison – were a 
strong influence on an enquiring mind. These were major thinkers in the changing 
climate of Scottish philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. It was an era 
when the realism of Reid, was challenged by neo-Hegelianism; and, idealism, in 
turn, was brought under the critique of personal idealism. It will be argued that this 
context introduced Oman to the significance of personal freedom and it remained at 
the centre of his theology. Particular lines of continuity are noted between Oman’s 
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1992), 6-17. Bevans adds to the previous biographical information given by George Alexander in 
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theology and the philosophy of his teachers; and, further, his work is also compared 
with the older dualism of John Veitch and the contemporaneous ethical idealism of 
William Ritchie Sorley. It is argued that Oman’s contribution to philosophy of 
religion has deep roots in the varied philosophical culture of late nineteenth century 
Scotland. 
The Scottish connection to Oman’s work, however, is not emphasised to the 
exclusion of the European. Chapter three, therefore, draws attention to Oman’s deep 
understanding of German and French thought. The Kerr Lectures, published as Faith 
and Freedom in 1906,2 reveal Oman to be an encyclopaedic student and independent 
thinker, even from this early point in his academic career. Oman looked upon the 
whole European tradition from the Reformation through the Enlightenment to the 
twentieth century as the great spiritual heritage of the modern world.  It was a 
heritage rent apart by the division, indeed hostility, between faith and freedom. 
Oman traces the struggle between faith and freedom, sometimes with freedom in the 
ascendant to the detriment of faith and at other times vice versa. Oman’s lectures 
follow the ebb and flow of faith and freedom from Luther to Pascal, from Kant to 
Hegel and from Schleiermacher to Ritschl, each of whom pushed the boundaries one 
direction or the other. The scarred history of Europe and the deep need for 
reconciliation between these warring poles in human experience set the agenda for 
Oman’s life’s work.  
The second half of the thesis is interpretative and critical, examining how Oman’s 
concept of personal freedom functions overall in his theology.  Chapter four looks at 
the wide implications of freedom for theology, metaphysics and personality. The 
priority Oman gave to personal freedom led to his revision of the Reformation 
theology of grace, with the result that it was recast in personal rather than 
instrumental terms. Furthermore, the remit of freedom extends beyond personal 
relations. Oman regarded freedom as being as fundamental to cosmology as to 
persons. The bête noir for Oman is determinism, whether materialistic, theological or 
philosophical. The ontology on which the universe rests has freedom at its core: all 
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of creation moves in freedom and order towards fulfilment in the sovereign purposes 
of divine love.  
Analysis of the nature and function of freedom leads to a discussion of Christology 
in chapter five. Personal freedom is perceived as inconsistent with a magisterial 
Christology in the classical sense. Oman’s Christology takes a radical turn in the 
assertion that it is the freedom of Christ, and the freedom to which he calls his 
disciples, that marks him as a unique human being and an icon of the divine. Oman’s 
radical conclusions about Christ are predicated on his belief that the universe evolves 
spiritually as well as materially and there can be no historical finality in revelation. 
New levels of meaning are ever being discovered as the problems of the world are 
addressed in the light of the transcendent. The Cross is the most significant historical 
instance of the meeting of above and below, the material and the spiritual, and 
Oman’s Christology is, thus, fundamentally cruciform. Christ clarifies the 
omnipresent revelation of love in and through creation; and this he does in the only 
way possible, which is by reconciliation to the demand and call of love in his own 
life and in death. The model of clarification and fulfilment is reminiscent of the 
philosophical theism of Campbell Fraser.  
What pertains to Christology applies also to Oman’s ecclesiology. In chapter six, it is 
shown that the philosophy of the empirical and the ideal, of the natural and the 
supernatural, that directs Oman’s Christology is determinative also of his 
understanding of the Church. However, in addition to evolution and philosophy 
Oman draws upon the idea of the apocalyptic. For Oman, apocalyptic imagery in the 
Bible presents a philosophy of history that is open and teleological. The Church 
stands between heaven and earth, but its leaning is heavenward. What this means for 
the Church in practice is explored under the headings: institutions, ministry and 
sacraments. Oman practical theology reflects his non-conformist tradition, but with 
significant radicalisation. 
The final chapter reviews the contextual aspects of the thesis. Oman was a Scottish 
and a European thinker. When contextual influences are given due recognition, more 
obscure aspects of Oman’s thought are better understood. Further, Oman’s emphasis 




method and sui generis in the field of theology. Personal freedom and context are 
related; Oman both inherited the idea of personal freedom and developed it. In 
Oman’s work freedom is more than a personal quality; it is the primary ontological 
link to the author of being, ever to be realised anew and always transcending its 
greatest earthly realisation. 
Secondary Sources 
There have been to date five published studies of Oman work. Francis George 
Healey provided the earliest in Religion Reality: The Theology of John Oman, 
published in 1965.
3
 It is an exposition of Oman’s main themes and an important 
introduction to Oman’s work.  Healy offers a good analysis of Oman’s concept of 
freedom with respect to the natural world and to the supernatural. Where this thesis 
goes beyond Healey is in ascribing a magisterial position to freedom over and above 
the other facets of Oman’s thought; the ontology of freedom becomes the unifying 
principle of Oman’s work and his vision. 
An earlier study by George Grant, an Oxford D.Phil. Thesis, completed in 1950, was 
not published until 2000 in Volume One of his Collected Works.4  Grant’s study 
shows how Oman’s philosophy of the natural and the supernatural proves to be 
fundamental to his theology. However, Grant makes no reference to Scottish 
philosophy and his references to European thinkers tread well worn paths, in the 
footsteps of Kant, Schleiermacher and Ritschl. A wider angle on influences in 
Oman’s work would have enriched this thorough exposition of Oman’s thought. 
Nevertheless, the recent availability of this study to a public readership will greatly 
enhance understanding of Oman.  
Stephen Bevans’ monograph, John Oman’s Doctrine of God,5 published in 1992, 
brings Oman into the field of ecumenical study. It has the great merit of a Catholic 
perspective and evaluation of a firmly rooted Protestant thinker. Bevans’ highlights 
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 F. G. Healy, Religion and Reality: The Theology of John Oman (Edinburgh and London: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1965). 
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 George Grant, Collected Works, Volume One (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 157-401. 
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how important God as a personal reality is for the architecture of Oman’s theology. 
Bevan’s accommodation of Oman within a Catholic sensibility, however, misses 
something of the radical edge to Oman’s thinking. The logic of Oman’s radical focus 




A lesser known study of Oman is found in Joan Crewdson’s, Christian Doctrine in 
the light of Michael Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge: a personalist theology 
published in 1994.
7 Crewdson compares Oman and Polanyi highlighting the strong 
similarities in their emphasis on the personal nature of knowledge. Crewdson’s 
monograph includes a good review of how the personal focus of Oman’s 
epistemology informs his theology of divine-human relations.  
Another study of the experiential aspect of Oman’s theology was published in 2003. 
Adam Hood’s Baillie, Oman and Macmurry: Experience and Religious Belief 8 is a 
comprehensive account of Oman’s epistemology. Hood offers an evaluation and 
validation of Oman’s theology of experience, answering some contemporary critics. 
The argument of this thesis that personal freedom is the unifying principle in Oman’s 
thought is complementary to the work of Hood and Crewdson. Personal knowledge 
is the corollary of personal freedom. 
The above studies in their varied approaches elucidate Oman’s published work; and 
this study with its focus on context and freedom provides new angles on already well 
established themes. In addition, the exploration of the nineteenth century context and 
the postulate that personal freedom is the unifying principle of Oman’s theology 
opens new horizons on the subjects of ontology, Christology and the Church.  
 A recent study, John Oman: 	ew Perspectives, is awaited.9  
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 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 7, 116, 121-122, 
128n, 137n and, also, John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
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a Personalist Theology (Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 1994). 
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A full bibliography is given at the end. Oman’s main published works and the 
editions quoted in the thesis are listed below. In footnotes they are referred to by 
their primary titles: for example, Vision and Authority. The thesis has also drawn 
upon the Oman Archive in Westminster College Cambridge. It is a limited but 
important source. Oman gave instructions that his private papers should be destroyed 
after his death. Happily, Oman’s Lecture Notes have survived and are a valuable 
supplement to his published writing. A second, primary source used has been the 
archive of the Presbytery of the United Presbyterian Church in Orkney. This has 
proved enlightening as to the ethos of Oman’s home congregation, Victoria Street in 
Stromness. Presbytery records also reveal the concerns and priorities of the Seceder 
tradition in which Oman was spiritually nurtured and called to the Christian ministry. 
Books by John Oman 
Vision and Authority, or the Throne of St. Peter (Hodder & Stoughton, first edition 
1902, new and revised edition 1928; eighth edition with introduction by T. W. 
Manson, 1948). Citations are from the 1928 edition. 
The Problem of Faith and Freedom in the Last Two Centuries (London: Houghton, 
1906).   
The Church and the Divine Order (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911). 
The War and its Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915). 
Grace and Personality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first edition 1917; 
second edition 1919; third edition 1925; reissued by Fontana Books, 1960, 1961; 
with introduction by John Hick, New York: Association Press, 1961; Japanese 
translation by Y. Kami, 1982). Citations are from the 1925 edition).  
The Paradox of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921). 
The Book of Revelation: Theory of Text: Rearrangement Text and Translation: 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923). 





The 	atural and the Supernatural (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931; 
reprinted 1950). 
Concerning the Ministry (London: SCM, 1936; reprinted 1953; also published as a 
booklet, The Office of Ministry, SCM 1928; second edition 1929). Citations are from 
the 1936 edition. 
Honest Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941). 
A Dialogue with God (London: James Clarke & Co.1950; reprinted 1963).  
Translation 




Chapter One  
Freedom in context: Church and religion in Scotland and 
Orkney in the late nineteenth century. 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the early, formative, religious influences upon Oman in his 
native Orkney and in the ecclesiastical environment of the nineteenth century. 
Beginning with a survey of the mosaic that was the ecclesiastical landscape of 
Victorian Scotland, the chapter moves to the particularity of the United Presbyterian 
Church and the influence of its main theologian John Cairns. The chapter, also, 
examines the impact on Oman of the Free Church trial of William Robertson Smith. 
Further, the narrative will journey back to Oman’s childhood in Orkney, where 
elemental features of his thinking are first detected. It was the characters and tales 
that filled his childhood that taught Oman the meaning of personality; not as an 
abstract concept but as a varied, living reality. It was in Orkney, too, that the 
numinous became real, even before he could give it a name. 
Themes in outline 
Section one will take a broad-brush look at the ecclesiastical history of Victorian 
Scotland. Thereafter, it will focus more particularly on the formation and distinctive 
characteristics of the United Presbyterian Church. It was a religious communion 
marked by considerable breadth of vision and respect for individual conscience, 
especially with regard to confessional subscription. Oman was born into a tradition 
that, of all the Presbyterian traditions in Scotland, most respected the rights of 
conscience and took steps to accommodate conscience in its confessional theology. 
Sections two is devoted to the life and work of John Cairns, (1818-1892). Oman’s 
estimation of Cairns as a scholar and saint is corroborated by the quality of his 
learning, the breadth of his churchmanship and the depth of his piety. The formation 
of the United Presbyterian Church was largely pioneered by Cairns; and he was of 




ministry at the United Presbyterian Church Theological Hall from 1882 to 1885; at 
that time Cairns was Principal.
1
 Stephen Bevans records Oman’s remark in one of his 
unpublished papers, Dr. Cairns by One of His Old Students,” that Principal Cairns 
was “the greatest man I ever met”.
2
  It can be argued that Oman was not only 
influenced by Cairns but carried forward his theology, moving from a modified, 
confessional Calvinism to a personal, theological realism. 
Section three will look at the trial of William Robertson Smith. Although Smith 
belonged to the Free Church, his trial had a wide impact on the religious 
consciousness of Scotland. Oman ascribed his calling to study philosophy and 
theology to the questions the trial raised; it marked his awakening from intellectual 
and theological innocence.  
Section four takes the discussion to Oman’s roots in Orkney. The mature expression 
of Oman’s theology at Cambridge in the 1930s belongs to a world far removed from 
rural, pre-industrial, nineteenth century Orkney. But still, Oman understood his 
spiritual pilgrimage, over diversity of time and place, as a narrative of continuity. He 
found in his tradition the freedom to grow and develop; and it was in Orkney he first 
experienced the numinous, the ground of his later theology of the holy. Also, from 
his informal writings, the reader catches a glimpse of the earthy humanity that 
surrounded Oman’s upbringing. His spiritual anthropology was rooted in Orkney, in 
the sense of humanity in God and God in all things.  
The final section will come to an overview of the native influences that gave impetus 
to Oman the creative theologian. The core values of Oman’s work, the 
complementary nature of freedom and faith, the priority of experience over theory 
and the variety of human response to the divine, all sprang from seeds sown in his 
Scottish background. 
                                                 
1
 The Theological Hall of the United Secession Church became the Theological College of the United 
Presbyterian Church after the union of the Relief Church and United Secession Church in 1847. New 
buildings were acquired in Castle Terrace, Edinburgh, and opened in 1880 at a cost of £50,000 raised 
by voluntary subscription. Alexander R. McEwen, Life and Letters of John Cairns (London; Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1896), 627. 
2




1 Ecclesiastical Landscape  
If blue is emblematic of Presbyterianism, then it was the predominant colour of the 
ecclesiastical map of Victorian Scotland.  From the Highlands to the Borders and 
across the industrialised Lowlands, three strands of Presbyterianism captured the 
spiritual loyalty of Scots: the Church of Scotland, the Free Church and the United 
Presbyterian Church. Yet though these Presbyterian communities predominated, they 
co-existed with small though significant rivals. These latter survived the religious 
wars and magisterial Reformations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; they 
continued into the twentieth century, where they took up a valued place in the 
emerging ecumenical dialogue.
3
 For example, the Episcopal Church of Scotland 
provided a distinct sacramental emphasis for Christians who wanted to be both 
Protestant and Catholic and who culturally stood in the traditions of Jacobean rather 
than Covenanter Scotland. The Roman Catholic community, from the middle of the 
nineteenth century onwards, increased rapidly through immigration from Ireland; and 
there were other small, but significant, denominations or dissenting bodies: the 
Congregational, Old Independent and Baptist congregations with roots in the 
Reformation. In addition, there was the Methodist Church, the fruit of the itinerant 
preaching of George Whitefield and John Wesley. These smaller ecclesial 
communities were stronger in the eighteenth century than the nineteenth. They did 
not have large scale immigration to increase their numbers; and they tended to suffer 
as the result of the expansion of the United Presbyterian Church. However, these 
“traditional strands” of older non-conformity were to find a kindred spirit of a novel 
kind, in the populist evangelism Dwight L. Moody and Ira D. Sankey. The latter first 
visited Scotland in 1874. The fruits of this new evangelism, with its less doctrinally 
focused spirituality, were soon evidenced in the changing patterns of worship. Even 
in psalm singing Presbyterianism, in the face of heated debate, organs were installed 
and hymns became normative, changing not just the face of Presbyterian worship, 
but something in its core spirituality. Personal spiritual experience, whilst not 
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replacing doctrinal orthodoxy, came to have a more determinative place in personal 
and corporate life.  
However, though minority bodies had a part to play, it was Presbyterianism – 
established, free or voluntary – that won the spiritual adherence of the majority of 
Scots; these varied expressions of Presbyterian of polity and practice are outlined 
below. 
1.1 Established Church  
Andrew L. Drummond and John Bulloch, in the second volume of their  
comprehensive study, The Church in Late Victorian Scotland,4 remark that thirty 
years after the Disruption “the Church of Scotland had not merely survived but was 
gaining strength.”
5
 Despite the cataclysmic change of the Disruption, the Auld Kirk 
remained an important feature of the ecclesiastical landscape. This assessment, 
however, should not be over emphasised. Bulloch and Drummond have a decided 
sympathy towards the Establishment and the burden of their argument is that the 
Disruption forced the Church of Scotland into a “sectarian” environment. Thus, they 
portray the continuing strength of the Auld Kirk in a fractious ecclesiastical climate 
as a testament to spiritual strength, if not superiority. 
Her mind was more flexible, her contacts were wider and, while the 
leaders of the Free Church spoke only to their own membership, men 




Callum Brown offers an alternative, revisionist history. Whereas Drummond and 
Bulloch wrote from the perspective of the 1970s, with an enthusiasm that was 
theologically liberal and ecumenical, Brown writes with a sociological interest and a 
postmodern perspective. He does not treat the religious diversity of the period as 
pejoratively “sectarian”.  For example, his view of the events of 1843 is that they 
were essentially a movement of self-determination, by a large section of the Scottish 
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 Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch, The Church in Late Victorian Scotland, 1843-1874 
(Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1975); and The Church in Late Victorian Scotland, 1874-1900 
(Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1978). 
5
 Late Victorian Scotland, 1. 
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population. Nor was the Disruption, in his view, “a single split”;
7
 much less was it 
the work of scheming clerics.  
The Disruption of 18
th
 March 1843 was the most spectacular event in 
modern Scotland. …This event was to become symbolic of a great 
sacrifice of money and security, and the ultimate statement of social 
and religious self-determination…Nationally, few parts were untouched 
by the Disruption with even the northern island groups of Orkney and 
Shetland experiencing a walk out of 32% of the clergy.
8
 
The Disruption, thus viewed, was the result of deep undercurrents in society that 
were both social and religious. Ecclesiastically, the tensions could not be resolved 
within existing structures; and so clergy and congregations found freedom in “the 
new wineskins” of the Free Church. It was the beginning and not the end of a 
process. The church history of the period that followed was a changing pattern of 
unions, failed unions, and protracted campaigning over the perennial issue of 
disestablishment. The freedom gained at the Disruption, when placed at the disposal 
of the Holy Spirit, led to sifting of hearts and minds in the search for unity in the 
body of Christ. 
1.2 Free Church of Scotland (1843-1900) 
Brown described the genesis of the Free Church in dramatic terms. The Disruption 
expressed the zeitgeist of Scottish religious culture in the middle of the century. Its 
effects reached far and wide, impinging on diverse social and economic 
communities.  
It created a large and influential denomination almost literally overnight 
amidst scenes of great excitement and public attention. All over 
Scotland, ministers left their manses and ministers and elders and 
congregations left their parish churches to meet the following Sunday in 
farmyards, graveyards, public halls, barns, gravel pits, caves, beaches, 
on hillsides and on board anchored ships.
9
 
This great act of faith and sacrifice, as well as energy, was in a short time a settled 
part of Scottish religious culture. Kenneth Ross highlights the ease with which the 
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Disruption moved from being a protest movement to being established 
institutionally.
10
 The Sustentation Fund, the brainchild of Thomas Chalmers (1780-
1847), provided income for the 583 ministers in the first year. But its eventual 
success was such that it was able to provide for 1200 ministers by the year 1900. At 
the same time an extensive building programme was undertaken, providing churches 
and manses: an initiative reflecting the support of broad sections of the business 
community and commercial interests. The physical presence of the Free Church was 
thus quickly established. 
It was inevitable that a “free” Church, that came into being on a point of principle, 
namely freedom from patronage, should have the question of freedom ever at the 
heart of its life and witness. The question of personal freedom came to a head, and 
sad conclusion, with the trial of William Robertson Smith, beginning in 1877.  We 
know from Oman’s remarks in the preface to Vision and Authority that 
reverberations were felt far beyond the pews of Free Church members.
11
 The trial 
marked a spiritual turning point in Oman’s life.  For Oman the issue was not only 
one of freedom, with respect to confessional loyalty and its relation to conscience; it 
raised deeper questions about the nature of religion itself. The controversy inspired 
Oman to shift the seat of authority in religion from the written word to the primary 
witness of God in experience. With Oman’s mature reflection came a new paradigm 
for authority; the authority of the sacred and the holy, the voice of God spoken in and 
through the immediacy environment. The impact of the Robertson Smith case on 
Oman is discussed at length, below, in the section: trials and tribulations. 
1.3 The United Presbyterian Church (1847-1900) 
The United Presbyterian Church was formed on 13
th
 May 1847 through the coming 
together of the United Secession Church and the Relief Church. Although a major 
element in the make up of Victorian Presbyterianism in Scotland, the United 
Presbyterian tradition has not received the breadth of historical study that has been 
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given to the Auld Kirk or to the Free Church. Brown finds the secession traditions 
the most interesting sociologically; and he attributes neglect of interest in them to the 
fact that dissenting stubbornness fits ill at ease with present day ecumenical 
sympathies. 
Unfortunately these are also the least studied of Scottish churches, 
largely because ecclesiastical historians have viewed them 
unsympathetically from a twentieth-century ecumenical standpoint as 
schismatics, fanatics and inward-looking sectarians who “thought little 




Whilst misconceptions may account for lack of scholarly interest in seceding 
traditions of the eighteenth century, they do not explain the lack of historical study of 
seceding traditions in the nineteenth century, a period when increasingly they came 
together in successive ecclesiastical unions. The vision of a national Church never 
died; and the various unions amongst seceding factions, from 1820 onwards, were 
progressive steps towards its realisation. The seceding churches believed that their 
separation “was not from the Church of Scotland as such, but from those who had 
usurped power within it”.
13
 Separation had never been embarked upon lightly, and 
the ideal of a national Church was never jettisoned.  
The complicated historical paths towards greater unity are difficult to summarize 
with clarity. The metaphor of a patchwork quilt comes to mind. A variety of 
Presbyterian factions, with strange titles rooted in a colourful past, were slowly 
integrated into a greater whole. The Auld Licht burghers were received into the 
Church of Scotland in 1839. Ross remarks that to them the Established Church of the 
1830s was the “free, faithful and reforming” General Assembly to which the 
secession “fathers” had appealed.
14
 However, they were in the main to depart again 
with the Disruption in 1843! The Reformed Presbyterian Church, the successor to the 
Covenanters of the seventeenth century, entered communion with the Free Church in 
1876, on the condition that they held their own position with respect to the 
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Covenants. In the event, one minister and twelve congregations remained apart.
15
 
However, the first union of the century was the most significant. The creation of the 
United Secession Church in 1820 brought together the “new light” burghers and the 
“new light” antiburghers; both represented the more theologically liberal wings of 
the original Secession. It came about partly because of changing circumstances. In a 
new century the divisive issue of the Burgess Oath did not stir the same dogmatic 
passions; and difference of conviction was embraced in a spirit of tolerance. A 
charitable spirit informed the Basis of Union. The second article both canonised the 
traditional Seceder objections to interference by the civil magistrate and disavowed 
all persecuting attitudes. 
…we do not approve or require an approbation of any thing in these 
books (the Subordinate Standards) which teaches, or may be thought to 
teach, compulsory or persecuting and intolerant principles of religion.
16
 
The United Secession Church accordingly valued spiritual freedom with respect to 
confessional subscription. Ian Hamilton, in his study of the Seceders’ relationship to 
the Westminster of Confession of Faith, notes a change in the language of 
subscription. Hitherto ministers had been required to subscribe to the doctrine of the 
Confession in its entirety, except for the chapter on the civil magistrate. In the new 
Basis of Union, ministers were required to affirm only that the subordinate standards 
were “expressive of the sense” of Scripture. He quotes the relevant question from the 
new Formula of Ordination of Ministers. 
Do you acknowledge the Westminster Confession of Faith, with the 
Larger and Shorter catechisms, as the confession of your faith, 
expressive of the sense in which you understand the Scriptures…?
17
 
Not all were happy with the newly expressed freedom. A small number of 
Conservative Antiburghers separated in 1827 to form the Associate Synod of 
Protestors. Eventually they found a home with the Old Light Antiburghers. But still, 
despite these splinters, the inexorable movement was towards greater unity and 
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greater freedom. The United Secession Church, in moving away from the Covenants, 
in adopting a voluntary position on Church-State relations and in granting more 
freedom with regard to subscription, prepared the way for union with the Relief 
Church.  
The Relief Church had come into being in 1761. Like the other seceding traditions, it 
was born of dispute over patronage in the Established Church. Nicholas Needham, in 
his article in the Scottish Dictionary of Church History and Theology, highlights the 
salient characteristics of the denomination. These included the repudiation of the 
National Covenant (1638) and the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), the 
principle of open Communion, the practice of sharing pulpits with ministers of other 
denominations (though not with Arminians) and an emphasis on Church Courts as 
occasions for fellowship and consultation, rather than on their legislative function. 
The Relief Church placed emphasis on evangelism and was the first Church in 
Scotland to officially adopt a strategy for foreign missions. The Synod passed a 
resolution of 1796 calling on support for the missionary enterprise and encouraging 
all the members of this Synod (to) unite in their exertions with any 
society that may be formed to promote such a good and great design.
18
 
The members of the Relief Church were also strong in their campaign against the 
slave trade. They were also pioneers in the use of hymnody. The union of the 
“Relief” and the “United Secession” created The United Presbyterian Church, a 
denomination with 518 congregations.  
This summary of the component parts of the United Presbyterian Church helps put 
into perspective its particular ethos. Like the Relief Church, the United Presbyterians 
disapproved of “persecuting and intolerant principles in religion” and, from the 
Relief, the new body adopted the practice of free Communion. The new 
denomination was also committed to the voluntarist principle, something that 
hindered and frustrated dialogue with the Free Church. The United Presbyterian 
Church, however, had its internal disputes over the introduction instrumental music 
in worship, particularly organs. But this dispute resolved itself when, in 1872, 
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official sanction was given to the use of instrumental music in worship. Finally, with 
regard to the theological liberalism of the United Presbyterian Church, it is 
enlightening to return to Ian Hamilton’s study of subscription. He points out that the 
Formula of Subscription for the Basis of Union of 1847 marked a shift towards the 
United Secession formula of 1820 and away from the Relief Church traditional form 
of subscription. The Relief Church had asked ministers to subscribe to the “whole 
Confession” as a “Confession of their faith.”
19
 Indeed, in 1789 one of the Relief 
Church’s ministers, the Rev’d James Smith of Dunfermline, was disciplined for the 
proposal that subscription to the Confession should have the appendage, “in so far as 
it agrees with the Word of God.”
20
 However, the strictness of the Relief Church gave 
way to the latitudinous phraseology already noted as being in use in the United 
Secession Church from 1820. In 1847 licentiates and ministers in the newly formed 
United Presbyterian Church were not required to personally identify with the 
subordinate standards. In other words, they did not have to acknowledge the 
Westminster Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms as being a 
confession of “their faith.” The question became:  
Do you acknowledge the Westminster confession of Faith, and the 
Larger and Shorter Catechisms as an exhibition of the sense in which 
you understand Holy Scriptures?
21
 
Hamilton’s thesis is that this subscription was a further diminution of Calvinist 
orthodoxy. Certainly, these changes signalled a freer relation to it.  
Summary 
This section has examined the ecclesiastical mosaic that was nineteenth century 
Scotland. There were minority churches such as the Episcopalian, the Roman 
Catholic and varied dissenting bodies. However, Presbyterianism in its threefold 
form dominated. The established Church of Scotland remained the largest 
communion, followed by the Free Church and the United Presbyterian. The later part 
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of the nineteenth century was marked by movements towards re-union. With re-
union came accommodation and a shedding of principles that hitherto led to schism. 
Thus, the Church of Scotland gave up its patronage, the Free Church gave up its 
residual belief in establishment and the United Presbyterian Church, in final reunion 
in 1929, accepted a Church by law established. The question of individual 
conscience was always near to the surface and the United Secession Church and the 
United Presbyterian Churches led the way in adopting greater freedom with regard to 
confessional subscription.  
If one considers Oman’s emphasis on personal freedom in the light of the foregoing, 
it is not too much to say that he mirrored the agenda and debate that exercised the 
hearts and minds of many Presbyterians in Victorian Scotland. United Presbyterians 
struggled to reconcile the liberty wherewith Christ has made the believer free with 
the concept of confessional subscription imposed on ministers and elders. 
Paradoxically, the Westminster Confession of Faith itself says that implicit faith is 
injurious to conscience.
22
 However, thought-through, personal faith comes with a 
price tag; the cost being that of diversity of personal conviction and ever changing 
perceptions of truth itself.  Oman’s theology was willing to face the cost. If faith is 
truly personal then it must be an expression of the most cherished aspect of 
personality, i.e. freedom. Confessional theology in Oman’s work was replaced by a 
theology of personal reality, personally appropriated. Confessional theology 
remained as a witness to the spiritual journey travelled and, thereby, valuable as a 
vantage point from which to behold the distant vistas; but, the maps of theological 
minds of another age could not, for Oman, be determinative of the way still to be 
travelled. Only the radical call to personal freedom and faithful reliance upon God 
can navigate unchartered waters of the Kingdom of God. 
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2  John Cairns (1818-1892) 
The cautious, but real, theological liberalism of the United Presbyterian Church 
provides a suitable point of departure for the consideration of its main theologian. 
John Cairns was, by all reports, a big man in stature. He was born on 23
rd
 August 
1818, the son of a shepherd from Berwickshire. He himself worked as a herd until 
the day before he went to Edinburgh University. He was one of eight of a family 
who, like many other families of farm labourers, lived a migratory life within the 
confines of the Borders. The Cairns family moved six times in eleven years before 
settling at Dunglass Estate, in the Parish of Cockburnspath. The family Church was 
Stockbridge United Secession Church (Burgher), and the father was an elder from 
1831 until his death.
23
  John attended the local school at Cockburnspath. He was 
taught by a Mr. McGregor, a native of Perthshire and a graduate of St. Andrews who 
had been student for the Church of Scotland, but decided instead on teaching as a 
profession. Ordinarily school fees ranged from “three to five shillings a quarter;”
24
 
and for no extra charge Mr. McGregor proposed that John join the Latin class that 
was being formed. This proposal caused Cairns’ father great agony of conscience 
over whether acceptance of this offer would set one of his sons above the rest. His 
mother, however, had no misgivings and the minister, Mr. Inglis, was also in strong 
support of the proposal.  Within two years John was also in the Greek class! This gift 
for the study of language was to be a feature of Cairns’ academic career. In 1884, at 
the age of sixty-six, he acquired Dano-Norwegian in order to participate in the 
Evangelical Alliance Conference in Copenhagen. Around this time, too, he taught 
himself Dutch, so that he could read the works of Kuenen and follow the 
developments surrounding the secession of the evangelical party from the state 
Church in Holland. He began his day by reading the Bible in Hebrew and Greek; and 
to this in 1883 he added Arabic, so that he could lecture in “Mohammedanism”. 
Two years ago I took a fancy to learn Arabic, having to lecture in 
Mohammedanism….I believe that Christianity is going to recover its 
lost ground from this old enemy, not it may be very speedily, but in 
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time, and I wish to pray in Arabic for its arrival. When I read through 
the Koran I shall know the originals of all my Apologetics lectures. I 
shall have some revenge over Gibbon, who drew so triumphantly the 
career of the Saracens and yet professed that he did not know a word of 
the language; and if I cannot go to Palestine or Egypt, I shall be able to 
imagine the sound of Wady This or Tel That.
25
 
This aptitude for academic work was coupled with an equal interest in humanity. In 
his wanderjahr Cairns travelled on foot quite penniless throughout Germany, France, 
Switzerland, and over the Alps to Italy. While as a minister in Berwick, he travelled 
to Ireland in 1864 and climbed Croagh Patrick with pilgrims. He was impressed with 
the view from the Mayo mountains of Clew Bay, but was unimpressed at the 
pilgrims “walking on their bare knees” and in conversation he “tried to state the way 
of salvation through faith in Christ.”
26
 In 1880, in order that he “might speak of it 
from observation”,
27
he attended Mormon worship in Salt Lake City where Orson 
Pratt, the last survivor of the Saints founding fathers, gave the address. And although 
Cairns did not find the experience uplifting, he concluded that the Mormons, “if they 
have improved the earth as they have visibly done”, are “another case of God’s 
choosing the most unlikely instruments for His plans”.
28
It is a remarkably, tolerant, 
indeed charitable, remark. Furthermore, Cairns’ reverence for the ways of providence 
carried through to his teaching methods, being always careful not to impose his 
views on students. His biographer writes: 
One student, who at that date, was floundering at the university in the 
marshes that encircle Hegelianism, recollects how in the misery of 
mental confusion he was referred to Dr Cairns for guidance. Dr Cairns 
asked him to write out a detailed statement of the points that perplexed 
him, and having read the statement, merely told him to “go on and think 
things out for himself without fear”.
29
 
It was counsel predicated on the inviolability of personality and realism in 
epistemology: Cairns believed that God is his own best witness and will never 
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deceive the seeking heart. This personal realism would, in time, come to be equally 
cherished by Oman. 
In theology, Cairns was a moderate Calvinist. He raised the question of a Declaratory 
Act for the United Presbyterian Church so that subscription to confessional standards 
would not be hurtful to the conscience of ministers and elders. Not only was he 
instrumental in shaping the Declaratory Act of 1878, his powers of persuasion 
ensured it was passed unanimously by the General Assembly. This was no mean feat 
at a time of heresy trials and it gave to posterity a marker that is still relevant. His 
travels, his learning, his unending thirst for knowledge were combined with a warm 
piety. The Secession and United Presbyterian traditions were obviously amenable to 
the enlightened Calvinism that Cairns espoused. Unlike Rainy, he was not drawn into 
the turbulent waters of ecclesiastical politics; and he had the gift of plain speech in 
both his writing and speaking. To appreciate the stature of Cairns, one needs to look 
more closely at his spirituality.  
From Cairns’ letters, some published sermons and other literary fragments we have a 
glimpse of someone for whom piety was more essential than knowledge, and charity 
more important than doctrine. It was his piety and charity that enabled him to reach 
beyond the boundaries of his Calvinist creed and rejoice in what he referred to as 
“the faith of the universal Church”.
30
 Speaking of Methodists, he says: 
Far be it from me to speak one unkind word of brethren I love so much, 




In the same spirit, Cairns had a good relationship with the Church of England vicar 
and people in Berwick on Tweed. The Vicar of the Parish from 1866 to 1880, 
Reverend J. G. Rowe M.A., gives a fulsome picture of Cairns. 
When I came to Berwick, Dr. Cairns was the first and, I think the only 
Nonconformist minister who called on me. I was struck at once with his 
large, well built frame, fine, open, countenance, bright brilliant eyes 
and expressive, masculine mouth. His manner was manly and heartily 
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cordial, not gushing nor obtrusive, but that of a man who meant what he 
said and was prepared to respect your opinions…
32
 
Significantly, Rowe recalls the sense of being fellow workers that they shared, and 
an awareness of a catholicity of faith that was the bond between them. He continues: 
I remember how he wished health and prosperity on me and mine, and a 
blessing upon the work I came to do. He told me how he admired the 
liturgy of the Church of England, and how he could fully subscribe to 
her articles. His issue with us concerned solely Church government.
33
 
Nor was Cairns’ gesture merely words, as evidenced by his attendance at the weekly 
lectures in the Episcopalian Church hall. 
That he really meant this was witnessed by his not infrequent 
attendance at the Thursday morning lecture in the parish church, 
prompted, I think, by that simple humility which led him to make one 
of the “two or three” then gathered together…Better, holier, more 
happy neighbours none could have than he and his sister.
34
 
These quotations correct the image of Cairns as man of fanatical zeal.
35
 And they 
paint a portrait of a man secure in himself. One would imagine his presence at the 
Episcopalian morning lecture may have raised an occasional eyebrow! Yet his thirty 
years as minister in Berwick was marked by no discord or dispute.  
One detects a spirituality that was the source of magnanimity and a catholicity of 
spirit. Cairns’ piety was not a restricting facet of his life, but a liberating one. As 
virtual leader in the United Presbyterian Church, it is plain that Cairns had the 
spiritual vision and determination to transcend both Calvinism as a system of 
doctrine, and Presbyterianism as an exclusive ecclesiology. Under his guidance, 
Article 7 of the Declaratory Articles of 1878 granted “liberty of opinion …on such 
matters not entering into the substance of the faith;” in effect, it affirmed the priority 
of the personal over the confessional. In Cairns’ words, the aim was “to grant liberty 
here and there as was not formally allowed, although generally believed to be acted 
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 This personal latitude can either be portrayed negatively, as by Ian 
Hamilton – namely, an erosion of Calvinist orthodoxy – or it can be valued positively 
as an alleviation of the spiritual stress caused by orthodoxy. For Cairns it was not 
erosion, but the granting of freedom to mind and conscience. His latitudinous mind 
sought the maximum freedom possible within the Westminster doctrinal tradition. It 
was a limited freedom, but still it was in its day a triumph for conscience. It formed a 
precedent that was to find replication in the Free Church Declaratory Act of 1893 
and become an enduring facet of Presbyterianism in Scotland. 
Evaluation of Cairns would be incomplete without consideration of his involvement 
in the “Ferrier Affair”. Though of catholicity of spirit in churchmanship and 
latitudinous in his Calvinism, in philosophy Cairns was suspicious of pantheism and 
Hegelianism. Therefore, not as a detached observer but as a very interested party, 
Cairns was enlisted to advise Edinburgh Council with regard to the appointment to 
fill Sir William Hamilton’s chair in 1856. A pamphlet war ensued between Cairns 
and Ferrier, with Cairns accusing Ferrier of flirting with dangerous German ideas and 
betraying Scottish philosophy. The controversy has evoked various responses from 
succeeding generations of philosophers.  For example, George Davie writing in the 
1960s regards Cairns as the villain of the sad episode; describing him as,  
(an) evangelical fanatic, but full of levelling rancour, accommodating  
within certain limits to the march of social improvement.
37
 
Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane, philosopher and biographer of Ferrier, gives a more 
dispassionate view. Writing some forty years after the event, she reflects on how 
attitudes to the whole question of truth and how it is pursued had changed: changed 
in the direction of tolerance, though with corresponding loss of passion. 
The greater toleration of the present day may mean corresponding lack 
of zeal or interest, but it surely also means recognition of the fact that 
men may choose their own methods in the search for truth without 
thereby endangering the object held in view. Mr Cairns’ attack without 
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The irony was that Ferrier was not espousing atheism. Indeed, as Richard Burdon 
Haldane points out in the forward to his sister’s biography of Ferrier, Ferrier’s work 
became important in Christian apologetics by the end of the century. 
The opinions which in 1856 were regarded by the authorities of the 
Free and United Presbyterian Churches as disqualifying Ferrier of the 
opportunity for influencing the mind of the youth of Edinburgh, ….are 
regarded by the present generation of Presbyterians as the main reliable 
bulwark against the attacks of unbelievers. If one may judge by the 
recent volume called Lux Mundi, the same phenomenon displays itself 




One of Cairns’ criticisms of Ferrier’s philosophy
40
 had been, “that it remakes 
Absolute Existence into mere relation and leaves everything in the realm of Being” 
41
 
To later Scottish theologians, the thought of God being known “in relation” was a 
gain. The next generation of philosophers would take up the idea of relation as 
fundamental to ontology under the label of personal idealism.  
2.1 Oman and Cairns: warmth of appreciation 
Oman held Cairns in the highest regard. In the short unpublished paper
42
 quoted by 
Bevans, Oman veers towards hagiography, painting a picture of his College Principal 
in the most revered terms. Cairns was “the greatest man I ever met”, Oman 
commented; and, “it was personality that impressed us not his work”.
43
 Cairns’ life 
called for a biography to be written, but “he himself was too modest to care what 
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meaning the world had of him”.
44
 Interestingly, though Cairns was a gifted linguist, 
Oman felt that his mother tongue, Scots, gave most freedom to his thought, whereas 
English cramped his expression. 
Every Scotsman growing up amongst ordinary people has to learn 
English as a foreign tongue. English never did justice to his [Cairns’] 
freely moving mind as his Scotch (sic) did.
45
 
Recalling Cairns’ lectures, Oman tells how Cairns could quote from the “Hebrew 
Bible by the page”; of how there appeared “something of divine radiance when he 
talked of great subjects” and “of all things about him his laugh was the most 
wonderful”.
46
 Allied to Cairns’ engaging lectures was the spiritual quality of his life 
noted above. Oman comments; 
Of nothing did he make more conscience than the students’ prayer 
meeting. During the last moments of his life it is said he imagined 
taking part in it. [Break] When asked to preside he replied, “You first, 
I’ll follow” No words more completely sum up his life.
47
 
“Warm appreciation” might be too reserved an estimate of how Oman valued Cairns: 
as a man, as a Christian and as a thinker. Cairns appeared to Oman as a personality in 
whom humanity and piety blended without one corrupting the other. “His boyish 
tastes never left him as when eating green gooseberries and skimming stones on 
water”: that simplicity was integral to a gravitas that touched his students deeply. 
Oman sums up Cairns’ impact as he describes the end of term departures to service 
in various parts of the world. 
….always partings, which we know will be forever, and the prayers had 
an inspiration in them. And when Cairns rose we felt a higher spirit 
among us, there was felicity of expression, strong feeling, sympathy 
and all that we look for in one that leads prayer [Break] but there was 
something else, something of a man who in ordinary life is in the 
infinite and not the finite. And there in a word was his true greatness. 
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And so, the paper continues in an elegiac tone. It reveals a lot about Oman as well as 
his mentor. Oman, too, lived with a sense of the divine in the midst of the ordinary. 
The 	atural and the Supernatural may be considered a philosophical analysis of the 
spiritual sensibility that Oman recognised so clearly in Cairns and which was native 
to his own soul. One gets a feeling that the boldness of Oman’s theological position, 
namely that of setting personal experience of God above external authorities, may 
not have developed so quickly without first hand experience of the personal piety of 
Cairns. Oman found in Cairns a personal sense of God that was a near relation of his 
own and for Oman, like Cairns, piety and intellect are integrated in faith, with piety 
in the lead. 
With regard to academic theology, Cairns’ main published work beyond a wealth of 
pamphlet literature, are his Cunningham Lectures of 1880. He was the first 
theologian from outside the Free Church to be invited to give the lectures; lectures 
instituted by the Free Church in memory one of her foremost theologians.
49
 In the 
lectures, Cairns took up the theme of Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century: As 
contrasted with its earlier and later history.50 He displays great erudition and the 
lectures show Cairns’ encyclopaedic knowledge with regard to patristic sources, as 
well as to German and French theology. His conclusions with regard to unbelief are 
summarized as follows. 
First, there is no continuity in unbelief. “Almost nothing has been in common but the 
rejection of the supernatural. Deism, pantheism, scepticism and atheism, have all 
appeared in turns. If there has been progress, it has been from negation to negation 
more extreme;”
51
 Cairns continues: 
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The assailants of Christianity have reversed each other’s procedure, 
making each other’s denials their premises….A whole generation, a 
whole century, disowns the spirit of its precursor, which, however, 
returns, if not in the mass, in solitary instances. Hence the oblivion into 
which so much of this literature has passed.
52
 
This point highlights the importance of what Oman calls “spiritual ancestry” in 
Judeo-Christian faith in comparison with the repudiation of tradition in its critics: 
“the higher our own endeavour, the more we shall know its dependence upon the 
good and faithful”.
53
 In other words, the prophetic spirit in Christianity is a 
constructive criticism, a purifying of tradition as well as new apprehension of reality. 
Oman was at one with Cairns that theological thinking never begins with a tabula 
rasa but is contextualised; and both thinkers exhibit appreciation of the depth and 
width of tradition, though Oman took freedom in relation to tradition further than his 
teacher. 
Secondly, in Cairns’ view, Christianity has advanced in spite of all adverse 
argument. 
It was a great saying of Origen, in opening his reply to Celsus, that Paul 




Argument, for Cairns, can neither create nor destroy. “The reasonings (sic) of 
unbelievers”, he writes, “have not hindered, on a large scale the progress of 
Christianity”.
55
 One wonders, however, if Cairns was alert to the depth of alienation 
from Christianity in Victorian society. The advance of evolutionary views, higher 
criticism and pantheism had an accumulative effect that dissipated the faith of many 
Victorians. But, Cairns would not credit reason with such seductive power over the 
spiritual; and neither would he concede that rationalism is effectual as an instrument 
of spiritual renewal. He continues: 
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 “Christianity has not been saved to us in Britain mainly by the 
arguments of Butler and Sherlock; but by the slow yet sure revival that 
began to spread over the English speaking world; nor was Germany 
rescued from rationalism, in so far as it has been, merely by professors 
and theologians meeting negative criticism, but by the return of visible 




Oman, unlike Cairns, does not underestimate the power of sceptical voices and he 
did not have Cairns’ confidence that Christianity, as presently constituted, could hold 
back the tides of secularism.  For example, in The 	atural and the Supernatural, 
Oman devotes considerable space to countering theories that religion is illusion;
57
 
that said, Oman did not believe that rational argument alone could rescue faith. In the 
same volume, he wrote: “the basis of religion, whatever it may be, is not rational 
argument”.
58
 The primary thing for Oman, as with Cairns, is the encounter of God 
with the whole person, through feeling, conscience and intellect. Encounter with the 
divine puts the whole person, not merely intellect, to the test. In that respect, the 
essence of religion is more like art or poetry than rational discourse. Oman sums up 
the point as follows: 
Because religion is often studied by persons better equipped 
intellectually than religiously, this danger of introducing intellectual 
interest illegitimately is always with us. It is a danger of the same kind 
as criticism is for poetry, when it proceeds as if criticism were poetry.
59
  
Thirdly, following on from the foregoing criticism of a purely rational apologetic, 
Cairns considered that the only true defence against unbelief is the reassertion of the 
supernatural character of Christianity. “It is eminently so in connection with the 
Methodist revival in England;”
60
 and, renewed appreciation did not stop there. 
the very experience of Romanism and Tractarianism has been in the 
same direction; for it has not been merely for their hierarchical or 
ritualistic side that has given them strength against unbelief, but their 
meeting so far those wants of the soul which are rooted in the relation                                      
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Oman, similarly, emphasised supernatural reality underneath otherwise diverse 
ecclesiastical renewal. He regarded the Confessional movement in Germany and the 
High Church movement in England as a “revival of practical religion” that can not be 
merely ascribed to “intellectual constructions of Christianity”.
62
 And, like Cairns, the 
great thrust of Oman’s work was to see reality in its wholeness; theology, he 
believed, should not “isolate and divide what should be one in itself and the source of 
all unity”.
63
 Again, in this emphasis, Oman shared the conviction of his teacher. 
Cairns wrote:  
Wherever we can, by fair and legitimate interpretation, harmonise 
scripture with history, with philosophy, with science, we are not only 
warranted but bound to do so, since all truth is one, and God requires us 
to display it unbroken.
64
 
En route to his three conclusions with respect to unbelief, Cairns has much to say 
about the reality of God. If the reader sets Cairns’s views along side those of Oman 
written in the ensuing century, the lines of continuity are clear.  The central premise 
of both theologies is that God is more than a principle of reason. Cairns’ 
Cunningham Lectures reveal a theology which integrates intellect, conscience and 
heart and which is expressive of the wholeness of personality and reality. Cairns 
valued reason as an aid to experience, but it could not be a substitute for it. Oman, 
from that same starting point, developed a relational theology which was to place 
personality at the centre of Christian experience of God. The impact of the large and 
generous figure of John Cairns must surely have played a part in setting Oman’s 
thoughts in motion. 
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This section has brought into focus the stature and significance of John Cairns, the 
foremost theologian of the United Secession and United Presbyterian Churches. 
Cairns may be described as a catalyst in the change that was taking place in Scottish 
Presbyterianism. The process of liberalisation was greatest in the United Presbyterian 
denomination. Whether the process is called the erosion of Calvinism or the birth of 
evangelical catholicity, Cairns was at the centre of the transformation. He is a 
representative of the Scottish tradition of humble rural roots coupled with broad 
education. Cairns spoke from deep within tradition and brought light to it from 
without, from the whole European tradition of philosophy and theology. The piety of 
his childhood ran concurrently with his breadth of learning and he influenced the tide 
of events with his personality as much as his arguments.  
Oman’s adulation is particularly striking because it was characteristic of him not to 
put his “confidence in princes”
65
, intellectual or otherwise. Obviously, Oman found 
in Cairns a spiritual mentor who inspired him not to emulate but to grow and 
develop. Oman’s theology builds upon the person-centred focus of Cairns, stretching 
far beyond anything imagined by his mentor, yet in continuity with it. Cairns’ 
biographer comments that Cairns’ methodology was to: 
….build up, out of the data of biblical interpretation, counterchecked 
but not over ruled by Christian consciousness, a system which may 
harmonise with the philosophic spirit of the present day.
66
 
One vital difference is to be noted in Oman. In the interests of Christian freedom, it 
is Christian consciousness that takes priority over biblical data. Oman’s relationship 
with Cairns did not result in imitation but in appreciation and warmth of respect that 
did not inhibit independence of mind. That this should have been so, is a tribute to 
master and pupil alike.   
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3 Trials and Tribulations 
This section looks at the ecclesiastical trial of William Robertson Smith. It begins 
with inquiry into Smith’s background and his academic genius. Oman ascribed his 
conviction with regard to the importance of personal freedom to the impact of the 
Smith case. However, it was not the only “heresy” trial and the question arises as to 
why the Smith case should have been so singular in its influence upon Oman. 
3.1 William Robertson Smith (1846-1894) 
William Robertson Smith was born in the Free Church Manse in the Parish of Keig 
and Tough, near Alford in Aberdeenshire. His education prior to his matriculation at 
Aberdeen University was entirely at home. Both his parents were enthusiastic 
teachers. His father, William Pirie Smith, was of humble origin and was an 
apprentice wood turner before preparing for the Free Church ministry. His first call, 
and subsequent ministry, was to the newly created Parish of Keig and Tough. 
Smith’s mother, Jane née Robertson was daughter of Peter Robertson, a previous 
Rector of the University, and niece of Aberdeen artist George Giles.
67
 There were 
nine children in the family: two died in infancy and only five lived into adult years. 
William and his younger brother George were delicate in health but, nevertheless, 
won bursaries to Aberdeen in 1861; William was not quite fifteen, and George only 
thirteen years eight months. William went on to win the prestigious Ferguson 
Scholarship in Mathematics, in open competition with candidates from the then four 
Scottish universities.  Smith’s mathematics Professor encouraged him to go directly 
to Cambridge, “where all the most promising young Aberdonians habitually went.”
68
 
However, Smith’s mind was set on the Free Church ministry; and so he went to New 
College for the four year Divinity course. During this student time, his mathematical 
abilities were employed as assistant to Peter Guthrie Tait, Professor of Natural 
Science at Edinburgh University. He was also tutor in Hebrew in his final year and 
he studied in Germany during the summer semester. At this early stage in his life he 
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made “effective personal contact”
69
 with leading continental scholars; and, when the 
Chair of Hebrew and Oriental Languages became vacant at the Free Church College 
in Aberdeen, he was appointed to that post. The year was 1870; he was twenty-four 
years of age. 
A brilliant academic career, however, was soon to be blown onto the rocks of 
theological controversy. It is generally recognised that the controversy that followed 
Smith’s publication of articles in Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1875 was fanned by a 
scathing review in the Edinburgh Courant of April 1876. The Review by John 
Tulloch ((1823-1886), Established Church minister and Principal of St. Mary’s 
College St. Andrews, was at the time considered by some as an attempt to destabilise 
the Free Church. William Johnstone quotes Smith’s father, William Pirie Smith, on 
this point. Writing in his memoir he says: 
It has been asserted- and the assertion has never been called into 
question – that that(sic) Review was dictated by Ecclesiastical jealousy 
– and Principal Tulloch has admitted as much, or at any rate that the 
writing of it was a natural act of revenge for the opposition offered by 
the Free Church to some doctrines propounded by Dr. N. McLeod.
70
 
Of course, the articles Smith wrote were challenging in any event for the Free 
Church. For example, one of the central issues was the authorship of Deuteronomy. 
Was Deuteronomy a farewell address to the children of Israel? before Moses death 
and before Israel’s entry to the promised land? Or was the Book of Deuteronomy, as 
Smith argued in company with continental scholarship, a legislative programme from 
a later time? Did it in fact reflect, not the teaching of Moses, but that of the Hebrew 
prophets from the eighth and seventh centuries? Does it come from the reforms of 
the reign of King Josiah? Sadly, the Free Church could not contain the polarities 
between these questions and the traditional view of the Bible as the Holy Scripture. 
After a protracted trial lasting from 1877 to 1881, Robertson Smith was dismissed 
from his Professorial Chair. The posts he subsequently held included that of Editor in 
Chief of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Reader in Arabic in Cambridge from 1883, head 
of Cambridge University library from 1887 and Sir Thomas Adams Professor of 
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Arabic at Cambridge from 1889. He died from spinal tuberculosis in 1894; his 
brother Herbert had died of the same illness in 1887. His body was taken by train to 
Keig, and after a simple ceremony, attended by many friends he was buried in the 
Parish graveyard. The simple inscription reads: 
In memory of William Robertson Smith 
Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge 
Born 8th November 1846 
Died 31st March 1894 
Ps xxv: xiv The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him. 
If, as the early Church said, the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church; by 
analogy one can say that the tragedy of Robertson Smith was a seed as well. The 
Smith case was the “big case” that marked the end of an era. From early in the next 
century, theology and biblical studies would be no longer hostage to confessional 
constraints. Robertson Smith came at near the end of the tradition of Church based 
theology; and his tragedy was herald of a time when secularisation would ironically 
be the guardian of religious freedom. Perhaps Smith’s gravestone in Keig, without 
any reference to his time as Professor in the Free Church College, was a sign of the 
road that all academic study of theology was to take in the twentieth century.  
With regard to an assessment of Smith himself, he may best be called a conservative 
radical. For example, he had no equivocation about subscribing to the Westminster 
Confession of Faith. He refused the overture of Principal Tulloch to entice him into 
the broad Church movement of the Established Church.
71
 And, like his Old 
Testament Professor at New College, A.B. Davidson, Smith regarded himself as a 
“believing critic.” Alec Cheyne comments:  
Like Davidson before him, Smith must be ranked among the believing 
critics. That is certainly how he regarded himself….An early draft of 
his notorious Encyclopaedia Britannica  contained a frank avowal that 
his account of his biblical writings proceeded, not from rationalistic 
presumptions, but from what he called “ a recognition of the unique 
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This point finds elaboration in Smith’s Answer to the Form of Libel. There, he makes 
what Cheyne calls a “striking remark.” It is an insight into how Smith integrated his 
radical academic mind and the traditional faith he was proud to acknowledge as his 
own. 
If I am asked why I receive the Scripture as the Word of God and the 
only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the 
Protestant Church, because the Bible is the only record of the 
redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God to be 




It is, indeed, a revealing remark. It takes us to the roots of Smith’s personal faith, 
roots again prophetic of the twentieth century. Smith affirms the Scripture as the 
Word of God because of its subject matter, namely, the revelation of God in Christ. It 
is a position that has echoes of the neo-orthodox reconciliation of the transcendent 




3.2 The Robertson Smith trial: a call and commission to Oman 
The trial of Robertson Smith had many ramifications for the Church of his day and 
subsequently. Robertson Smith and his trial have been described in some detail 
because of its lasting impact on Oman as a young student in Edinburgh fresh from 
Orkney in 1877. Its effect is well documented in Oman’s work and in secondary 
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 Oman had gone to Edinburgh with the ambition to study medicine;
76
 his 
knowledge of theology was not sophisticated and his grasp of the issues in the trial of 
Robertson Smith were, in the first instance, beyond him. However, the cardinal point 
which emerged for Oman was the pursuit of truth as the primary aim of life. Oman 
was appalled to hear an elder say that “if Robertson Smith is right, if it is truth it is a 
dangerous truth, and he has no right as a professor of the Church, to upset the Church 
by declaring it”.
77
 This issue set the theological task for the rest of Oman’s life. In 
the preface to the revised edition of Vision and Authority, published in 1928, he 
commented:  
I hope I have not since weakened in my loyalty to truth, but in those 
days I thought of intellectual truth the one worthy pursuit in life: and 
this suggested that the Church was not interested in it. Had I been 
intending the ministry, probably I would have been put off it, but this 
affected me somewhat as a call to my life’s work.
78
 
Oman’s subsequent themes – the reconciliation of faith and freedom, grace as a 
nurturing relationship, the supernatural as an order of freedom, the imperative of 
honesty in religion – all of these have roots in the trauma of Robertson Smith’s trial. 
Personal freedom became for Oman the sine qua non of theological inquiry and 
fundamental to understanding God, Christ and the Church.  
3.3 David Macrae (1837-1907): a lesser case? 
One puzzle remains: the ecclesiastical trial of the Reverend David Macrae (1837-
1907).
79
 The case was being dealt with in the courts of the United Presbyterian 
Church, contemporaneous with that of Robertson Smith in the Free Church. In 1879, 
the Synod of the United Presbyterian Church voted by 288 votes to 29 that “Mr 
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Macrae should be no longer a minister of the Church”.
80
 Macrae’s request was for 
liberty to question the eschatological teaching of the Westminster Confession, in 
particular its dogmatic assertion of fixed destiny and eternal punishment of the 
wicked. Macrae “claimed the freedom to hold and to teach within the Church the 
theory of conditional immortality or that of universal restoration”.
81
 It is puzzling 
that Oman should make no mention of this case when speaking about personal 
freedom. Macrae’s views, and his appeal to the Church for the right to express them, 
undoubtedly caused heart searching amongst United Presbyterians. Cairns spoke at 
the Synod debate and stated that conditional immortality and universal restoration 
“would disturb the equilibrium of Christian theology”.
82
   
One can only speculate as to Oman’s silence with regard to Macrae, a minister of his 
own denomination. At face value, no further reason needs to be sought other than the 
contingency that it was the Robertson Smith case that gripped Oman personally and 
changed him so deeply. Or, did the scholarly and historically celebrated status of 
Robertson Smith make him a more compelling example of martyrdom to personal 
conviction? Maybe, it is significant that Robertson Smith lived the latter part of his 
short life in Cambridge; it was from there that Oman spoke about the issue in his 
Inaugural Address as Principal of Westminster College.
83
 Perhaps the issue was 
muddied by the question at stake. Oman never affirmed universalism and even 
entertained the idea of a lost soul.
84
 But, then again, the affirmation of the right of 
someone to hold a contrary opinion to one’s own is even more a test of freedom as a 
sacred principle. When Macrae is rescued from the archives of history, he stands as a 
worthy example of personal conviction courageously held.
85
 In the annals of history, 
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the story of Macrae and his fate shines as an instance of Oman’s foundational belief 
that personal conviction of truth matters above all else. Truth is no respecter of 
persons and always comes at a cost; it would have added to, and not detracted from, 
Oman’s championing of personal freedom had he made mention of Macrae. 
Summary 
This excursion into the question of heresy trials in the nineteenth century illustrates 
how difficult the Presbyterian Churches found it to reconcile faith and freedom. The 
existence of denominations is, in fact, illustrative of Oman’s insistence that freedom 
cannot be corralled in institutions. Religious freedom, the gift of the Reformation and 
radicalised at the Enlightenment, could not be put into the old wines skins of 
Christendom. Presbyterianism dealt with the issue of individual assertions of 
conscience through its courts; but, by that means alone it did not come to a resolution 
of the matter. From great scholars like Robertson Smith to more doctrinally 
heterodox, but sincere, ministers such as Macrae, the question of freedom and belief 
cried out for reconciliation. Oman found a call in listening to the Smith case in 
Edinburgh; a call not just to study for the ministry, but a call to total endeavour of 
heart and mind to think through the impasse between the competing claims of 
freedom and faith. The way through would emerge from a new, relational 
understanding of divine-human relationships. Oman’s solution recognised freedom, 
no less than faith, as a divine gift to be valued and an opportunity to glorify God. 
This section has shown that the agenda for Oman’s theology of personal freedom 
grew out of empathy with the personal agony and fate of Robertson Smith, a martyr 
in the cause of intellectual freedom and commitment to the path of truth wherever 
that should lead. The hinterland to Oman’s theology does not begin, however, with 
his experience of the Robertson Smith trial; it stretches back to an Orkney childhood 
and the impressions of an island, rural, adolescence. 
4 Orkney Roots 
From the macro parameters of denominations and their concerns, it is illuminating to 
turn to the micro picture of Oman’s roots in Orkney. It was in Orkney that Oman was 




that he had a striking experience of the numinous at the standing stones at Stenness. 
Much later he would connect it, though critically, with Otto’s concept of the non-
rational element in religion. He wrote: 
When a boy of fourteen or thereabouts, I was riding through the 
Standing stones of Stenness on a winter afternoon when dusk was 
settling into darkness……The close-cropped heather cracked under my 
horses feet, the loch on the right was shining under the glow of sunset 
and the loch on the left was almost to blackness, and across the bay the 
gravestones in the churchyard stood white and clear above it. The circle 
of stones had the look of giants against the grey sky……a more 
numinous scene at a more numinous hour, could not have been found 
on earth. And the feeling which struck me is not inaptly described as 
the mysterium tremendum et fascinans.
86
 
Nor was this an isolated incident; Oman had a sensitivity to the numinous that may 
even be termed habitual. In the 	atural and the Supernatural he writes: 
I had been to church. I think the preacher had been expressing the 
absolute difference between good and evil under the material forms of 
heaven and hell. I went down to the edge of the water alone, and stood, 
a very small child, with the full tide at my feet. Along the smooth 
waters of the sound a path of sunshine carried the eye out to the open 
sea. It flashed upon me that if I dropped in and floated out, with endless 
sea around, I should be alone for ever and ever.
87
 
To understand Oman the theologian, therefore, his Orkney roots are essential, 
especially with regard to his understanding of religion as apprehension of reality 
mediated through the senses. He would later, with Hume, come to understand that 
religion as an essential element in human nature and with Schleiermacher come to a 
deeper understanding of the religious consciousness. However, rational 
sophistication came later; for Oman, it could never be a substitute for elemental 
experience. Oman’s mystic sensibility stirred amongst a windswept environment of 
the sea and land was the starting point for a spiritual and intellectual journey. 
When Oman spoke of Orkney, he always did so with deep fondness and with 
humour. Stephen Bevans recounts his family circumstances. Oman was the second of 
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six children, four sons and two daughters.
88
 His father Simon was captain of the mail 
boat to the mainland and farmed a small holding as well. Oman dedicated his Kerr 
Lectures, Faith and Freedom, to his father “a scholar only of life and action but my 
best teacher”.
89
 Local archives in Orkney show that Oman’s father was involved in at 
least in one incident of bravery whilst at sea, rescuing passengers from an emigrant 
ship. A contemporary account reads: 
Captain Oman of the Royal Mail brought his steamer near the wreck of 
the 250 ton emigrant ship the Albion, a small boat unfortunately 
swamped as it reached the steamer, only 4 out of 15 rescued – the rest 
of the stricken vessel reached safety.
90
 
However, the nuclear family was only a part of his formative experience. In a short 
paper entitled “The Orkneys”, Oman recalled life in a rounded way, noting 
geography, history, language and folk customs as well as religious practice. The 
paper is undated, though it must stem from the early years of the twentieth century as 
Oman remarks: “there are only two ways of arriving, either via the Pentland Forth, 
some fifteen miles, from Shetland, a hundred miles north, unless the air-ship prove a 
third”. He adds: there was an alternative as every child knew: “your father or the 
doctor found you at low-water amongst the sea weed”.
91
 Folklore was part and parcel 
of his early life. He knew “an old woman” recently deceased “who saw six fairies, 
less (in size) than new born babes, dressed in white with a red stripe down the front, 
dancing on a sunny broch”. Oman smiles: “I am told that the fairies left because they 
could not tolerate the malt tax”.
92
  Weddings lasted all night and “home brewed ale 
was passed around in huge wooden cogs with three upright handles or lugs and 
nothing else is proper”.
93
 The minister always came to these events which were 
accompanied by the firing of pistols and fiddle playing.  
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The religious life of Orkney in Oman’s formative years seems to have been 
congenial to an earthy humanity, far removed from the myth of a straight-laced 
Calvinism. Round the coast from the Old Man of Hoy, a householder had a sore loss: 
 His wife and his cow were blown off the cliff together. Some months 
after wards the minister met him and proceeded to console him upon his 
loss. “Deed Sir” was the disconcerting reply, “as yae hae often said, but 
I never understood it as well before, the ways of Providence are 
wonderful. When the wife and the coo were blown over the cliff I 
thought I had a sair sure loss, but I gaed over to Graemsay and there I 
got a fair bonnier wife and a coo that is far better”.
94
 
Oman’s great grandfather, John Wood, whose name carried down to Oman, was “the 
last man to wear a long waistcoat and silver buckles on his shoes” and a firm 
supporter of “all things established” including the established Church in Stromness.
95
 
The minister of the established Church, Mr Clouston, was Oman comments, “a very 
original character” having “four sermons which appeared like the phases of the 
moon”.
96
 On the island of Harry, the parish minister, Mr Johnstone would ask “is it 
advisable to have an evening service?” He would then announce the singing of three 
verses of Psalm 119 and address an elder in his pew saying: “We will go out and 
look!” Once outside the elder would gaze widely around the heavens and say, “Weel 
Sir! It’s not looking good at all; that is an ugly cloud over Hoy”;
97
 and so, there was 
no evening service! These stories, no doubt spiced with poetic licence, reveal Oman 
in time and place, a living link with a lost world. It is interesting that Oman had 
family connections to the established Church. Perhaps most people had: the three 
strands of Presbyterianism – the established, the Free and the Secession –were of 
equal strength in the archipelago which had a total population of 32,000
98
 at the time 
of Oman’s writing. In a reflective mood, Oman commented on the impact of the 
Secession in the eighteenth century.  










 Orkney was obviously a more populous place in the late nineteenth century. The population in 2007 




The Secession not only created a genuine religious movement in those 
it attracted to itself but gave a great stimulus to the established Church 








4.1 The United Secession Church in Orkney 
The minutes of Presbytery and Synod of the United Secession Church reveal a 
denomination with concerns both spiritual and social. For example, the minutes of 
Orkney Presbytery reveal a call to prayer for mission at home and abroad.  
The clerk read a call to prayer from the Foreign Mission Board 
earnestly inviting ministers, office bearers and members of the Church 
at home and abroad to unite in earnest prayer that God would at the 
present time fulfil his promises by granting a fresh baptism of the Spirit 
both to the Church at home and to workers and concerts in the mission 
field proposing that the week beginning Sabbath 17
th




Obviously, prayer for a week reflects strength of faith and devotion. The Presbytery 
also held regular conference days devoted to what might be called practical religion. 
The minutes of 1888 record the details of a conference on preaching and, later in the 
year, at “Lammas”, on the work of the Church. The schedule for the latter was as 
follows: 
• A meeting of prayer on Monday 8.00pm 
• Conference proper on Tuesday at 11.00am 
• Evangelistic meeting on Tuesday at 8.00 pm 
• Subjects for Conference:  
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• The state of religion in our congregations 
• The work of the Church at home and abroad 
• The care of the young 
• The work of an elder 
• All elders, managers, Sunday School teachers, collectors and 
other workers shall be invited to attend and take part and any 
members who please to come.
102
 
Broader issues also concerned the Presbytery. The minutes reflect the deep 
conviction of the Seceder tradition that Church and state should be totally separate. 
Thus, with respect to the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland a lengthy 
resolution was past, “earnestly disapproving of the national establishment of the 
Church of Ireland”. The resolution continued: “the establishment of Episcopacy in 
Ireland was a great error…it has been the source of numberless calamities ….and has 
kept up a rankling sense of injustice amongst the mass of the Irish people and evoked 
a spirit of disloyalty and rebellion”.
103
Presbytery was on the winning side of history, 
the Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1870. The Regium Donum was 
simultaneously withdrawn from Presbyterian ministers in Ireland. It had been 
provided by William III as a counter poise to the Anglican establishment. The 
Presbytery of Orkney had, also, called for the Regium Donum’s discontinuation. 
Interestingly, the ministers of the Secession Church in Ireland had compromised and 
accepted the royal patronage.
104
 In any event, the picture the minutes give is of a 
Church alert to national issues and ever willing to advance its own view of relations 
between Church and state. 
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Germane to Oman’s religious background in Orkney is the question of the 
procedures followed with regard to his call to the ministry. Oman was accepted as a 
student for the ministry in 1882 and in the following years, through to 1885, the 
Presbytery gave him “intersessional (sic) exercises”.
105
 These exercises indicate the 
seriousness with which the United Presbyterian Church took ministerial calling. 
Exercises included exegesis of scripture, preaching, examination in doctrine and 
maturity of personal religion. Oman’s exercises for trial in 1885 are illustrative of the 
point. They are listed as: 
• Personal Religion 
• Theology – Regeneration 
• Lecture – Romans 12: 1-2 
• Homily –John 8: 31- 32 
• Popular Sermon – 1st Timothy 1:15 
• Exercise with address – 1sr Corinthians 2: 9-11 
• Thesis: Is God knowable? 
Given Oman’s latter contribution to theology, these are interesting subjects. If one 
were to select a group of texts to illustrate the spiritual realism of Oman’s mature 
theological perspective, these would be suitable for inclusion. The personal nature of 
faith, renewal of the mind, the relation of truth to freedom, the existential 
significance of the work of Christ, the transcendence of God and the crowning 
question, is God knowable? Certainly there are lines of continuity from Oman’s 
United Presbyterian heritage to his later emphasis on the personal nature of spiritual 
reality. It would be wonderful had a record of Oman’s responses remained extant. No 
record is extant. Oman transferred to Edinburgh Presbytery in 1886 “with a note of 
his trials for licence”. In Edinburgh a range of influences open up. Oman would 
come under the influence of his spiritual mentor Principal John Cairns and his 
Professor of Moral philosophy and United Presbyterian minister, Henry Calderwood, 
would encourage him to take up translation of Schleiermacher. 
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4.2 Victoria Street Congregation 
Robert Small in his History of the Congregations of the United Presbyterian Church 
1733-1900 106 portrays a history of the Secession in Orkney with many twists and 
turns. For example, in the parish of Orphir a minister was inducted to the Church of 
Scotland in 1746; the people resisted and the Church was shut down. Nothing 
happened for twelve months and then the Presbytery made a second attempt to induct 
the minister, with the aid of a troop of soldiers brought over from Caithness. The 
troops were to deal with any repeat of the protest. Sadly, one woman was killed and 
several people were injured.
107
 The Secession Church in Orkney survived these 
turbulent years and became the largest of the three Presbyterian denominations.  
In 1803, money was collected to build a Church in Stromness; Victoria Street was 
selected and in 1805 the work began; in 1806 the Congregation had 30 
Communicants and two Elders; the congregation was then erected as a separate 
Congregation from Kirkwall. Yet growth was not rapid given the population of the 
town. The first minister, Andrew Wylie, was ordained in 1809 into a fellowship with 
17 members and 160 adherents. But by 1837 the second minister, William Stobbs, 
reported 544 communicants of whom 60 were from the Parish of Stenness and 37 
from Orphir. He was Superintendant of a Sabbath evening school with an attendance 
of 310 and his monthly prayer meeting had about 200-300 present.
108
 An interesting 
aside to this early history of the congregation is the fact that of Mr Stobbs’ family: 
one son joined the ministry of the Established Church and another son attended the 
United Presbyterian Theological Hall, but “became incapacitated for study.” A third 
son was certified for study at the Hall in 1861; but attended for only one Session, 
before also joining the ministry of the Church of Scotland. Yet these changes in 
loyalty did not seem to have any detrimental effect on their father’s ministry, or in 
the affection with which he was held. It is a further instance of a breadth of charity 
that seems to have characterised Oman’s early experience of organised religion; and, 
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perhaps, not an insignificant fact in his reaction to the polemic and rancour that 
confronted the “island lad” in Edinburgh with the Robertson Smith affair. Indeed, 
one might even see the charity of his youthful environment as a factor in his later 
championing of personality, freedom and conscience. 
The Victoria Street congregation provided Oman with spiritual nurture, through 
worship and Sabbath School. Oman’s baptism is recorded as follows: 
John Wood Oman, son of Simon Oman and Isabella Rendall.  
Occupation of father Proprietor, Biggins, Parish of Stenness 
August 26
th 
1860  by Mr Stobbs.
109
 
The day of the week was a Sunday, so it might be assumed that the baptism took 
place at worship, “before the congregation”. Oman’s father, Simon, was elected an 
elder in the congregation in 1878; however, he declined to take up the call. The 
Session minute reads; 
[The elders elect] appeared one by one before the Session who dealt 
with them one by one as to their soundness of piety and soundness in 
the faith and principles of the Church and, also, their acceptance of the 




In the event, three of the five men elected by the congregation accepted the call. 
Perhaps, one could take Simon Oman’s decline of the call to be an example of the 
independence of mind that Oman admired.  
In other matters, the Kirk Session minutes reflect in miniature the mixture of piety 
and social concern that was evidenced in the minutes of the Presbytery and Synod. 
For example, members appear before the Session for quarrelsome conduct with 
fellow members, sharp business practice and for attending Plymouth Brethren 
services. Denial of “the privileges of communion” was the common sanction, usually 
followed by restoration. Discipline over sexual matters was not common. In an 
instant in 1867 of a “concealment of pregnancy”, the case was to be “kindly dealt 
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with by the moderator”.
111
 On a totally different front, the Kirk Session agreed to 
“grant a congregational meeting and collection in aid of emancipated slaves in North 
America whose claims will be advocated by a deputation of students from the 
Theological Hall Missionary Society”.
112
 Piety and social concern stretching near 
and far were the two hallmarks of United Presbyterianism in Orkney. 
4.3 Oman’s appreciation of his roots 
Oman himself always spoke appreciatively of his religious upbringing, observing 
that influences from childhood and early life can never be fully measured, even by an 
individual himself. This would have been true, no doubt, with regard to the effects 
and intensity of congregational life in a small, homogeneous, community. 
Where people live so close to one another as they do in such places as 
Stromness, perhaps the personal influence which goes forth from a 
congregation can never be known till the consummation of all things. 
But that influence is the great matter. How many of us will carry the 
mark of it to the day we die? 
113
   
Oman was writing in 1906, in a volume of essays that marked the centenary of 
Victoria Street United Free Church, Stromness. He confessed that the name did not 
come easily to him for in his early years it had been the United Presbyterian or, 
colloquially, the “Secession” congregation. Oman was three years of age when Mr 
Stobbs died but he gives an interesting insight into how the minister of 34 years in 
the Congregation was long remembered. He writes. 
Of Mr Stobbs I heard more than any other person in the world. There 
was an old fashioned portrait of him, too, with white hair standing up, 
and something of the potentate and the parent in his face, seen in many 
houses to make him a reality.
114
 
Oman continued, “perhaps there was some austerity” though this was understandable 
in the light of the times. 
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When one thinks of Stromness of those days, with its harbour solid with 
storm stayed vessels, and its many public-houses full of sailors, the 
dancing and amusements upon which the Session frowned did perhaps 
lead to dangers requiring stern measures. In any case, there was 
mingled with the awe a very sincere regard and even affection for a 
minister who did watch for souls as one who must give account.
115
 
As Oman continues, one recalls Stephen Bevans remark that Oman was “a 
theologian between two centuries”,
116
 he embodied both Victorian values and   
modern sensitivities. Oman was in touch with a diverse inner landscape. When he 
recalled Orkney, the Orkney of his upbringing, he was not remembering history per 
se, it was a folk memory that was part of his soul. He dipped into a collective 
consciousness that brought even the distant past into remarkable focus. Take his 
recollections of Congregational life:  
I have some kind of memory of disturbed thoughts about the use of a 
gown, of some dissatisfaction with shaving, and a lengthy series of 
discourses on the Heroes of the Faith.
117
 
These events occurred during the ministry of James Nesbit, from 1865 to 1874, when 
Oman was a child and barely a teenager. He speaks with the same sense of 
familiarity about the ministry of the first minister, Andrew Wylie, who was there in 
the Congregation of Stromness from 1809-1826. It is worth repeating this lengthy 
quotation as an illustration of Oman’s living sense of the past. 
I can never make out whether Mr Wylie was a preacher or not, but his 
influence must have been very wonderful. He began his work amidst all 
the evils which accompanied the French wars, when dissent and treason 
were regarded as very much the same thing, when there was a very 
rough element in the town and feeling was very bitter.
118
 
This was in the time of his grandparents. 
In spite of that, he not only built up a large congregation, but I 
remember being told of how the worst of women in the town, and the 
war had done a great deal to make them worse than they were,  
mourned his loss. The people who were young when he died, and old 
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Even allowing for the nostalgia that the occasion stirred (the centenary celebrations 
of the Congregation) it is remarkable how vivid the past remained in his present. 
In Oman’s adult years in the Stromness congregation the quality of the preaching 
made a lasting impression. Of the ministers who knew in his adult life, he begged 
indulgence to “speak with the disrespect of a contemporary”.
120
 In effect he pays a 
compliment. Of David Woodside, minister from 1881 to 1885, he says: 
To this day I have not ceased to admire the dogged energy with which 




He speaks of Thomas Simpson, 1894-1901, the first minister of the United Free 
Church, in a similar vane. 
A more honest and direct person …both in the pulpit and out of it, 




In these comments we have echoes of the values Oman sought to impart to his own 
students later, in his lectures on practical theology. The spiritual impact of elders, 
too, comes in for praise.  
No institution, I believe, was ever served with more faithfulness, 
ability, and weight of character than the Presbyterian church by the 




To this there is an important caveat. 
…it was only the men who decided things. But the highest and most 
beautiful life of the church seems to me to have been enshrined not in 
the men, but in the women. When people talk of the severity of the 
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Presbyterian religion, I always think of the old ladies, perhaps 
especially the old maiden ladies, in the U.P. Kirk in Stromness.
124
 
He gives examples again of childhood memories of “these very gracious old 
gentlewoman,” recollections which came back to him “like the scent of clover across 
the sea”.
125
 Oman’s relation to his spiritual roots in Victoria Street Congregation 
seems to have been one that nurtured natural affection, gratitude and enquiring faith. 
Summary  
This journey to Orkney has taught many things about Oman. It was by the Standing 
Stones of Stenness that, as a youth, he experienced the numinous in a powerful way; 
it was the vast expanse of sea and water that stirred his sense of infinity. From 
earliest experience, the natural intimated the supernatural and the finite the infinite. 
Oman’s sense of the uniqueness of personality was, also, Orkney born. His childhood 
was peopled with characters, earthy and individual, unselfconscious and natural in 
their humanity. Oman’s reminiscences dispel the myth of a Calvinistic straight jacket 
and dreary conformity. The Presbytery minutes of the United Secession Church, and 
the later United Presbyterian Church, reveal both a deep piety and a broad social 
concern. There is the element of discipline; but, it may be argued, its object is 
pastoral more than social control. Oman spoke fondly of his upbringing in Victoria 
Street Congregation of the United Presbyterian Church, especially of the women. His 
experience could not contrast more markedly than with that of George Mackay 
Brown, brought up in the same congregation but with a bitter sense of alienation.
126
 
The ministers, the elders, the women ministered to Oman the love of God. He was 
not blind to their imperfections; but, the failure of human nature was the occasion for 
compassion. If one were to look for the influence of grace upon personality, in 
keeping with the relational ways that Oman was to understand it in his later theology, 
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one might well turn to the accounts of his Orkney childhood and young life. Orkney, 
for Oman, was peopled with personality, with souls living in the half light, where the 
ordinariness of earth reflects the splendour of heaven. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has located Oman’s theology in the context of the ecclesiastical and 
religious mosaic that was late Victorian Scotland. Orkney roots, the nurture of the 
United Presbyterian Church, the personal influence of John Cairns, the intellectual 
awakening of the Robertson Smith case; all these contributed to the shape of Oman’s 
theology. From these contexts emerged the ongoing themes characteristic of Oman’s 
work.  
First, the issue of freedom, so hotly debated in nineteenth century Scottish 
Presbyterianism, was a backdrop to Oman’s theology of grace and personality. Oman 
grew up in an ecclesiastical and theological environment where the issues of freedom 
and faith were part of national debate. In time, Oman would argue that faith and 
freedom complement each other in a relational experience of grace and in the 
personal nature of reality, God’s reality and ours.  
Secondly, the priority of experience over intellectualisation began with Oman’s 
Orkney childhood where he felt a sense of the numinous. It is not that, as a child, 
Oman could explain his experience of otherness and infinity; indeed, it is central to 
Oman’s epistemology that he did not rationally comprehend; he experienced in the 
first instance and explanation came later. Oman, as a theologian, would subordinate 
the Bible, doctrine and the Church to the immediacy of personal encounter; one 
wonders if the confidence for such radicalism was inspired by a wholesome spiritual 
nurture. It may well have been that in Oman’s experience of family, Church and 
community, love was first, and everything else was given its place.  
Thirdly, Oman’s ambiguous relationship to institutions, at once fearful of their power 
and acknowledging of their necessity, was coloured by first-hand experience of what 
the misuse of power can do to individuals who transgress institutional norms. The 




Oman. The impact of the heresy trial may even have been atavistic, triggering a folk 
memory of the poor people of Orphir who suffered –some to the point of death – at 
the hands of dictatorial ecclesiastical power. In any event, the effect was that Oman’s 
ecclesiology always set freedom above Church authority. This principle would give 
Oman’s ecclesiology a distinctive shape, always tending towards the ideal though 
never leaving the empirical behind.  
Fourthly, the theme of personal freedom had many strands in its making. A relaxed 
spiritual upbringing, the shock of the Robertson Smith trial, the person-centred 
approach of Cairns: all combined to reinforce what was an instinct in Oman’s soul. 
In his island environment, Oman breathed an atmosphere were freedom had to be 
won in the face of danger at sea and toil on land; it was no abstract freedom, nor was 
faith its enemy. On the contrary, Oman experienced life in a community where faith 
was the ground and support of human endeavour and where reliance upon God 
nourished the love and courage vital to human survival, physically, emotionally and 
spiritually. Oman’s idea of personal freedom was distinct from neo-liberal autonomy; 
it was a freedom carved out of the hardship of ordinary living. The ongoing 
intellectual journey from Orkney would be by way of two vital milestones: one 
philosophical and the other theological. It was as a student of philosophy in 
Edinburgh that Oman found that his philosophy teachers had an intellectual concern 
for personal freedom as an aspect of metaphysics. In his philosophical education, 
Oman was given the tools to expand his thinking and to come to clarity about his 
primary intuitions. The philosophical vision Oman found carried him forward to his 
second milestone, a theological appropriation of European intellectual traditions 
from the Reformation to the twentieth century. The next chapter takes up the first 





Oman and Scottish Philosophical Traditions 
Introduction 
In the nineteenth century, the hinterlands of religion and Scottish philosophy were 
part of a single intellectual landscape. David Boucher comments in his monograph, 
The Scottish Idealists: 
Scottish idealism was immensely spiritual in character and recognised 
no hard and fast distinctions between philosophy, poetry and science.
1
 
The Scottish realist tradition was, also, essentially spiritual. Thomas Reid regarded 
the mind’s ability to grasp first principles and “to judge those things that are self 
evident” as “purely the gift of heaven”.
2
 Reid’s philosophical realism proved to be an 
intellectual helpmate to faith not least in America, through the influence of James 
McCosh.
3
  However, by the mid-nineteenth Scottish philosophy was increasingly 
diverse in its interests and perspectives. Gordon Graham in his, Scottish Philosophy, 
1690-1960, points out that John Veitch, in Glasgow, took philosophy in a literary and 
cultural direction; Alexander Bain, in Aberdeen, pursued a rigorous empiricism 
laying the foundation for modern psychology; Thomas Chalmers, in St Andrews, 
explored the philosophical roots of social responsibility.
4
 Nor was Edinburgh exempt 
from change, though it took the form of evolution rather than a radical overturn of 
tradition. The Welsh idealist philosopher, Henry Jones,
5
 had commented: 
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Hegelianism “sits enthroned on every famous river in this island except the Forth”.
6
 
In support of Jones’s contention, one need only recall the remarks of Henry 
Calderwood in his Inaugural Lecture on taking up the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 
1866. Calderwood expressed the hope that through his “privileged position” he 
would “render some important service to the truth” to the “Scottish Philosophy”, “the 
philosophy of this land”.
7
 However, by the early twentieth century, Alexander 
Campbell Fraser and Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison had moved considerably from 
realism to a spiritual realism and personal idealism respectively. It was into this 
changing environment that Oman came in 1877 to read philosophy. He arrived aged 
seventeen, a mere “raw lad from the ends of the earth, with little equipment except a 
vast responsiveness to the intellectual environment”.
8
 
This is, perhaps, a good point to acknowledge the difficulty of contextualising 
Oman’s thinking, either in philosophy or theology. A characteristic of his work is 
that it is free-standing. He gives a vision rather than a map with co-ordinates. In The 
	atural and the Supernatural, he explains the reasons for this approach. It is not that 
“he wants undue credit for originality by ignoring his intellectual ancestors”. 
9
 It is, 
rather, that he thinks the proper place for names and sources is a text-book, and he 
even recommends one – George Galloway’s The Philosophy of Religion,10 where “a 
long list of authorities is given with learning and discrimination”.
11
 The reader of 
Oman, in consequence, has to do homework to establish the text beneath the text, to 
see what sources contributed to his thinking. With this caveat in mind, this chapter 
will examine the contributions to Oman’s thinking of the two prominent streams of 
Scottish philosophy, realism and personal idealism. 
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Themes in outline 
The first section examines the lines of continuity between Oman and some of the 
philosophers in the realist tradition. Calderwood, the most consistent realist, 
emphasised the importance of “person” in moral philosophy and this has clear echoes 
in Oman’s use of the term. Campbell Fraser explored the idea of the universe as a 
spiritual reality, the medium for the divine-human dialogue. Both Fraser and Oman 
have a philosophical forbear in Berkeley, particularly in their understanding of nature 
as a system of divine symbols. Fraser, though starting from a realist position, sought 
to encompass the idealist insight that reality is fundamentally spiritual. There is 
something of the eclecticism that is characteristic of Fraser found in Oman as well. 
From Calderwood and Fraser the chapter moves to the philosophy of John Veitch, a 
consistent and tenacious opponent of Hegelianism. The striking emphasis in Veitch 
upon the holy, the mediating power of nature and the priority of experience over 
rationalisation makes for an obvious comparison with Oman. 
In section two, the focus is on personal idealism. Whereas Scottish realism may be 
characterised as an antecedent influence; it was the old, established, philosophical 
tradition in Edinburgh. Personal idealism was a relatively more recent phenomenon: 
taking shape late in the nineteenth century and coming to maturity in the early 
twentieth. Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison, more than any other in Scotland, gave 
personal idealism its shape, writing some of its seminal texts.
12
 Also in the personal 
idealist tradition was William Ritchie Sorley. His focus was on the moral aspect of 
reality and of personality. Sorley was contemporary with Oman at Cambridge and 
their work reveals important similarities and differences.  
Throughout, the chapter will compare and contrast Oman with his teachers and his 
contemporaries. In particular, the chapter will posit that Oman’s settled, or mature 
philosophical, context is amongst the philosophers of personality prominent at the 
end of the 1st World War. Oman, it will be argued, takes the theme of personality 
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and gives it a theological underpinning; he is in that respect both a child of his 
context and a creative thinker whose mind ranges freely across the common 
landscape of philosophy and theology. In conclusion, it will be noted that personal 
freedom is a recurrent theme in the philosophers reviewed. Oman’s central concern 
with personal freedom was, therefore, not held in isolation; it was part of the 
philosophical environment in which he did his creative thinking. 
1 Scottish Realists: Calderwood, Fraser and Veitch 
1.1 Henry Calderwood 
Henry Calderwood was born in Peebles in 1830 and was Professor of Moral 
Philosophy from 1866 until his death in 1896. Oman’s friendship with Calderwood 
extended beyond his student days; and he paid tribute to Calderwood in the latter’s 
biography.
13
 Both were ministers in the United Presbyterian Church. However, it is 
with respect to Oman’s thinking on personality, and what it means to be a person, 
that we are able to observe the proximity of their thought. In Grace and Personality, 
Oman defines personality in fundamentally moral terms – a moral person is “self-
determined, according to his own self-direction, in the world of his own self-
consciousness”.
14
 There is a mantra-like quality about this definition: self-
determined, according to our own self-direction, in our own world of self-
consciousness. Where does it come from? It is when we turn to Calderwood’s Hand-
book of Moral Philosophy that we find Oman’s source. Calderwood’s Hand-book 
was first published in 1872; it had run to its sixteenth edition and 14,000 copies by 
1888. It was a text-book for students of philosophy and widely used as such. 
Calderwood’s definition of personality reads: 
Man is self-conscious, intelligent, self-determining power –a Person, 
not merely living Organism, not a mere Thing, Personality involves 
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Here is a definition of personhood, in essentials the same as Oman’s. Personality is 
grounded in self-consciousness, shaped by self-directed intelligence and issues in 
self-determined activity. In Calderwood’s subsequent digressions there is a rejection 
of deterministic theories of personality, either naturalistic or Hegelian. Positively, 
there is a Kantian affirmation of the centrality of will and of the unity of personality. 
In a person, will, intellect and consciousness cannot be compartmentalised. He 
writes: 
Intellect is knowing power. Will is controlling power. These two are so 
related that the one presupposes the other. The phenomenon of 




Likewise with Oman, when he moves from self-determination to self-direction, he 




In Oman’s writing, however, the concept of personality does not remain static. In 
that respect, we have a contrast with Calderwood. For Calderwood, principles of 
morality are intuitive and self evident; conscience could err only in application, but 
not in principle, and Kant’s categorical imperative has the force of universal law. 
With Oman, however, by the time he writes The 	atural and the Supernatural, his 
concept of person is set in an evolutionary paradigm. He argues for a morality that is 
inspirational, ever reaching out to new insight, ever climbing new heights. Human 
beings develop in moral awareness and, therefore, the person can transcend the moral 
maxims characteristic of older intuitionalism. Oman writes: 
By what a man is he perceives what he should be…we thus, as it were, 
rise up on the stepping stones of our dead selves to higher things
18
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Accordingly, conscience, though sacred, may err and needs continual education; 
furthermore, the categorical imperative is inadequate to meet “the clamour of 
appetite and desire.” The categorical imperative “could only rule them if they are 
well chilled already”.
19
 Thus the moral person is not free, but is being made free, 
through living in a higher environment. “We cannot be strong to do anything without 
a wide atmosphere to breathe in…” 
20
 This is the atmosphere of the supernatural, or, 
in terms of Oman’s earlier work, the atmosphere of grace. 
In Grace and Personality, Oman’s great imaginative contribution was to hold 
together the autonomy necessary for the moral aspect of personality and the 
dependence on Divine aid that is characteristic of religious personality. The 
autonomy of self – self-determination, self-direction, self-consciousness – finds 
redemption from the dangers of introspection and self-centeredness in a dialogue of 
grace. Grace, for Oman, is essentially a relational, nurturing experience. It is an I-
Thou relationship that aids personality to make a journey of self-realisation, under 
God or, more particularly, with God.  
Interestingly, Calderwood in a short chapter on “Morality and its relation to 
Religion” affirms that the moral life is also the blessed life.   
The religious life and the moral life are thus essentially one, for we 
yield true homage to the author of our being when we use our whole 




So, whilst writing from the perspective of the older intuitionalism, Calderwood too 
believed that moral maxims and religion combine in personality. As observed, the 
view that the religious life and a moral life are essentially one –and vitalised in 
personal character – is a good description of how Oman understood the outcome of 
grace in the human sphere.   
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1.2 Alexander Campbell Fraser 
The second of Oman’s teachers, Alexander Campbell Fraser, was the father of 
Scottish philosophy in Edinburgh at the turn of the nineteenth century. Born in 1818, 
Fraser’s life spanned that of four monarchs. He saw Queen Victoria come and go; he 
knew an old woman in his native Argyll who had been an eye witness to events at 
Culloden. He was born a son of the manse and his father came out at the Disruption. 
Fraser studied at New College, hoping to fulfil a call to the Free Church ministry. 
However, his destiny was to be in the field of philosophy. His life was not without 
stress. So troubled was his mind as a student that he was “environed in deepest 
darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every faculty”.
22
 He found solace in 
Descartes and rested in the principle of moderation. Of opinions, he wrote, “the most 
moderate are probably the best, since extremes are commonly erroneous”.
23
  
Fraser describes the most significant encounter of his life as being with Sir William 
Hamilton. He writes: “I owe more to Hamilton than to any other influence”.
24
 The 
Edinburgh Town Councillors, who were the benefactors of the Chair of Philosophy, 
did not permit Hamilton to teach a “useless” subject like metaphysics. And so, Fraser 
was part of a select group that attended a metaphysics class at Hamilton’s home in 
the evening. It must have been a stimulating time. Fraser, however, was not a blind 
follower of Hamilton and went on to edit Locke’s Essay, as well Berkeley’s works.  
These studies moved his thinking in the direction of a type of personal idealism, or 
what he preferred to call “spiritual realism.” However, it was in his Gifford Lectures 
of 1894-96, published as Philosophy of Theism, that he gave an apologia for theistic 
faith. 
In the themes Fraser lays out in his Gifford lectures, we find a perspective that 
carries through to Oman. Take, for example, the terms “natural” and “supernatural”: 
Fraser uses these to describe reality in its two-fold aspect of material and spiritual.  
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The complex order of nature is God speaking to us. The elaborate web, 
weaved according to laws of natural connection, is a means to an end of 
its being a revelation to us of each other and of God. Living in and 
through his order, we are living in and through his active providence; in 
a process that may be without beginning, and may persist without end – 
at once natural and supernatural – outward nature significant of super-
nature with which it is animated.”
25
 
Like Oman, Fraser held that the natural world and the supernatural could not be 
understood apart from each other. Both appealed to Berkeley who posited that the 
physical world is a system of signs that mediate the transcendent. Much later, Oman 
would write: 
Berkeley has not been wrong in thinking, as one of his critics expressed 
it, that sense experience has the intelligibility of language whose 
conventions are one and all determined by a spirit akin to our own; and 
his argument against matter without meaning is valid to this day.
26
  
It is in this last point – namely, that reality is fundamentally personal and meaningful 
– that Fraser’s perspective was anticipatory of Oman’s. Fraser uses a striking phrase: 
the Creator is “on speaking terms with humanity”. Speaking is the operative word. 
Consciousness is not, as with neo-Hegelianism, a mere unfolding of cosmic reason. 
God can speak through the created order because, argues Fraser, that order is both 
natural and supernatural and virtually personal. It is because our human experience is 
personal that we can ascribe the attributes of personality to God. Our deepest 
relationship to one another is ethical trust; and our relationship to the universe is one 
where we trust its laws and rationality. So, asks Fraser: 
does this not mean that the universe is virtually personal, for us a 
revelation of a person rather than a Thing?....this practically means that 
our deepest relation to reality is ethical not physical: that personality 
rather than thingness is the highest form under which man can perceive 
God. This is the final moral personification, or religious conception, of 
the universe of experience.
27
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As well as reality being personal, the universe was also for both writers essentially 
spiritual.  In The 	atural and the Supernatural Oman could write of atoms: “for 
aught that it (physics) can show, they may think”.
28
 And mind, Oman argued, may 
reasonably be taken as the presupposition of evolutionary processes, rather than the 
end result. “The mind by which we know everything, science included,” is “first in 
principle”.
29
 This view of reality resonates with Fraser’s phrase: “conscious life is the 
light of the world”.
30
 For Fraser, matter, apart from perception, is an unrealisable 
abstraction.   
The sciences themselves – physical, chemical and biological – exist 
only in and through the conscious activity of a person; so that it is 




In this subjective idealism, or “spiritual realism”,
32
 there is a shared perspective.  In 
their distinction between the natural and the supernatural, in their emphasis on the 
personal nature of reality and in the centrality of mind in their metaphysics, Fraser 
and Oman may be termed kindred spirits. 
1.3 John Veitch 
Probably the most consistent representative of Scottish realism was John Veitch, 
Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow from 1864 until his 
death in 1894. John Veitch was a school friend of Henry Calderwood in Peebles. 
They came to Edinburgh as undergraduates. Veitch was the son of a Free Church 
mother and a Church of Scotland father. His father had been in the Napoleonic wars. 
He wore a medal on Sundays to Church, but only to the Established Church. When 
he had occasion to go the Free Kirk with his wife, discretion was the greater part of 
valour:  he left the medal at home!  
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John Veitch also was intending to fulfil a calling to the ministry. But he too opted for 
a career as a philosopher. Unlike Fraser, he was a realist of what we may call the 
“unreconstructed” kind – a stout defender of Hamilton and an unyielding opponent 
of Hegelian influences in Scotland. Our particular interest in Veitch, however, arises 
from his reflections on poetry and on transcendence. He was a poet himself.
33
 Veitch 
was especially inspired by border landscapes and collected the ballads of the 
Borders’ poets. He considered poetic awareness as a bridge from the natural world to 
the transcendent. In his own words: “the poetry of Wordsworth is the natural 
complement to the realism of Hamilton.”
34
 
Oman, too, had an interest in the epistemological significance of poetry. Readers of 
Oman find digressions on poetry in the section “Knowledge and Knowing” in The 
	atural and the Supernatural.35 There Oman asks the question: to whom shall we 
turn to find widest knowledge and the deepest meaning: to the scientist, or the 
philosopher, or to the poet and to the child? 
We shall, therefore, not betake ourselves to the scientist and the 
philosopher as authorities on what is known by awareness and 
apprehension, because they are precisely those persons whose eyes are 
in the back of their heads, looking for understandings and explanations, 
and who, even when they do look at their environment are most in 
danger of only seeing it with the their judgements and theories, but to 




Oman was writing some thirty years after Veitch; nevertheless, there is shared 
appreciation of the place of poetry in the field of knowledge. Both believed that the 
natural world yields levels of meaning that are not accessible to discursive thinking. 
The quotation above is indicative of how Oman was the more polemical, setting the 
cognitive value of poetry above the conceptualities of science. Veitch, more 
accommodatingly, stressed the complementary nature of the rational and the 
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The “holy” is another area that makes for interesting comparison between Oman and 
Veitch. Oman ascribes his understanding of the holy to his reading of an essay by 
Wilhelm Windelband, Das Heilige, published in 1902.38 For Windelband, experience 
of the holy is not a specialised aspect of awareness, nor the sphere of the irrational, 
but the ground of “Normalbewusstsein”:
39
 normal consciousness of truth, goodness 
and beauty. Oman is particularly strong on this emphasis on the “normality” of the 
holy; it was the basis of his criticism of Rudolf Otto.
40
  
Veitch does not speak of experience of “the holy” per se. However, in his 
descriptions of how human beings experience transcendence, he touches on similar 
issues. Veitch believed that experience of transcendence is realised “by most 
reflective minds”,
41
 though the poet experiences it at its “highest reach”.
42
 In a 
collection of essays, published in 1895, under the title “Dualism and Monism”,
43
 he 
reflects on how the mind can “be equally open to the world of sense – the finite, and 
to the sphere of the infinite that borders and surrounds this world of ours”.
44
 The 
resulting experience is one of awe and reverence. 
There is revealed to us that far wider and higher sphere of being which 
holds for us awe, reverence, and rebuke, incentives to action here that 
can never allow us to rest in the sphere of mere contentment of earthly 
enjoyment or bounded prospect.
45
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The reference to “incentives to action” is significant. The experience is not merely a 
matter of awe, but carries with it moral imperatives. As Veitch continues, he 
reiterates that such experience is “a catholic element” in humanity: to “feel and know 
a Transcendent Power” is “not a peculiarity of the individual, but open to every man 
who has singleness of vision and purity of heart”.
46
 Veitch – like Oman in relation to 
the holy – would argue that experience of transcendence is part of normal 
consciousness. 
Veitch gives a privileged role to nature. It is landscape and environment that for 
Veitch are most likely to raise consciousness to an awareness of a Presence “above” 
and “beyond” the natural. He describes the impact of his native Borders. 
Its hills and glens, widespread moorlands had nourished it, for nowhere 
does a man feel his littleness more, nowhere does he feel the awing, and 
purifying of solitude and mystery greater than on the far reaching, often 
mist darkened, moorlands of “the north cuntré”.
47
 
Oman, too, gives a key role to nature, but only in the early evolution of human 
experience. He may well have categorised Veitch’s description of the impact of the 
natural world as an instance of primitive religion,
48
 an example of the “awesome” 
holy. Or, to use another Oman concept, Veitch’s description of the revelatory power 
of nature is an instance of the “particular” holy, inspired by places and objects, like 
the standing stones in Stenness, the altar in the tabernacle, or the binding of the 
Koran.
49
 It is arguable, however, that whilst Veitch shows a particular relish for awe 
and mystery, his views as they develop are compatible with Oman’s wider 
categorisation of the holy. Oman believed that the primitive holy has the potential to 
evolve into ethical awareness, moral sensitivity and binding conviction, apart from 
any material context.
50
 A similar continuum is observable in Veitch. Awe can be 
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“sublimated” into a “revelation of moral and spiritual truth.
51
 Thus, when Veitch 
digresses on his own experience of awe, he explains it in fundamentally moral terms.  
This power independent of me, outside of me, yet uniform, passing on 
before me in endless process-vision, yet linked to me in bounds of 
reason, feeling and imagination, makes me patient, observant, teaches 
me waiting and reverence. 
52
 
This link, in terms of “reason, feeling and imagination”, indicates that for Veitch, 
too, experience of the Infinite is never simply context bound, nor purely irrational, 
and always has the potential for refinement.  It also holds for Veitch that such 
experience is part of “normal consciousness”.  Nature may have a privileged role to 
play as epiphany; poetry may be well suited to cognitive expression; but these do not 
negate a sense of transcendence – of the holy – in ordinary experience.  
Though Oman came to his understanding of the holy via Windelband, Veitch 
illustrates that an interest in poetry and knowledge, in reverence and transcendence – 
in what would later be termed the numinous – was not unknown in the Scottish 
philosophical tradition. Veitch’s philosophy of nature was a forerunner of key 
elements in Oman’s epistemology and it is difficult to imagine that Oman would 
have been unaware of Veitch’s published work. 
Summary 
Oman wanted to avoid a text-book genre, and so there is no paper trail to sources and 
influences. But perhaps a modest claim can be made to having found text beneath the 
text of Oman’s work: not text shining vividly beneath the surface, but more like an 
archaeological artefact, suggestive of earlier inhabitants on the site. Setting Oman’s 
work in an historical perspective enables the reader to see how some of his main 
themes were anticipated. With respect to Henry Calderwood, there is quite a direct 
link to Oman’s definition of personality. In the work of Alexander Campbell Fraser, 
there is a complementary metaphysics, built around the relation between the natural 
and the supernatural, and a vision of reality that is spiritual and personal. Fraser’s use 
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of the terms “natural” and “supernatural”, in his Gifford lectures of 1889, were 
worthy of acknowledgement by Oman. John Veitch, in 1895, wrote concerning 
poetry, knowledge and experience of transcendence. It would have been interesting 
had Oman brought Veitch’s insights into his discussion.  
Finally, because of Oman’s extensive knowledge of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, he 
is rightly credited with keeping alive liberal protestant thought in the English 
speaking world. Perhaps his failing was not to acknowledge his Scottish 
philosophical antecedents. In late nineteenth century Scotland there was lively debate 
of the very issues that Oman deemed important. Had Scottish philosophers been 
more engaged by Oman they would have made a worthwhile contribution to his 
work. 
2 Personal Idealists: Sorley and Pringle Pattison 
Personal idealism was an affirmation of the importance of self, or personality, within 
total reality. It was a philosophy born of reaction to absolute idealism where self 
consciousness was absorbed in the larger consciousness of the whole. In a 
memorable phrase, Francis Herbert Bradley and Bernhard Bosanquet maintained that 
the individual’s mode of being is “adjectival”, as opposed to “substantive”.
53
 The 
foremost personal idealist in Scotland was Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison (1856-
1931) whose influence stretched far afield. Another advocate of a “person-centred” 
approach was fellow Scotsman, and Cambridge philosopher, William Ritchie Sorley 
(1855-1955). Both had a strong concern for the theistic implications of personal 
idealism, and this makes them interesting for comparison with Oman. In examining 
the writings of Pringle Pattison and Sorley the object is not, as with Oman’s realist 
teachers, to establish common philosophical roots or antecedents. Rather, it is to find 
a common approach to common problems. All three were, in various ways, 
personally affected by the war. Oman worked for a time in France, and in the 
Midlands, helping in military hospitals with the YMCA. He was also a critic of 
jingoism and a supporter of conscientious objectors. Pringle Pattison and Sorley each 
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lost a son amongst the soldier casualties of the War. They dedicated their respective 
published lectures to their memory. By 1918, therefore, a new cultural and 
intellectual reality had dawned. There had been, in Oman’s words, “a definite close 
in measureless destruction of an age”.
54
 Amongst the challenges which the war 
bequeathed to philosophy was to reckon with the reality of moral evil, as well as to 
establish the worth and dignity of personality.  
2.1 W R Sorley 
William Ritchie Sorley was born in Selkirk, in 1855, where his father was a Free 
Church minister. He studied for the ministry at New College and took semesters in 
Tübingen and Berlin. However, like many others, he moved from theology to a 
career as a philosopher. Nevertheless, his interest in theology never waned and he 
remained a practising Christian. Sorley read philosophy at Trinity College, 
Cambridge.  Then, after university appointments in London, Cardiff and Aberdeen, 
he returned to Cambridge as Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1900. He held this 
post until his retirement in 1933. 
Sorley’s main published work was Moral Values and the Idea of God.55 There he sets 
out to find in moral and ethical experience a guide to ultimate reality. In the opening 
sentence, he summarised his task. 
The purpose of the present work is to enquire into the bearing of ethical 
ideas upon the view of reality as a whole we are justified in forming. 




En route from his discussion of values to his theistic conclusions, Sorley affirms the 
importance of persons. Influenced by the subjective idealism of Berkeley, he argues 
that the individual, or “centre of conscious life”, is the “first clue to the nature of 
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 An individual, capable of choosing moral values, presupposes 
that there is a moral order in which values are grounded. He writes:  
It follows therefore that the value or goodness actually achieved in 
personal life implies as its ground or condition a standard or ideal of 
goodness. Accordingly, we are compelled to form the conception of an 
ideal good or of a moral order….
58
 
This moral order, which is the source and inspiration of values, may be given the 
name God.  
God must therefore be conceived as the final home of values, the 
Supreme Worth – as possessing the fullness of knowledge and beauty 
and goodness and whatever else is of value for its own sake.
59
  
In this way, Sorley makes a progression from the values embedded in experience, to 
persons, to the moral order and, finally, to God. 
This is only one half, however, of Sorley’s ethical idealism. In the second half of his 
lectures he was concerned to affirm the place and function of the natural world. It is 
the merit of traditional theism, he believed, that has a place for both the natural and 
the ethical. The natural order and the moral order are equally important to the 
functioning of the whole, and part of God’s purpose and design. 
If the moral order is not altogether sundered from the natural order, if 
the universe is really a universe and not a multiverse, then we must hold 
that the moral order is the order of that one mind whose purpose nature 
and man are fulfilling. Here therefore we have a key to the theistic 
interpretation of the world.
60
 
That the natural order and the moral order fulfil a divine purpose was a bold 
affirmation in a post Darwinian world. Sorley’s case, however, does not rest on 
evolution per se. Rather, it is an argument based on moral values and their 
transcendent point of reference. The transcendent realm of ideals, a realm that is as 
real as the physical world, exists apart from the evolutionary process.  
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It is not owing to natural selection, but rather in spite of it, that the mind 
of man affirms an affinity with truth and beauty and goodness, and, 
undismayed by opposition, seeks its home among ideals. To them as 
well as to nature the mind of man has adapted; and this adaption can 
neither be explained nor explained away by biological laws.
61
 
There is, therefore, a “design greater than Paley ever dreamed of”.
62
 It is a design not 
reducible to, nor circumscribed by, the natural world, but reflected in the adaption of 
the human mind to an objective transcendent realm of value. 
The order of truth which the intellect discovers and an order of moral 
values which the reason acknowledges are objective characteristics of 
reality, and they are reflected in the mind of man.
63
 
Importantly, nature serves this transcendent realm. It is in the natural world that 
transcendent ideals are realised. Human beings, we might say, have a foot in both 
camps, straddling the divide between the world of physical causality and higher 
values. Sorley comments: though the “selective processes of nature don’t specifically 
favour those who cherish values highly, or reward those who devote their lives to the 
service of ideals”,
64
 the world of nature “may be regarded as a fit medium for the 
fashioning and training of moral persons”.
65
   
Nature is the medium only; through it the end is to be reached. But 




In this way, Sorley arrives at an ethical theism that links experience, the natural 
world and transcendent value.  
In his last lecture, Sorley develops his idea of God.  Experience, having yielded 
moral values to the seeking soul, points to God as “the conscious ground of this 
moral order”.
67
  If we are to go further and speak about the nature or being of God, 
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we must turn to personal categories, for these are the highest we know: “the divine is 
limited by the analogy of the spirit of man to the spirit of God”.
68
  The Divine and 
human meet as the purposes of God are realised in the human spirit.  
Men are free to work out their purposes, and, at the same time, there is 
a divine purpose in the world which human history fulfils and to which 
the environment of nature is subordinate. The divine purpose is that 
values should be realised in man’s nature, and it can be realised only by 
man making this purpose his own.
69
 
The personal nature of the relationship between God and human beings is of primary 
importance.  Humans are free to pursue divine purposes or to frustrate them. For 
Sorley, these purposes are discovered not in specific religious activities but in the 
total spectrum of life. God’s approach, through the “whole region of common life”, 
as well as in “our dealings with nature and ordinary social relations”….“always 
respects free will”.
70
 Consequently, “the theological doctrine of irresistible grace is 
relinquished”.
71
   
In meeting and welcoming the divine grace man’s spirit is not passive 
but responsive; and the divine influence comes as a gift and not by 
compulsion. “Behold I stand at the door and knock.” said the Master. 
Entry is craved, not forced.
72
 
And so, Sorley concludes that, “in love, spirit appeals to spirit in virtue of their 
affinity”.
73
 But the soul, nevertheless, may be so preoccupied with routines, or be so 
immersed in “lower interests”, that it remains deaf to the call of God. On the other 
hand, if the soul should answer the call, it discovers “its essential nature and spiritual 
destiny”; and it also finds its “freedom in fulfilling the divine purpose”.
74
  All in all, 
personality, nature and history find their raison d’être in God’s final and ultimate 
purpose of love. This purpose can be experienced in time and space as communion 
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and fellowship; but it also transcends any earthly appropriation, and awaits 
eschatological fulfilment. 
2.1.1 Sorley and Oman 
If we compare Sorley’s work to that of Oman, we have a good example of the shared 
horizons. The emphasis on human autonomy, the dignity of personality and the 
personal nature of grace are central for both thinkers.  Most notably, Sorley abandons 
the traditional concept of irresistible grace. In divine-human relations there is an 
absence of all coercion and an invitation to free response. This was the cardinal idea 
in Oman’s Grace and Personality. One could say that Grace and Personality was an 
in-depth theological reflection on this fundamental insight.  
The sphere in which grace, as relationship, is realised is, for both writers, the natural 
world. What Sorley describes as the “whole region of common life” is, for Oman, the 
“whole breadth of experience”. There is for each something of a disenchantment with 
organised religion and a belief in the universality of God’s presence, awaiting to be 
realised in secular vocation. Grace for Oman is, 
not merely in some special sacred sphere of ecstasy or rite or even duty. 
Nothing less is at stake than the whole nature of the world when rightly 
used as God’s world.
75
 
In these insights and emphasis there is, one could argue, an anticipation of the 
secular Christianity of theologians such Bonhoeffer and Ronald Gregor Smith.
76
  
Experience of war in any era inevitably exposes institutional marginality. 
It is illuminating, also, to compare Sorley’s Moral Values and the Idea of God with 
The 	atural and the Supernatural. Although the latter was written over twenty years 
later, in 1931, there are broad continuities. For example, methodologically Oman, 
like Sorley, begins with a bottom-up approach and is scathing of abstraction. He 
writes: 
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Unless theology is, like true science, about experience and not in place 
of it, it is worthless.
77
 
However, Oman focuses on experience on a wider front than moral awareness. The 
reality of the transcendent for Oman is apprehended through the ideal values of truth 
and beauty, as well as through moral sensibility. Sorley, of course, recognised the 
intellectual and aesthetic aspects of experience, too; but he believed that moral values 
are primary. 
Man is not a cognitive being in the first instance, and only thereafter an 
active being. Knowledge is sought by him in virtue of some interest; 
and the interest in knowledge for its own sake is a late interest.
78
 
In contrast, for Oman, beauty takes the lead. The human quest for beauty is “the true 
search for unity and harmony and perfection in all things”.
79
 For instance, in morals, 
a search for beauty inspires “striving for harmony in thought and action”. 
80
 Equally, 
in a highly intellectual field such as science, “beauty is a conspicuous element in the 
abstract completeness aimed at in the higher mathematics”.
81
 Beauty, Oman 
concludes, “ought at least to be the inspiration of the study of all life”.
82
 In a 
secondary sense, beauty belongs to religion. However, this latter belonging has been 
often a negative experience. Beauty suffers at the hands of religion because of 
traditional piety. Oman writes: 
…by few things has it been limited and stereotyped and formalised 
more than by having imposed upon it narrow or external or sentimental 
or traditional forms of piety.
83
 
Yet, beauty is an essential part of “true religion” in that “a sense of beauty and a 
sense of the holy are not far apart”.
84
 Neither beauty nor the holy live “by the clear 
hard light of understanding” but rather by “intuitions and anticipations which go far 
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beyond what can be justified by understanding”.
85
 In this focus on aesthetics, Oman 
reveals the abiding legacy of Schleiermacher; whereas Sorley, in his moral emphasis, 
is a disciple of Kant.  
Beyond these differences, however, there is a shared conviction that the natural 
world and the world of values belong together in One Divine reality. Of the intimate 
connection between the material and the spiritual, the natural and the supernatural, 
Oman writes: 
The two are not in opposition, but are so constantly interwoven that 
nothing may be wholly natural or supernatural.
86
 
For Oman, this duality in unity is the proper context in which to understand 
evolution. Freedom and purpose transcends material determinism; but evolution may 
be spoken of as fulfilling a Divine purpose. Oman uses the language of evolution as 
descriptive of how humans “adapt” to their spiritual environment. There is a 
“selection” at the level of spiritual environment that mirrors the evolution in the 
natural world. Oman draws the following analogy between the challenge of natural 
environment and that of the spiritual. “The creature that has learned to live in the air, 
if it returns to the water, does not become a fish but a corpse”; so, with respect to the 
absolute values or our spiritual environment, “the Supernatural is only a higher bar of 
judgement being a sacred call and a decisive opportunity”.
87
  At the human level – as 
Oman sees it – evolution has consequences not less grave than in the other spheres. 
He concludes: “Man is the only creature we know who has consciously entered into 
this heritage”.
88
 Or, as Sorley expresses it, “conscious purpose is known to us 
directly only as it exists in the mind of man”.
89
  In these ways, for both thinkers, all 
of reality – natural and spiritual – is construed in an evolutionary paradigm. Divine 
purpose cannot be proven from the material world, but it is a valid postulate of 
human consciousness. 
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Oman and Sorley have a great deal in common, even though with contrasting 
emphases. They have a mutual philosophical antecedent in the thought of Alexander 
Campbell Fraser, for whom Sorley worked as an assistant. Fraser also sought to 
understand the natural world within a spiritual perspective, and all three 
acknowledge a debt to Berkeley.
90
 But, apart from shared roots, Sorley and Oman 
have a family resemblance in their articulation of a theism that is grounded in 
experience, affirmative of freedom, protective of personal autonomy and integrating 
of the natural world in a larger spiritual whole. With regard to theology, Sorley and 
Oman set aside “irresistible grace” in favour of grace as love, gift and invitation. 
2.2  Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison 
Pringle Pattison was a transitional figure between the Scottish realism of the late 
nineteenth century and the personalism of the early twentieth.
91
  He was born in 
Edinburgh in 1856, and baptised Adam Seth. Later, he changed his name to Pringle 
Pattison as a condition of receiving a bequest: the Haining Estate, near Selkirk, in the 
Scottish Borders. In 1878 he graduated from Edinburgh and, afterwards, went to 
study in Germany. On return to Edinburgh in 1880, he became an assistant to 
Alexander Campbell Fraser, in succession to William Ritchie Sorley. He held various 
appointments in the Universities of Wales and St Andrews before succeeding Fraser 
in 1891 as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics. It was a post he held until his 
retirement in 1919.  
Recent, renewed interest in Scottish philosophy in the early twentieth century regards 
Pringle Pattison not merely as transitional but pivotal to the emergence of personal 
idealism. David Boucher writes: 
Andrew Seth is of immense importance in the history of British 
Idealism because for years after he edited what was the manifesto of 
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Scottish Hegelianism he more fully developed his doubts he had hinted 
at earlier. He now questioned the metaphysical conclusions that 
Absolute Idealism projected and was at the forefront in Britain of 




Even more recently, Cairns Craig, in his panoramic review of Scottish philosophical 
culture since the Enlightenment, argues that Pringle Pattison’s criticism of the 
Kantian-Hegelian tradition and his return to the Scottish tradition was, in effect, a 
quest for a post-modern philosophy. It was Pringle Pattison, argues Cairns, who 
cleared the way for the constructive thinking of John Macmurry, later in the 
twentieth century. 
In Seth’s effort to create a post-modern philosophy by a return to 
Scottish traditions and by a critique of the whole Kantian-Hegelian 
tradition we can see a pre-figuration of the most important philosophy 
of the twentieth century, that of John Macmurry…
93
 
This contemporary evaluation of Pringle Pattison’s significance finds support when 
one considers his personal journey from neo-Hegelianism to personal idealism. From 
his seminal works – Essays in Philosophical Criticism,94 Hegelianism and 
Personality95 and The Idea of God in Recent Philosophy96 – it is clear that Pringle-
Pattison’s personal idealism was born of considerable heart-searching, and of rigor in 
sifting competing intellectual opinions. 
Essays in Philosophical Criticism was the “manifesto of Scottish Hegeliansim”.97  It 
was dedicated to the memory of Thomas Hill Green and the Preface was written by 
Edward Caird. The volume aimed to carry forward the work of Green for whom 
                                                 
92
 David Boucher, (Edited and Introduced) The Scottish Idealists (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 8-
9. 
93
 Cairns Craig, Intending Scotland: explorations of Scottish Culture since the Enlightenment 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 169. 
94
 Andrew Seth and R  .B. Haldane, edited  Essays in Philosophical Criticism  (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1883). 
95
 Andrew Seth, Hegelianism and Personality  (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 
1887). 
96
 Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy  first edition, 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1917); second edition, (New York, Oxford university Press, 
1920). 
97




philosophy was not “a study of the words of men that are gone” but “a life 
expressing itself with that power and authority which belongs to one who speaks 
from his own experience, and never to the “scribes” who speak from tradition”.98 
Seth, as he was then known, as well as being joint editor, contributed an essay 
entitled: “Philosophy as Criticism of Categories”.  The essay was devoted to a 
critical examination of Kant’s polar categories of the phenomenal and the noumenal.  
It was on Kant’s part “a mischievous step” to isolate “the conditions, principles or 
categories from the experience in which they are disclosed to us”.
99
 On the contrary, 
argued Seth: 




Clearly, at this early point in his thinking, he was within an Hegelian perspective. 
Within four years of the publication of Philosophical Criticism things became very 
different. In 1887, in Seth’s second series of Balfour Lectures, published as 
Hegelianism and Personality, he gave a cogent criticism of absolute idealism 
coupled with an affirmation of the importance of personality in metaphysics.  
The radical error both of Hegelianism and of the allied English doctrine 
I take to be the identification of the human and the divine self-
consciousness, or, to put it more broadly, the unification of 
consciousness in a single Self.
101
 
Idealism, he believed, is a valid philosophy but only if it finds a place for the 
threefold reality of nature, personality and God. The merit of idealism is its 
affirmation of unity. Within that unity, the individual has a key role to play, not as a 
means to an end, but as an end. “Self”, he writes, “is the very apex of separation and 
differentiation”.
102
 This is in contrast to the absolute idealism of, for example, John 
Scott Haldane, who saw personality in terms of its contribution to social unity. 
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…..personality is no mere personality of one individual amongst others. 
We find in social life that it unites and does not separate us.
103
 
For Haldane, the only personality one can truly speak of is the personality of God, in 
which the whole of experience finds unity.
104
  It is important to note, however, that, 
though disagreeing with neo-Hegelians and absolute idealists Seth maintained a great 
respect for Hegel.  
In all this, Hegel is the protagonist of Idealism in the historical sense of 
that word, and champions the best interests of humanity. It is 





 reflections in the Idea of God, published in 1917, continued to 
develop a twofold emphasis: an idealist insistence on Mind and unity, together with 
an insistence on diversity and personality. It was a narrow road to travel and the 
alternative seemed broad on either side. If self is not, as the absolute idealists thought 
“adjectival”, then could it be that reality is in fact fundamentally pluralistic? This 
was the course taken by radical pluralists like Pringle Pattison’s contemporary, 
J.M.E. McTaggart.
107
 The latter posited that finite selves “exist in their own right” in 
a “systematic whole”, and in “reciprocal dependence”.
108
 But, reciprocal dependence 
was too “weak” a concept for Pringle Pattison. Just as humanity stands in an organic 
relationship to nature, so the humanity is also organic to God. Ideals are the presence 
of God, immanent in the human spirit. He writes: 
But as soon as we begin to treat God and man as two independent facts, 
we lose hold on the experienced fact, which is the existence of one in 
the other and through the other.109 
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Thus, it is clear why critics accused Pringle Pattison of never resolving the essential 
conflict between idealism and personalism.
110
  
However, little attention has been given to his attempts to find a solution. In two 
articles in The Philosophical Revue of 1892,111 he makes a distinction between 
metaphysics and epistemology, a distinction which he consistently maintains. His 
argument is that knowledge is always “trans-subjective” and presupposes a relation 
between knower and known. But, this doesn’t, he argues, obviate metaphysical 
identity. This point, he believed, was often obscured by neo-Hegelians. 
Hegelianism, in fact, offers an eminent example of the confusion 
between Epistemology and Metaphysics on which I am dwelling. With 
Hegel the essence of the universe is thought, here in the subject, and 
thought there in the object; and there is some temptation, therefore, to 
think that metaphysical identity absolves us from epistemological 
enquiry. But, this is not the case. However much the objective world 
and the individual knower may be identified in essence, the objective 
thought which he recognises is still trans-subjective…
112
 
Pringle Pattison adds that “Hegelians are not the only sinners in this respect”.
113
 If it 
were the case that Hegelians “swamped epistemology in metaphysics”, it is also the 
case that realists of the Scottish school were guilty of projecting the dualism inherent 
in knowledge into reality.  Often, the so called “natural realist” was left defending 
metaphysical dualism of mind and matter as two generically different substances. 
Thus, realism “falls at once into the most un-philosophical crudities”.
114
 
With this distinction between epistemology and ontology, Pringle Pattison was able 
on the one hand to identify with the metaphysical idealists and yet maintain that 
knowledge is by its very nature personal. The following two quotations sum up his 
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distinction between the epistemological individuality and ontological identity in 
Divine Being. 
Knowledge means nothing if it does not mean the relation of two 
factors, knowledge of an object by a subject.115 
The universe is once for all a whole and the external world as the 
Hegelians put it, is essentially related to intelligence, in other words it is 
not a brute fact existing outside the sweep of divine life and its 




When, therefore, in the concluding chapter of the Idea of God, Pringle Pattison 
reflects on what personal idealism means for divine-human relationships, he provides 
a theology of both intimacy and freedom. He compares the creation of the soul “not 
to the manufacture of an article, which remains throughout something separate from 
its maker” but, rather, to “the addition of a child to a family”. It is a strong image of 
identity and belonging. 
But there is something more intimate still; for its filaments which unite 
the finite spirit to its creative source are never severed.
117
 
And, as in the realm of knowledge, the relational aspect is not lost.  
The Productive Reason remains at once the sustaining element of the 
dependent life, and the living content, continually offering itself to the 
soul which it has awakened to knowledge and the quest of itself.
118
 
Having committed himself to the personal nature of the divine-human relationship, 
Pringle Pattison makes several critical adjustments to theology. He abandons the 
traditional concept of Omnipotence. He argues that the “real omnipotence” is 
“atoning love”; and God is “no far off theological mystery”, but is found “in the very 
texture of our human experience”.
119
 He concludes, the theological interpretation of 
the Spirit as the third person within “the inner constitution of a transcendent 
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Godhead” is fundamentally misplaced. For him, the “doctrine of the Spirit” is the 
“profoundest, and therefore, the most intelligible attempt to express the indwelling of 
God in man”.
120
  In his theology of the Spirit, Pringle Pattison is far removed from 
Trinitarian orthodoxy; yet, in his theology of the Spirit’s working, his views are 
perfectly at home in the mystery of grace. 
2.2.1 Pringle Pattison and Oman 
In Pringle Pattison’s personal idealism and Oman’s personalist theology, there is 
obviously a mutual emphasis on personality. However, there are differences. 
Generally, Oman considered that Pringle Pattison leaned too much towards the 
nineteenth century understanding of “individuality” at the expense of Kant’s more 
robust concept of the “individual”. It was Pringle Pattison’s contention that what 
German idealists had done was “to enlarge and complete Kant’s conception of 
intrinsic value by making it include all the higher reaches of human experience”.
121
 
He regarded this as a good thing. For Oman this broadening of personality 
compromised its autonomy and self-determining character. He expressed his 
disagreement in The 	atural and the Supernatural.  
But what Prof. Pringle Pattison thinks success was rightly achieved by 
discarding the eighteenth century framework of the Kantian scheme, 
which is what I call the question of the individual: my contention, on 
the contrary, is that the essential weakness and failure of all 




Perhaps Oman may be characterised as a “hard” personalist in comparison to Pringle 
Pattison’s “softer” variety. In this emphasis on autonomy and self-determination 
Oman is much closer to Henry Calderwood than to Pringle Pattison. It was Oman’s 
view that Pringle Pattison, though a critic of neo-Hegelianism, continued to think 
within essentially Hegelian horizons. Reviewing the Idea of God, he comments: 
Pringle Pattison has not adequately settled his account with 
Hegelianism and relies more on mere “organic unity” for solving 
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This is a valid point. In terms of theology, however, there were gains in neo-
Hegelianism. It could accommodate an appreciation of spiritual presence and 
sacramental realism. Because Pringle Pattison allowed for an ontological identity 
between the finite spirit and its creative source, he was much more creative than 
Oman with his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. His philosophy was compatible with the 
New Testament focus on “indwelling”
124
 and he did not regard this as a violation of 
personality. If the Divine relationship is – as he characterises it – “the existence of 
one in the other and through the other”,125 then grace can be experienced in us. 
Consequently, the Spirit and sacraments can be appropriated in more than a relational 
way.
126
 Divine presence does not stop at the boundary of self-directing, self-
legislating, self-conscious personality. The mystery of the Spirit transcends Kantian 
categories.  
In contrast, Oman’s theology both of the Spirit and the Sacraments is entirely 
relational and bereft of immanence. Nevertheless, one could argue that Oman, in 
making human autonomy sacrosanct, is a prophet of a more radical theology. For 
Oman, the experience of freedom is the experience of God; in this respect, he 
anticipated a more secular spirituality. 
Summary 
This comparison of Oman and Pringle Pattison has highlighted fundamental 
differences. The latter sought a via media with idealism through the distinction 
between ontological identity and epistemological difference. It was a distinction 
aimed at salvaging personality from being an “adjective” of the absolute.
127
 This 
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distinction was helpful to a theology of the Holy Spirit and the Sacraments. God in 
us, as well as with us, is a concept that is common to the New Testament as it is to 
idealism. Oman, however, is uncompromising on the primacy of human autonomy 
and a strictly relational ontology. In this emphasis Oman shows more indebtedness to 
the dualism of his Scottish realist roots than to personal idealism.  
Regardless of these differences in relation to metaphysics, Oman and Pringle 
Pattison share a theology of God as love, known and mediated through human 
experience. In his concluding Gifford Lecture, the latter’s final comment is: “the real 
omnipotence of atoning love” is “no far-off theological mystery but, God be thanked, 
the very texture of our human experience”.
128
 Oman, at one level, would have said, 
Amen! God is in the texture of human experience. However, for Oman that can be 
only the tip of the iceberg. His conviction with regard to transcendence made him 
irreconcilable to a theology of a purely immanent God. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has set Oman in the context of Scottish philosophy. It was a landscape 
where philosophy and religion complemented each other intellectually. That Oman’s 
teachers of philosophy in Edinburgh, Henry Calderwood and Campbell Fraser, were 
ministers of the United Presbyterian Church and Free Church respectively, is 
emblematic of the close relationship between the two disciplines. This was an 
environment well suited to the teenager from Orkney who brought to philosophical 
studies a strong religious sensibility. Orkney had given Oman a sense of the 
numinous, an awareness of personality and a perception that freedom and faith are 
complementary. Through his reading of philosophy and through the impact of his 
teachers –who were substantial thinkers in their own right – Oman’s native religious 
instincts found clarification and expansion.  
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Root and branch is probably an appropriate metaphor for Oman’s relationship to 
Scottish philosophy. Oman’s main theological themes bear the hallmarks of his 
philosophical antecedents: Calderwood’s definition of personality, Fraser’s spiritual 
universe, personal and both natural and supernatural. Veitch visited questions of 
poetry and epistemology, mystical awareness and the human sense of the sacred. It is 
likely that Oman would have read Veitch’s monographs; though, unfortunately, he 
makes no reference to them. In time to come, Oman’s philosophical and religious 
reflections would have a native complexion. Of course, his inquiring spirit and 
critical acumen would discover new, but similar, lines of thought European thinkers, 
in Windelband and Otto. 
The other half of the metaphor, branches, is descriptive of Oman’s relation to 
Scottish philosophy in the early twentieth century. The period immediately after the 
1
st
 World War gave birth to a broad interest in personalism. Pringle Pattison was the 
pioneer of personal idealism; a branch that had in it something of the soil of the older 
realism as well as the sap of Hegelianism. Oman, in his theological personalism, was 
closer to the subjective idealism of Fraser: both acknowledged their indebtedness to 
Berkeley.  Sorley, too, described himself as an idealist of the “Berkeleyan point of 
view” because individual minds discovering and realising values are, he believed, the 
first clue to the nature of reality and value. Oman shared with Sorley a desire to keep 
personality distinct, free and in a gracious relationship to God. Yet, Oman’s thought 
transcended the ethical Idealism of Sorley in his interest in the phenomenology of 
religion: in the holy, the sacred and aesthetics.  With regard to Pringle Pattison, 
Oman felt that, with his emphasis on immanence and the “organic” nature of reality,    
his thought was too much within Hegelian ambience. However, in his strict 
adherence to relationship and transcendence, Oman was unable to accommodate the 
New Testament promise of “indwelling” of the Spirit. This is a limiting factor in 
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The continuity that Oman exhibits in relation to his teachers and contemporaries does 
not, however, take away from his stubborn individualism. Whilst Oman may have 
found human experience clarified and expanded by his philosophical studies, he 
never sought, or succumbed to, complete intellectual systematisation. Experience, for 
Oman, is always greater than even the most satisfying explanations. For this reason 
he escapes the accusation of optimistic liberalism. Oman was ever alert to the 
bewildering clouds that can suddenly appear on the horizon and to the half light that 
illumines but does not give transparency; for him, these existential ambiguities are 
occasions for faith rather than shallow certainty. Human experience as the ground of 
theology cannot but make for reserve and forbid conclusion. Oman, accordingly, 
leaves the reader with a theology of hard realism and a liberalism that is always a 
work in progress.  
Any appraisal of Oman, however, is incomplete without consideration of his 
extensive knowledge of European philosophy and theology. In keeping with the 
Scottish educational tradition, Oman studied in Europe and engaged with the great 
European intellectual traditions, namely the Reformation, the Enlightenment and 
nineteenth century romanticism. This European dimension to Oman’s thought is the 





Oman and European Thought 
Sources 
The sources for tracing Oman’s engagement with European thinking are relatively 
good. In 1893, when a minister in Alnwick, he translated Schleiermacher’s Reden 
über die Religion, together with a biographical introduction of fifty-eight pages and 
critical notes to the text.
1
 This work shows Oman’s early, and not uncritical, 
appreciation of Schleiermacher.  In addition, his 1906 publication, Faith and 
Freedom, displays a wide knowledge of European theology and philosophy of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Lectures, in outline, were given at 
Westminster College in 1904 and later delivered as the Kerr Lectures in the Glasgow 
College of the United Free Church. In fact, the lecture themes had an earlier origin in 
Oman’s D. Phil dissertation, presented to the University of Edinburgh in 1884, which 
was entitled: Rationalism and Romanticism: a study of Kant’s “Religion within the 
limits of reason alone” and Schleiermacher’s “Speeches on Religion”.2 These early 
writings are an important archive, enabling the reader to observe Oman’s interaction 
with European intellectual traditions from the Reformation through to the 
Enlightenment and Romantic eras.
3
 This chapter, therefore, looks at Oman’s dialogue 
with this broad sweep of European intellectual history, beginning with the movement 
that Oman believed gave birth to modernity: the Reformation. 
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Themes in outline 
The chapter will follow the chronology of the Kerr Lectures. Oman traces the roots 
of the conflict between faith and freedom to the Reformation. The first section will 
examine Luther’s theology of Christian freedom. For Oman, it is the sine qua non for 
understanding not only Reformation history, but subsequent historical developments. 
The freedom gained at the Reformation represented a fundamental decoupling of 
religion from its institutional expression. The next two hundred years were, in effect, 
a philosophical and theological extension of Luther’s principle.  
Section two turns to the Catholic Reformation. Oman’s interaction with the thinking 
of the Catholic Reformation is a totally unexplored area of his thought. Yet, it is the 
second of his lectures. He could have passed it by and moved on to the 
Enlightenment. But, in fact, Oman saw the Catholic response to Luther’s radical 
freedom as emblematic of what has been perennial; namely, churches have sought a 
halting place between freedom and authority. Oman felt that the resulting 
compromises offer no ultimate resolution of the issues; however, he shows 
appreciation of Jansenism and the ideas of Pascal. 
Section three surveys how Oman moves the discussion forward to the Enlightenment 
and the Romantic era. Oman begins by highlighting the significance of Butler. It was 
Butler who corrected the deist isolation of rationality from the totality of experience 
by linking reason to conscience. In that respect, Butler was a forerunner of Kant. 
Oman expresses warm appreciation of Kant’s doctrine of autonomy from which there 
can be no going back. However, Kant’s religion within the realm of “reason alone” 
suffers from the lack of anything to warm the heart; it cries out for nurture, love and 
grace.  Oman posits a personal, loving environment which is not a threat to the 
autonomy Kant did so much to prioritise; rather, it nurtures and enhances the 
freedom Kant prized. The germ of Oman’s later Grace and Personality is found in 
his reflections on Kant’s moral religion and its weakness. 
Section four proceeds to the Romantic period, which Oman felt was a nineteenth 
century reaction to the emphasis on reason and autonomy, characteristic of the 
eighteenth century. The idea of humanity as part of a cosmic drama and creation as 




the whole artistic spirit of the age. Oman places Hegel and Schleiermacher in this 
context, appreciating the insights of both, yet feeling that they tipped the balance 
away from the personal freedom which Luther had discovered and Kant had 
championed. Hegel left a legacy that was to take many twists and turns, but always 
encompassing the individual within a larger whole. Oman remained committed to the 
freedom of persons in an environment that nurtures such freedom. The tenets of The 
	atural and the Supernatural exist in embryo in Oman’s discussions of the 
Enlightenment and the Romantic era. 
Section five is a concluding review of the impact of European thought upon Oman’s 
theological perspective. By the time Oman comes to write The 	atural and the 
Supernatural in 1931, his thought having travelled by way of Grace and Personality 
and Vision and Authority, has a settled appearance in the mode of personal theism, or 
theistic personalism.  It was a philosophy of religion that was shaped on the one hand 
by Oman’s background in Scottish philosophy and by the depth of his engagement 
with European intellectual traditions. Oman stood in a long tradition of being a 
Scottish and a European thinker. 
1 The Reformation 
Oman regarded the Reformation as being a movement that set the intellectual agenda 
for the succeeding centuries. The central issue, he believed, was freedom and its 
relation to faith. The quest for freedom left no aspect of life untouched: religious, 
social or political. In his opening Kerr Lecture, it is plain that Oman regarded 
Luther’s pamphlet, Concerning a Christian’s Freedom, as the seminal tract of the 
Reformation. It was freedom as a spiritual value, rather than practical issues of 
Church reform, which inspired and determined revolutionary fervour of the age. Of 
Luther’s significance, Oman wrote: 
Of the religious life of the Reformation, which was far in advance of its 
method, the greatest exposition is Luther’s work before referred to, 
Concerning a Christian’s Freedom.4 
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Luther’s two key propositions, that a Christian is perfectly free and lord of all, whilst 
perfectly a dutiful servant of all,
5
 set freedom at the heart of the religious life. The 
radical implication was that faith is not a restriction placed upon freedom, nor is love 
a burdensome addition to it. Rather, faith and love are the partners of freedom, when 
freedom is understood as fellowship with God. Accordingly, loving service is a free 
outworking of divine friendship, not a prerequisite for it. To be a Christian, therefore, 
is to travel lightly, in the true freedom of faith; or, as Oman summarizes it, “to be a 
Christian, to be justified, and to be free, all mean the same thing”.
6
 In this concept of 
faith, minimalist with regard to creed and existentialist in character, Oman believed 
there is a revolutionary understanding of the religious life. For example, if freedom is 
at the heart of faith, and faith the author of freedom, is there any necessary 
connection to “externals” of religion: ceremonies, structures and organisation? 
Pushing the question to its limits: can religion be free from the authority and control 
of the Church? Oman believed an affirmative answer is the logic of Luther’s 
position. Religion can and should be free from religious “authorities,” both pontifical 
and confessional. Whether Luther would ever have envisaged Oman’s radical 
trajectory is another question. However, Oman believed that Luther had raised 
questions that carried through to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, the 
Reformation had “abundantly raised questions concerning freedom that have never 
ceased to be asked ever since”.
7
  
1.1 Decoupling religion and institutions 
Oman argues that there has always been a tension between the Church as an 
organisation and spiritual reality. It is his view that at no point in Christian history 
have they ever been synonymous. The medieval Church came closest to absorbing 
one into the other. 
Yet the distinction was there, and the true claim of the Church was 
never in her great organisation or her completed creed, but in the 
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heroism which made men not count their lives dear to them that they 
might win the peoples from idolatry and barbarism, in the beautiful 
ideal of woman hood created anew in Jesus Christ, in the piety that 
delivered from the old pagan hardness of feeling and gave a new 
meaning to commonest human relationships and humblest duties, in the 
tenderness which made men succourers (sic) of the sick and the outcast, 
in the humanity which made them accept poverty to be brethren of the 
poor and emancipators of the slave, and in the humility which made 
them pioneers of all progress through the dignity they gave to labour by 
engaging themselves in menial toils.
8
 
This marathon sentence is a good summary of Oman’s polemic against the 
identification of Christian living with ecclesiastical organisation. For Oman, the 
relation of religion to structure is contingent and ever changing; indeed, it is the spirit 
of Christianity that sanctifies the institution and not vice versa. Oman writes: 
Christianity sanctified the organisation with which it was connected, 
but could never entirely be indentified with it, and there was always the 




With the Reformation the day of independence for religion dawned, bringing into 
sharp relief the impossibility of any organised structure containing, or constraining, 
the human response to God. The Reformation was fundamentally a paradigm shift, 
marking the arrival of a new religious sensibility. It was the beginning of modernity, 
or what Oman called “Modern Time”. The freedom of faith, as articulated by the 
doctrine of justification by faith alone, cut religion loose from its medieval 
anchorage; and it would, thereafter, find its meaning and relevance in the brave new 
world of freedom and autonomy. 
Beyond question the determining event was the Reformation, for it 
alone set up the distinction which ended the Middle Ages and created 
the Modern Time – the distinction between religion and the Church. 
This was the ultimate meaning of its insistence on justification by faith 
alone and not by doctrines or rites of the church.
10
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That the inherent distinction between religion and Church should emerge at the time 
it did, Oman ascribed to historical factors. Travel and the revival of learning in the 
period of the renaissance were one such factor. In an expanding world, 
geographically as well as intellectually, “any visible organisation seemed of smaller 
significance”.
11
 In the words of Kipling: “the foot of travel let out the stirrup holes of 
belief”.
12
 Commerce was also a factor in this widening of horizons.  
Commerce went with travel and involved intercourse with men of other 
faiths which made it less easy to believe that God had limited his grace 
to one institution. And the same effect was produced by the unveiled 
glory of ancient literature. 
13
 
Perhaps, most significantly, developments in science changed fundamentally the 
view of the universe and its laws; and it left in ruins the physical, as well as 
metaphysical, assumptions of the medieval Church. In the words of Leibnitz: “God 
was robbed of some of His most excellent attributes.”
14
 The result was an all 
encompassing naturalism.  
Heaven is no longer over our heads nor hell beneath our feet, and the 
earth which once seemed God’s only care is dust “less than nothing” 
amidst myriad worlds. Nor has ecclesiastical authority succeeded better 
in other spheres of science. Geology has refused to remain stretched on 
the “Procrustean bed of the Pentateuch.” No fulmination has availed 
against the idea of evolution. In medicine, once the Church’s special 
province, evil spirits have succumbed to bacteria; and in meteorology 
the very bells baptised to scare the demons of the air are protected by 
the heretical lightning rod.
15
 
In the meantime, the Church fought a rearguard action that was, in effect, to be of no 
avail. As she “perfected her imperial claim”, the “ecclesiastical authorities were 
slowly driven backwards contesting every foot of the retreat, their carnal weapons 
growing sharper as their arguments grew weaker”.
16
 In this manner, Oman outlines a 
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bleak picture of ecclesiastical impotence in the face of ever increasing knowledge 
and ever widening freedom. However, he believed, these changes were prophetic of a 
new order to come; an order built on freedom as the friend of faith, and on faith as 
the guardian of freedom. 
More and more, it has become plain that freedom is the fundamentally 




The rest of his Kerr Lectures are a delineation of this “spiritual idea”. In his last 
book, Honest Religion, Oman reiterates: “we need the kind of freedom that makes us 
indomitable”.
18
 Indomitable freedom, however, as Oman was ever eager to point out, 
comes not as an agent of ease, but with winnowing power. 
1.2 Uniting freedom and faith 
The existential reality of freedom evoked fear as well as joy in the minds of 
Protestant theologians. Thus, the spiritual ideal of freedom “as the only ultimate 
basis of a true faith”
19
 would be a long time in realisation. This, thought Oman, 
should not surprise us, especially “when we remember how long the Christian world 
had relied upon external guidance which it had considered to be infallible”.
20
 
Besides, freedom is always “at the mercy of wickedness and folly”;
21
 and, it was 
almost inevitable that the reformers began with “a deep sense of its overwhelming 
burden”.
22
 Several things followed. 
First, the earliest effect of freedom was the doctrine of the bondage of the will. And, 
though this development “might seem contrary to reason”, it was not, Oman thinks, 
an unreasoning response. Freedom is a terrifying reality; and, when its existential 
depths are plumbed, human beings will always seek relief from it. Indeed,  
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..this will never be strange to one who stands under the stars and thinks 
of infinity and eternity, and realises that God called him to direct his 
course in the midst of this terrible vastness.
23
 
It was, therefore, “to lighten the burden” that Luther in his doctrine of the bondage of 
the will, and Calvin in his doctrine of predestination, promised relief from the 
frightening responsibilities that freedom enjoins. Accordingly, people in Reformation 
lands were able to find, in God’s determining will and sovereign grace, the security 
once found in the Church.  For Oman, this turn away from freedom to divine 
determinism was the fruit of a deeply religious instinct because experience teaches 
that “it is a perilous undertaking to walk alone” and freedom is “futile” apart from 
God.
24
 However, whilst the exigencies of the time drove reformers in the direction of 
enslavement of the will, Oman believed that “it grows ever clearer that the denial of 
man’s share is no solution, but rather the abandonment of the problem”. 
25
 The 
“share” which Oman has in mind is that which belongs to personality. It was, Oman 
believed, that Divine sovereignty and human freedom find their resolution. Such a 
resolution, however, was not possible within the traditional theological categories of 
omnipotence and omniscience. A solution would have to wait for the inter-personal 
categories of the twentieth century.
26
  
Secondly, having given freedom wholly over to God, the Reformers sought a safe 
repository for faith, not as in the middle ages in the Church, but in correct doctrine 
and holy discipline. Historically, the hallmark of reformed churches has been 
adherence to the primacy of the scriptures, a confessional understanding of faith and 
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congregational discipline. These, in Oman’s estimation, were an attempt – again 
driven by the circumstances of the time – to keep freedom within manageable 
bounds.  
Amid turmoil which arose from the half liberty of imperfect men, even 
Luther was not always loyal to his high ideal, and Protestantism turned 
generally to a faith easier to teach and an order easier to enforce. It set 
up a new school of correct doctrine, made faith the acceptance of its 
system and rested order on the old type of submission.
27
 
Delivered to the United Free Church in 1906 this evaluation of the Reformation 
heritage must have been challenging to those listening. The era of “correct doctrine” 
in Scottish Protestantism ended with the heresy trials of the nineteenth century. But, 
at the time of Oman’s lectures, there would still have been a strong belief in doctrine 
as fundamental to Christian faith. Oman’s strictures read as an indictment of 
confessional churches. However, he takes the edge off his criticism with an historical 
perspective. Though the needs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries meant that 
churches sought security for faith in sound doctrine, the essential vision of freedom 
as the true friend of faith was not lost. 
Yet in the darkest days there was a difference. It was never quite 
forgotten that Luther’s conception of freedom of the children of God 
was the only ultimate basis of a true faith and a stable order.
28
 
Thirdly, the magisterial aspect of the Reformation which led to the establishment of 
national churches was also, for Oman, a double-sided development. The move 
towards national churches in Europe was too widespread to ascribe it to mere 
political expediency. “An arrangement so general cannot be fully explained either by 
accident or human devices.”
29
 The positive side of the establishment of national 
churches was to extend the idea of the “sacredness of the whole of life”.
30
 Again, this 
is an example, in Oman’s view, that religion transcends mere ecclesiastical 
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boundaries. However, he is equally critical of the subjection of religion to state 
interference, perhaps with his Orkney folk memory in mind.
31
 
The defect of the method is sufficiently apparent. The Church has ever 
since been exposed to becoming the plaything of worldly politics, and 




In any event, Oman saw the establishment of national churches as a modest step 
towards “an extension of the scope of religion” and correspondingly a curtailment of 
“the previous division between the State and a foreign dominion under the name of 
the Church”.
33
 It was prophetic, he believed, of a better dispensation to come. The 
gain in the establishment of national churches in Reformation Europe lay mainly in 
the potential for a fuller realisation of spiritual freedom because “a freer system in a 
freer society should not only safeguard but carry forward”.
34
 The idea of a national 
church was for Oman, therefore, provisional and prophetic of a less institutional 
fellowship of faith that would evolve: a fellowship where freedom and faith were 
more obviously at one. 
Summary 
As an interpreter of the Reformation, Oman’s primary interest is theological. The 
Reformation set the theological agenda for the centuries to follow; indeed, it marked 
the beginning of modernity. Oman’s essential argument is that the Reformation was 
about the freeing of religion from the authority of the Church. It was the spiritual 
root of Luther’s break with medieval Christendom. If the Church is no longer the 
guarantor of salvation, and if the faith of the individual is the essential link to God, 
the position of the institutions becomes problematic.  
On the other hand, Oman was wary of theological abstraction and we see a lively 
interest in the historical factors. The traumatic events of the sixteenth century had 
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roots in the Renaissance. Travel, science and the discovery of ancient learning all had 
a part to play in marginalisation of institutional Christianity and in the quest for great 
freedom. Freedom proved an unruly idea. In consequence, the history of the sixteenth 
century is one of attempts to manage the dangers posed by freedom to faith and 
order. Calvin’s theology of Predestination and Luther’s Bondage of the Will, 
magisterial Reformation and the creation of national churches, confessional theology 
and the writing of catechisms in Protestant churches were efforts to give freedom 
structural expression. These were, in Oman’s view, both advances and limitations.  
Finally, as a postscript, Oman’s theological work would profit from being read 
alongside the wide and varied historiography of the Reformation. Such a reading 
would highlight how Oman’s study is theologically weighted and ideologically 
driven. It must be remembered, however, that he was not claiming in his Kerr 
lectures to give an historical account per se, but rather to trace the development of 
the two streams of Reformation thought: freedom and faith.
35
  
2 The Catholic Reformation 
Oman also addressed the question of freedom in relation to the Catholic tradition. 
“The hope,” he writes, “of maintaining this freedom within the fold of the Catholic 
Church was not confined to Luther and the Protestants.”
36
 Accordingly, he devoted 
the second of his Kerr Lectures to the Catholic responses. The lecture is significantly 
headed “Jesuitism and Pascal’s Pensées”.  
2.1 The Jesuits 
With regard to the Jesuits, Oman shows appreciation of the personal, spiritual 
struggle of the founder of the Society of Jesus. 
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Like Luther, Ignatius Loyola passed through a great personal conflict. 
To Loyola also it seemed if his life had been one continuous course of 
sin. But he came out of the battle on the other side from Luther
37
 
“The other side” was a spirituality that sought freedom in obedience, discipline and 
through the faith of the Church.  
Salvation was to be achieved by a kind of knight-errantry, with 
confessions three days long and scourgings (sic) three times a day, and 
with obedience to the word of order like a solder as the highest duty. 
Obedience to the human head of the Church occupied exactly the same 
place with Loyola as faith with the Divine Head with Luther.
38
 
Thus, Oman passes from appreciation of Loyola’s spiritual struggle to a strongly 
critical assessment of the Jesuits and their theology.  He regarded the Jesuit theology 
as essentially inimical to the interests of freedom. 
Jesuitism, being called into existence to fight Protestantism, took the 
radical step of repudiating the whole concept of Christian freedom.
39
 
Luther, Oman believed, had rescued freedom from the prison of institutional 
authority, with the result that freedom could find joy in God alone. The Jesuits, in 
contrast, gave primacy to the Church in directing the soul’s relation to God. And so, 
with regard to salvation, “we are justified when Christ’s righteousness, working 
through the Church, produces our righteousness”.
40
 In pastoral theology, freedom 
was likewise made subject to Church authority. When offering pastoral guidance, the 
Jesuits sought the widest possible latitude for individual choice, in order that 
personal freedom could be reconciled with the moral legislation of the Church. The 
doctrine that evolved was “probabilism”. Its chief characteristic was a balance 
between freedom and obedience, with maximum latitude given in cases where 
conscience could not conform to Church law.
41
 One might call it a “situation ethic” 
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within the context of the Church’s moral teaching. For Oman, however, this via 
media was an attempt to put the new wine of freedom into the old wines skins of 
institutional authority. Both the depths of human sinfulness and the heights of Divine 
grace call for a more radical theology of redemption, so that there can be 
reconciliation of the soul with God, without Church direction or institutional 
mediation.  
Moreover, if life is divided between freedom and responsibility, the 
natural man will always be ready to move the boundaries backwards, 
and the best way to commend him to the claim of the Church will be to 
make the sphere of independence as large as possible.
42
  
Thus, Oman regarded Jesuit casuistry as corrupting of both morals and faith. Large 
boundaries will always be more acceptable to the self-righteous than to the saint. 
And, it is equally the case that the conscience aspiring after truth, the troubled soul in 
quest of holiness, will be dissatisfied with even the widest moral parameters allowed 
by ecclesiastical authorities. The gospel is a call, not to minimise sinfulness but to 
find forgiveness and freedom in the soul’s personal relationship with God. A legally 
construed morality was, for Oman, dangerous, being always liable to hypocrisy. He 
writes: 




In this critique, we see again Oman’s dogmatic adherence to what he regarded as 
central insight of the Reformation, namely, that an essential distinction is to be made 
between religion and the Church.  
In other words, as definitely as the Reformation set religion above the 
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2.2 The Jansenists 
Whereas Oman is strongly critical of the Jesuits, he is, perhaps surprisingly, 
appreciative of their theological conservative opponents, the Jansenists.
45
 The 
movement which derived its name from Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), Bishop of 
Ypres, marked a return to the theology of Augustine. Emphasis was placed on the 
fall, the eternal plight of human beings in their natural state, the need for the 
regenerating power of Divine grace and on Divine election. The movement met 




For Oman, however, the Jansenists had a real vision of the spiritual importance of 
freedom. They may not have “attained the freedom depicted by Luther”,
47
but they 
could see that freedom must “reach as high as heaven”.
48
 Fundamental to the 
Jansenists was the inner relation of the soul to God. The key conviction expressed by 
Abbé Saint–Cyran, the leader of the movement at the convent Port-Royal, was that 
“when God means to deliver the soul, He begins internally”.
49
 Oman adds that, 




Because of Jansenist emphasis on personal devotion, the movement was a significant 
part of the quest for freedom that the Reformation had triggered. Jansenists 
challenged the power of the Church and many had to flee to Holland where they 
became the nucleus of the Old Catholic Church. Jansenist spirituality, though steeped 
in tradition, caught the mood of the age. It combined a deep pessimism about human 
nature with a fervent belief in redemption. They “found strange dark things in the 
heart of man and abundant perplexity and weakness”, but they believed that their 
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freedom was to be found in God, if only they could make “the rule of the Church at 
once more spiritual and austere”.
51
  Jansenism, in Oman’s reading, did mirror 
Calvinism. It placed the soul in direct relation to the electing, regenerating grace of 
God, but it did not fully understand that the sphere of religion is as wide as the 
sphere of life. Even with this criticism, however, one cannot help being stuck by the 
affirmative spirit of Oman’s concluding evaluation. As an historical movement, 
Jansenism occupied, Oman argues, “a singular position between Romanism and 
Protestantism”, “always tending to recur” and “which some day may be of vital 
importance for the Christian Church”. And, he adds, “never, except in Jansenism has 
it received deliberate utterance”.
52
 One cannot help but feel that Oman recognised in 
Jansenism something of the spirit of his own Seceder tradition. The Old Catholic 
movement that emerged from Jansenism placed a strong emphasis on interiority 
within a firm doctrinal and institutional framework. The Jansenists – like the Lollards 
before them and the Old Catholics to follow, together with Protestants like the 
Seceders – combined individual faith with institutional fellowship, but with primacy 
given to the soul’s personal relation to God. This mediating position between 
spiritual freedom and institutional belonging remains the ground occupied by the 
Churches born at the Reformation even to-day. 
2.3 Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) 
The most famous, and to Oman’s mind, the most creative Jansenist was Blaise Pascal 
(1632-1662). Pascal was introduced to a “remarkable band of men known as the 
Associates of Port Royal”
53
 through his sister Jacqueline, a nun in the convent of 
Port-Royal, near Paris.
54
 In relation to Pascal, Oman’s writing is at its most generous 
and appreciative. What attracted Oman to Pascal was the way that he both 
exemplified the spirituality of the Jansenists and transcended it. Pascal “continued to 
be a devout son of the Church, with a submission both to her creed and her 
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discipline” and this “was amazing in one so free”.
55
 Oman ascribes Pascal’s freedom 
to the primacy he gave to “the living experience of the grace of Christ”. This, 
however, was not mediated grace in the institutional or sacramental sense, but rather 
the grace of mystical relation to Christ.  
....it is not the Christ of the Church, but the Christ of living faith and of 
the Gospels, the Christ who is God’s answer to the enigma of life.
56
 
Again, one can argue – but to a far greater degree than with Jansenism – that in 
Pascal Oman found a spiritual understanding of faith that was kindred to his own. 
For neither thinker can God be known abstractly, but only through addressing the 
conflicts, the contrasts and the dilemmas of human existence. The strength of 
Pascal’s spirituality was that he: 
….looks at the extremes of wisdom and folly, of evil and good, and he 
seeks to understand man by means of them.
57
 
The wounded depths of humanity are in need of healing, the broken spirit cries out 
for restoration; and to this human predicament Christ comes as Redeemer. Oman 
summarises Pascal’s description of the human dilemma and its answer in Christ. 
It is not a necessary Being that it profits us to know, but the God who 
meets our need. This need we know when we know our own sinfulness. 
God we may know and not our need; our need we may know and not 
God. But we cannot know God in Christ without knowing God and our 
own need. This response to our need, this unveiling of man to himself 
and healing of the wounds laid bare, is the true proof of Christianity.
58
 
To cast it in modern terms, it was the existentialist in Pascal that spoke to Oman. For 
Oman, also, the only God that matters is “God sensible to the heart”.
59
 In that 
sensibility, freedom and faith are never put to shame, but rather, come to realisation 
in life and action. 
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A second, and related, aspect which appealed to Oman was Pascal’s experiential 
methodology. Oman makes much of Pascal’s contrast with Descartes. Descartes’ 
search for certainty led him to the thinking subject and to mathematics as a key to the 
universe. Oman concedes that Descartes’ methodology arose from “an earnest love 
for truth”; it became the method characteristic of the succeeding centuries. 
To understand the eighteenth century we must never forget that it was 
the age of mighty triumphs of mathematics in astronomy, the age that 
culminated in Newton, and that from Descartes, himself a discoverer in 
this region, onwards, it sought in a mathematical method a guide to all 
the labyrinth of the universe.
60
 
For Oman, however, the strength of Descartes’ method was also its limitation. To 
make “reasoned thought the standard of truth”, to restrict knowledge to what can be 
“built up by rigid deduction” and to place sole trust in the method of mathematics as 
“a guide to all the labyrinth of the universe” is “nothing short of idolatry”.
61
 In 
contrast, Oman found in Pascal a wide empiricism that could trust impressions of the 
outside world: it did not rely on deduction, or restrict thinking to understanding. 
Oman quotes approvingly Vinet’s opening remark about Pascal’s empiricism: 
The ultimate standard is ourselves, but it is ourselves in all our reach, in 
all that we feel as well as all we think, in all we have attained, as well 
as in the bare faculty of following a deduction.
62
 
It was Pascal’s plurality of method that was particularly attractive to Oman.  Pascal, 
though a mathematician and scientist himself, did not believe that science alone 
could unlock the mysteries of life. There are different kinds of knowledge: none of 
them complete. As a more recent commentator on Pascal observes: 
One of his deepest objections to the Cartesian method is that it assumes 
to assume that all real and valid knowledge is of the same kind, that 
there is only one way to certainty, which is that of rational conviction.63 
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In fact, for Pascal there could be no absolute certainty. Like Montaigne,
64
 he believed 
that “opinion not reason governs the world”.
65
Besides, reason being a human activity 
always bears the marks of human subjectivity and prejudice. In Oman’s paraphrase 
of Pascal: 
Laws of nature doubtless exist, but the corrupt reason has corrupted 
all…..Reason is duped by feeling, disturbed by ridicule, distracted by 
trivialities, kept in leading-strings by will, at the mercy of self interest.
66
 
It is for these reasons that philosophy, theology and the humanities in general are 
driven back to the study of human nature. Compared with the abstract methods of 
science, they have less certainty and more angst; however, their lessons are not for 
that reason less valuable. 
The proper study of mankind is man, but no study is less popular, for 
none is less consistent with being at ease.
67
 
This spiritual anthropology has many resonances in Oman’s later work. The human 
and the spiritual, the earthly and the heavenly, the natural and the supernatural meet 
in the human heart. Redemption is the healing of the rift between them. Given the 
strong line of continuity between these thinkers from such diversity of time and 
place, perhaps it is not surprising that Oman said of Pensées, “no book of modern 
times bears so distinctly the stamp of spiritual genius”. It is a remarkable 
commendation. Oman found in Pascal a freedom of spirit that could stand outside of 
ecclesiastical structures with, as it were, a heavenward glance. Like Oman, Pascal 
did not deny the necessity of structure – but it is shaped by reality and not vice versa. 
Oman’s favourite metaphor to describe Pascal’s contribution to the question of faith 
and freedom is that of the contrast between a citadel and a temple.
68
   
Pascal did not make the defence of Christianity a citadel but a temple. 
To effect that adequately is the problem, for faith shut up in a citadel 
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will always be unhappy and unfruitful, and freedom will always be 
outside and at enmity.
69
 
The Catholic tradition was thus important for Oman, as well as the Reformation 
traditions; but not in the modern sense of ecumenism. Oman was too critical of any 
historical pretention to finality, especially of any claim to visible authority. He was 
too committed to an evolutionary perspective, whereby every historical expression is 
ever changing to be a believer in institutional unity. As observed throughout this 
section, Oman’s commitments and criticisms were born of a belief that faith, though 
never completely cut loose from material embodiment, must never rest content with 
those embodiments or become dependent on them. The rightful place for faith is with 
freedom in the centre of the soul, in fellowship with God. 
Summary 
The leaven of freedom affected the dough of every tradition. And the Catholic 
Reformation was, for Oman, a further illustration of the unruly power unleashed in 
the sixteenth century. He is critical of Jesuits’ attempts to keep freedom within an 
institutional framework and, correspondingly, appreciative of the Jansenists and 
Pascal. To Oman, they appreciated the transcendent dimensions of faith and freedom 
– even whilst they tried to be good servants of the institutional Church. Pascal could 
rise to “spiritual genius” and his empirical methodology was a corrective to 
Descartes method of rational deduction. There is more than an admiration for Pascal: 
his way of doing theology was a forerunner of Oman’s own method, perhaps even 
the inspiration of it. In this section we have seen another side of Oman. He was no 
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ecumenist but had a catholicity of spirit. The Jansenists and Pascal were, for Oman, 
evidence that spiritual freedom of the sixteenth century was no sectarian aberration. 
They illustrate that the freedom discovered at the Reformation, and carried over into 
the Catholic Reformation, is of significance, and of consequence for the whole 
Christian world, indeed for all of humanity. 
3 Enlightenment  
Oman approaches the Enlightenment by way of “English Deism and Butler’s 
Analogy”.
70
 This is indicative of Oman’s conviction that English thought was part of 
a wider European tradition. His discussion of the thinkers who shaped the thought of 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is wide ranging: from Hobbes to 
Locke and Butler. For Oman, the weakness of deism was its captivity to the scientific 
methodology. It was the achievement of Joseph Butler to set the question of faith and 
freedom in a wider context. Though reason can bear good fruit in the domain of 
science, in the human sphere the essential link is between freedom and conscience. 
When freedom is linked with conscience the result may be less sure-footed, but this 
in itself highlights the spiritual nature of freedom. Indeed, it is factors such as 
probability, and the provisional nature of knowledge, that make room for faith. For 
Butler and for Oman it is faith, not rational certainty, that is the guide in relation to 
ultimate reality.
71
 Both regard limitation in knowledge and dependence on faith not 
negatively but positively. Limitation is the field of our spiritual and moral discipline. 
However, Oman was unhappy to read the gospel solely as a call to faith and 
discipline.
72
 Butler’s emphasis on conscience, timely as it was, needs the good news 
of the Cross whereby we are crucified to the world and the world to us.
73
 In other 
words, personality needs the nurture of divine love, a love that is distinct from the 
world and yet the key to life in the world. Butler, for all his creative insight into faith 
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that transcends rationalism, still fell short of heavenly vision; that is, he did arrive at 
intuition of a love that is comforting as it is creative, a love that relieves burdens of 
the world as it empowers the soul to carry them. Butler’s theology cried out for a 
theology of the Cross, for an ontology of love, suffering and redeeming – the love of 
Christ crucified, dead and buried, and yet alive. Oman concludes: 
To Butler [like Pascal] God always remained somewhat less than a 
Father, having in Him always something of a household disciplinarian. 
In this Butler comes short of the glorious liberty of the children of God, 




Despite these misgivings, Oman regarded “English Deism” and Butler’s response to 
it as an important arch in the bridge from the Reformation to modernity. The modern 
period, proper, begins with the Enlightenment; it is then that the freedom birthed at 
the Reformation came of age. The early study of Oman’s work by Francis George 
Healey recognises this point. Healey comments: 
As he saw it, the Reformers republished St Paul’s teaching that faith in 
Christ sets a man free to be servant of all….In the eighteenth century a 
permanent contribution was made to the fuller understanding of 
freedom. The nineteenth century provided another.
75
 
Thus, the Enlightenment and its aftermath was a matter of the continuity, 
clarification and development.
76
 In an historical time frame, the Enlightenment and 
Romantic periods were the centrepiece of a very large mosaic.  
Coming to the Enlightenment itself, the multi-national aspect of the movement, or 
more accurately movements, is reflected in the names given to it: Enlightenment, 
Aufklärung and Illuminism. Stephen Bevans remarks that Oman “never seemed 
satisfied by any English designation”;
77
 it is true that no single expression could 
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capture the diversity and richness of a revolution that changed European culture so 
fundamentally. However, Oman himself remarks that the Enlightenment is the 
“simpler and more suggestive” of the terms in use. His own preference would have 
been for the term Emancipation.78 It was the end of “pupilage” in every sphere of 
life: intellectual, religious and political. Various influences contributed to it; and, 
there was a great deal of cross fertilisation. The influence of English Deism passed 
chiefly into France through Voltaire;
79
 and, though a direct connection between 
Kant’s practical reason and Butler’s doctrine of conscience cannot be asserted, Oman 
can say: “it is nearer akin to Kant’s thought than anything then existing in the 
world”.
80
 It was Kant who was the great figure of the Enlightenment; in Kant, Oman 
wrote: “the eighteenth century summed up its results, as in no other man”.
81
 
3.1 Kant and the Individual 
In Oman’s reading, Kant was “the necessary starting point” for the new generation of 
thinkers who were to follow him. He writes: 
No man is greater within his own limits than Kant, but the limits of few 
great men have been so severely set. Yet also belonged to his 
equipment, for in that wide-spreading, encyclopaedic age, such 
limitation made for power.
82
 
Kant gave central place to the self-determining individual, both in the sphere of 
knowledge and morality. In epistemology, it is the mind that brings order to sense 
experience; time and space are the categories by which the mind shapes reality and 
are forms of perception rather than forms of reality itself. These forms of perception 
apply to the world of phenomena. In the realm of practical reason, however, human 
beings access another dimension: the noumenal world of value. In the noumenal 
world it is the categorical imperative that shapes reality. With the same uniformity as 
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the laws of physics in the external world, the universal moral law – abstract, uniform 
and exact for all individuals – governs the inner realm of intelligible reality. The 
conscience, if an individual is to be free, must accept no other authority: no 
heteronymous influence, such as the verdict of other people.  Of course, the 
individual is free either to obey the categorical imperative or to disobey; therefore, 
the individual stands at a moral crossroads. The freedom and dignity of the 
individual is a destiny personally determined. Oman admires Kant’s achievement and 
summarises it as follows. 
Freedom is the essence of our personality. To act freely, not as a 
plaything of impulses, but according to an idea of law which our own 
reason has laid down for us, is to be a person, not a thing, is to rise to 
the realm of absolute purposes.
83
 
For Oman, the great debt owed to Kant arises from his affirmation of the rights and 
dignity of the individual. And, though human beings are not created good, through 
free obedience to the moral law they can become good; by means of what Kant 
called “moral asceticism”, the will free though corrupt can be disciplined. In 
addition, after the manner of the Lutheran doctrine of justification, God sees the end 
from the beginning; thus, even in the present, a human being may be regarded as 
good, though with a long moral road to travel.  
Gradual reformation cannot work the renewal. A revolution is required, 
a change of mind, a kind of new birth, a new creation, a complete 
transition from the maxim of self-love to the maxim of holiness. That 
being accomplished, a man is – so far at least as the principle is 
concerned – a subject susceptible of good.
84
 
But, as Oman observed, Kant’s “limits were severely set”; and when it came to 
understanding religion, this was particularly so. Religion was viewed exclusively 
through the lens of morality. The sublimation of religious categories into moral ones 
was so complete in Kant’s work, Religion within the realm of Reason Alone,85 that 
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no other conclusion was possible save that morality is “the sum and substance of 
religion”.
86
 In effect, Oman remarked, no philosophy of religion was ever in more 
need of the gospel, especially for a gospel that is more than morality. It was a 
paradox that Kant “will have no gospel”, and yet “no scheme of morals ever stood in 
more need of one. His yoke is not easy and his burden is not light”.
87
 Oman’s 
criticisms of Kant, accordingly, are in three directions.  
First, Oman finds Kant’s understanding of the moral law unsatisfactory. It is too 
uniform and abstract. Kant’s “one rule for all” excludes differences in personality. 
Therefore, though a champion of the individual, ironically he has no room for 
individuality. Hence, from the perspective of Kantian morality, differences in 
individual character can be construed only as defects in obedience. As we shall see, 
this distinction between the individual and individuality features large when Oman 
comes to consider Romanticism. At that point, he devotes considerable space to 
weighing up the respective merits of the Kantian ideal of the individual, in 
comparison with the concept of creative individuality so important to the Romantic 
thinkers.  
A second and broader criticism that Oman makes is that Kant’s attitude to the value 
of worship, either private or corporate, is wholly negative. For Kant, a truly good 
man might not pray at all; and, if he does pray, it should be only to ask for 
conformity to the will of God. In relation to corporate worship, it was Kant’s view 
that ritual and outward ceremonies are premised on the erroneous belief that God is 
susceptible to praise or persuasion. Worship is at best a distraction, at worst a hurtful 
moral attitude.  Oman finds this parsimonious conception of worship a failure to see 
that religion must arise above morality and that the purpose of worship is to 
introduce human beings to “the love that casts out fear”. It is love not law that is 
redemptive; and by love the soul is led to the freedom of the children of God. Oman 
acknowledges that Kant’s moral understanding of religion aims at the same end. 
However, morality, he believes, has neither a wide enough perspective, nor enough 
regenerative power to reach religion’s true goal of fellowship with God. Even at this 
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early stage in his thinking, Oman has in view a concept of grace that would nurture 
freedom, not hinder it. But such a theology of grace would come a decade later in 
Grace and Personality.  
Thirdly, Kant’s failure to appreciate the need for religion to transcend morality arose, 
Oman believed, from his undervaluing of historical religion. For Kant, historical 
religion is “a useful kind of nursery governess for the true moral religion”.
88
 
However, it is something to be grown out of as we mature to a truly rational, moral 
faith. To Oman, this was inconsistent given Kant’s strong belief in the Kingdom of 
God. For Kant, the Kingdom of God is a transcendent reality and the goal of 
historical existence. Should history, therefore, not be of ultimate significance for 
faith? Is historical existence not the sphere where moral and spiritual character is 
shaped amidst contingency and ambiguity? It is, surely, “the eternal foundation not 
of an earthly kingdom but of a heavenly kingdom”.
89
 In this way, Oman argues, 
Lessing’s impasse between the contingent truths of history and the eternal truths of 
reason is bridged. The contingent truths are the eternal truths: they are by nature 
personal and existential. Perhaps Oman has the distinction between geschichte and 
historie in mind, recognizing that narrative transcends the facts and engagement is 
necessary to knowledge. He comments:  
Moreover, we have a history which the frivolous cannot know, a history 
which has no meaning except for those who are seeking to accomplish 
the victory of freedom in the earth.
90
 
Even after we have taken these criticisms on board, Kant remains a strong influence 
on Oman’s thinking. Of particular importance is Kant’s emphasis on the dignity and 
freedom of the individual. This is plain in one of Oman’s most eloquent passages. It 
is a passage where Oman extols the importance of the eighteenth century, as shaped 
by the philosophy of Kant, for our understanding of human dignity and for universal 
human rights. It is a passage that would be worthy of quotation in any document 
affirming human rights. This section ends with the passage in full. 
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To be able to regard all individuals alike and to find man’s dignity not 
in his opulence of nature but in his common humanity, is a fundamental 
moral and religious requirement. The foundation of all liberty is regard 
for the individual conscience and for the faith which is truly an 
expression of personal need. Moreover, this regard for the individual is 
the only secure foundation for a human society that is to be based on a 
more stable condition than outward compulsion. The ultimate test for a 
social order is its regard for the rights and duties of the individual as 
such. The century, therefore, wrought an immense work for human 




That the League of Nations had not been formed when Oman wrote this – and the 
United Nations and its Universal Declaration on Human Rights was nearly half a 
century, and two world wars away – must make it a remarkably visionary statement. 
The genesis of it, of course, is in Kant’s moral philosophy. 
4 Romanticism  
Oman was aware that the term Romanticism has broad parameters and can apply to 
subject matter as wide as literature, philosophy and theology. In The 	atural and the 
Supernatural he acknowledges this diversity and indicates his own particular focus 
and boundaries. 
The term Romanticism is confusing, not only because it is used with 
different meanings, but because there is the constant habit of slipping 
from one meaning into another. In its wider meaning, Romanticsim 
covers the whole poetic movement of the early nineteenth century; in 
its narrower, it means a special school of thought of which Goethe was 
the divinity, Friedrich Schlegel was the high-priest, Hegel was the 
philosopher, and Schleiermacher the prophet. Here we are dealing with 
the latter kind of Romanticism especially with its philosophy…..
92
  
Similarly, in the Kerr Lectures, it is the philosophical aspect that concerns Oman; 
and in particular the relation of the individual to individuality. Whereas the 
distinguishing feature of the eighteenth century was the centrality of the individual, 
the hallmark of the nineteenth was a preoccupation with individuality. This change of 
emphasis was in itself a natural outcome of Kant’s philosophy; but, on the other 
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hand, it jeopardised all that Kant had achieved. This section will examine this 
paradoxical feature of Romanticism.  
Oman begins with recognition of continuity; it was natural that philosophy should 
seek a philosophy of the individual that would complete the work that Kant had 
begun. Kant had been the great guardian of individual freedom and dignity, but he 
did not make allowance for the variety that is the hallmark of personality. The 
individual in the Kantian definition was a rather colourless creation. As Oman puts 
it: 
It enjoined man to be moral, but did not show what he was to be moral 
about; it asserted the dignity of the individual, but it did not show in 
what form of individuality this dignity was to display itself; it asserted 
freedom, but it was freedom in a vacuum not a world.
93
 
Therefore, though Kant probed the depths of what it means to be a person, a broader 
understanding of personality was required. The philosophers of the Romantic era 
filled the vacuum and Kant’s moral philosophy passed through a metamorphosis: 
changing from a philosophy of the transcendent to a pantheistic philosophy of the 
world. No longer was there moral asceticism, but an enthusiastic embracing of life in 
the world. Oman lists the following reasons for this transformation from Kant’s 
moral Idealism to the metaphysical Idealism of the nineteenth century. 
First, idealism was a natural complement to Kant’s work. Kant had emphasised the 
function of mind in the creation of knowledge. It was his constructive answer to 
Hume’s scepticism. But the nineteenth century philosophers asked: why does reason 
have to be as purely functional as the Kantian categories proscribe?  Could reason 
not – as Fichte boldly asserted – “produce the manifold of sense, as well as fashion it 
into experience”? Was reason not, in fact, as Schelling believed, “the thinking again 
of God’s thoughts because man was made in God’s image.”? Hegel was heir to all 
these suggestions and developed them most thoroughly and completely. 
Consequently, the Romantic era breathed a pantheistic air and freedom sprouted 
wings and soared to artistic heights. Oman graphically describes the contrast between 
Kant and his successors.  
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With this conception, freedom could no longer be regarded as mere 
autonomy, mere self-government, or the task of maintaining it as a 
mere riding of the marches between God and man and man and man.
94
 
On the contrary, freedom adopted the air of “a gorgeous pantheism with its confusion 
of all vital distinctions and its idea of liberty as mere luxuriance”.
95
 
Secondly, evolution was also a contributing factor to an expanding sense of 
individuality. We have already noted that: “what the Law of gravitation was to the 
eighteenth century the theory of Evolution was to the nineteenth”.
96
 However, 
whereas the Darwinian idea of evolution became for some the foundation of 
materialism; for others the idea of developing spiritual experience was inherent in the 
evolutionary process. Organic ways of thinking opened up a whole new world of 
possibility, linking thought with matter, and both with God. For example, Hegel 
considered the emergence of all things, material and mental, as a natural continuum 
and a Divine revelation – “the self-unfolding of the Universal Reason”. 
97
 
Schleiermacher too, looked upon strife and conflict as part of “an ordered whole”.
98
 
Evolution was a prevailing idea bearing upon a whole range of Romantic 
sensibilities. 
This conception of restless struggle and a growing individuality in the 
bosom of a universe that rejoices in the unfolding of all its variety, is 
the keynote of the new age.
99
 
Thirdly, a growing interest in history was a correlate to the idea that the world is a 
great, growing organism. And, this too enhanced the concept of individuality.  The 
human factor in the course of history took on new importance. The Romantic period 
saw a great explosion of investigation into the past. “Dead languages were 
interpreted, buried libraries were dug up, remote centuries were at least dimly 
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 Every form of research tended to become historical; the scientist 
began where history ended.  And, consequently, the scientist, 
….sought to carry back our knowledge of society and man and living 
creatures and even the inorganic world to the beginning of things.”
101
 
Fourthly, pietism also contributed to an understanding of the individuality. Religious 
awakening had a lasting effect beyond its eighteenth century beginnings. It was a 
corrective to the prevailing philosophical idea that human beings are merely moral 
subjects of the Supreme Governor of the Universe. Methodism in Britain, Pietism in 
Germany and the Great Awakening in America recovered the place of feeling in 
religion: the ramifications ranged far and wide. Kant himself had grown up in the 
atmosphere of piety. Schleiermacher was educated by Moravians and remained a 
pietist “of the highest order”.
102
 Newman’s religious life owed its birth to 
Evangelicalism. Furthermore, argues Oman, even literary and artistic revival became 
for “many young spirits like a religion”.
103
 
A new sense of freedom flowed in them, freedom of individuality, 
freedom of luxuriant growth against the gardener’s shears.
104
 
These varied factors interacted to provide an environment where Kant’s philosophy 
of the individual could expand and take on a cosmic significance. It was as though 
human creativity had found a whole new spiritual world and the individual was free 
from the narrow moral construct of Kant’s philosophy. Oman acknowledged this 
sense of continuity, but was alert to its dangers. 
And so, to the other side of the paradox: Romanticism threatened all that Kant had 
achieved on behalf of the individual. This, certainly, is Oman’s reading of it. Whilst 
it was natural that there should be a swing away from the “dry temper of the 
preceding century”, Romanticism’s love of individuality was “full of moral and 
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 It is a revealing comment.
106
 Oman’s chief complaint against the 
Romantic celebration of individuality is that it abandoned Kant’s basic dualism 
between the world and transcendent reality. It is divine “Otherness” that allows the 
space for personal responsibility. “Moral and spiritual danger” arises when the 
antagonism between the world as it is and the world as it is meant to be is obscured 
or denied. The freedom that Kant contended for is contingent on a dualism that 
refuses to indentify the world with God. In fact, the gulf, or the enmity, between the 
world and God creates the “resistance by which we must climb”.
107
  
By starting without this dualism we must end with a denial of all 
fundamental distinctions, with the repetition of the mystic phrase “all in 
one,” with the great cloud land of pantheism where the shadows of 
giants carry on a phantom battle of the gods; whereas by starting with 
this dualism and bearing the burden of it in life, we may end with the 
high solution of wisdom and love, which after all is the only unity 
worth finding in the world.
108
 
In this comment, from early in his career, Oman was on the side of the moralists 
rather than the artists. He even says “that the way of freedom and duty often refuses 
to be artistic”.
109
 With a forward glance into the history of the first half of the 
twentieth century, Oman’s unease with cultural absorption of Christianity echoes 
other warnings. For example, in the 1930s it was the strong contention of neo-
orthodox theologians that nineteenth century theology had succumbed to culture, 
with the subsequent loss of the transcendent Word of God. Oman, too, from a 
different perspective, saw the danger and warned of it. Oman’s ground for warning 
focused, as we have seen, primarily on the freedom and dignity of persons. And, for 
Oman, the dignity of persons is predicated on an ontological depth to reality that 
marks a limit to every system: cultural, political or philosophical. That limit also 
marks the sacred space in which human dignity finds its home. In religious terms, 
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our thoughts are not God’s thoughts, neither are his ways our ways.
110
 Yet, God is 
not distant but present to us in our brother and sister;
111
 or, as Oman expresses it, 
human beings are the ultimate symbol of God: “the sacrament of the Divine is 
humanity”.
112
 Oman sets against the power of culture an affirmation of the Other, at 
once in our neighbour and above all.  
4.1 Schleiermacher and Hegel 
Oman’s critique of Romanticism was as usual nuanced. Stephen Bevans rightly calls 
him the “reconciler of opposites”. Hence, though he is firmly on the side of Kant, he 
is also aware of the contribution of Romanticism. In a long sentence he describes the 
positive contribution of the movement he has just so stridently warned about. The 
sentence is quoted in full. 
This defect in moral strenuousness being acknowledged, the gain of 
Romanticism, however, ought also to be acknowledged – its 
recognition of the elements in human nature and in life which had been 
ignored, its attempt to life in a world and not in a vacuum, its thought of 
the universe no longer as a great machine of which the main problem 
was to find the driving wheel, but as a great work of art, the more 
glorious that it is still in the process of creation, its idea of man’s mind 
no more as a calculating machine, a lathe for turning out logical 
conclusions, but as a mirror of the universe, a copy in a finite form of 
Eternal Reason, not a mere faculty of abstractions, but a treasure house 
of all the variety and individuality of the world.
113
 
How, one may ask, can this protean description be reconciled with the earlier 
criticisms we have encountered? It is a good example of Oman’s methodology. He 
always takes the widest possible angle on a problem and strives to discern both worth 
and weakness in every intellectual position. It is, indeed, the fruit of making freedom 
the final hermeneutical principle. If knowledge must function, as Oman believed it 
does, within an evolutionary cosmology, then there can be no final intellectual, moral 
or spiritual resting place; nor can there be no road humanly travelled, which doesn’t 
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exhibit both gain and loss. Thus, Oman finds in Romanticism, or, more especially, in 
the two great figures of Schleiermacher and Hegel, vision and insight of abiding 
worth. 
4.1.1 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 
Oman’s analysis of Schleiermacher’s work is extensive, both in his translation and 
introduction to the Speeches and in his Kerr Lectures. The salient point, in Oman’s 
estimation, is that Schleiermacher delivered religion from the rationalism and 
moralistic tendencies of the eighteenth century. In so doing he gave primary position 
to individuality and, most importantly, he made the foundation of religion freedom in 
God. Oman sums up the point of view of the Speeches as follows: 
The Infinite is endlessly at work expressing itself in the most 
multifarious forms, and each individual in being one such expression of 
the infinite variety. It would almost appear as if, to Schleiermacher’s 
mind, infinity in God derived meaning and significance mainly from 
individuality in man. 
This view of man’s freedom, as the right and duty to be himself, went 
with a different conception of the source of freedom. The creative 
power in man is not ratiocination, but feeling or intuition. By feeling we 
have intercourse with reality.
114
 
Oman adds that the three editions of the Speeches, the first in 1799, the second in 
1806 and the third in 1829, show how Scheiermacher’s thought progressed. 
Nevertheless, it was the first edition of Speeches that made the “first deep 
impression”.
115
 And, “it is Schleiermacher’s enduring merit that he insisted that man 
must be free to be something, and that there is no real freedom except in God”.
116
 
Thus, in Schleiermacher, Oman found a writer who articulated his own deepest 
intuitions about the unity of piety and freedom. The quest for freedom that had 
aggravated the split between religion and unbelief from the Reformation onwards 
was, to Schleiermacher’s mind and to Oman’s, a false dichotomy. God rather than 
being the enemy of freedom is, each believed, its source and guardian. Furthermore, 
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Schleiermacher was able to arrive at a conception of freedom in God that avoided the 
excesses of pantheism. He envisaged the “transaction” between human beings and 
God in “more personal terms”.
117
 It was this aspect of Schleiermacher that Oman 
carried forward most in his own thinking.  
However, in spite of Oman’s admiration for Schleiermacher, he believed that there 
was something lost in the transition from Kant’s moral emphasis. First, 
Schleiermacher made his appeal to a cultured elite in order that they could see that 
religion was not at odds with artistic temperament. This, Oman argues, begs the 
question as to what Christian freedom is. Is it to be found in culture? Is it, in Oman’s 
pejorative expression, “a mere caste interest”?
118
 Should Christian freedom not 
dignify – as Luther implied – the work of the peasant, or artisan, as much as that of a 
cultured elite? 
Manifestly there is some mistake. The glorious liberty of the children of 
God can glorify the basest of tasks, and our spiritual heritage should not 
be at the mercy of any outward condition, even the means of culture. 
Man in that case is not free in any right sense of the word. Unless life’s 
final goal is something more independent of circumstances than culture, 
there can never be true inner freedom. Even such an outward good as 




In this estimation of Schleiermacher, we have both the cautious Oman and the radical 
Oman. He concedes, even admires, Schleiermacher’s vision of freedom in God in 
which the glory of being human may blossom. At the same time, he fears that the 
moral value of the individual may be lost if there are no windows from the world of 
culture to transcendent reality. Human beings grow and develop, not in light of 
culture, but in the half light of experience. It was the weakness of Schleiermacher 
and the Romantic writers generally that,  
The interest is so concentrated on individuality that the individual 
disappears behind it. Man does not stand as he did to the writers of the 
eighteenth century, with the burden of his freedom on his shoulders, 
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distinct both from God and other men, arraigning himself before the 




Thus, Oman retains a Kantian zeal for duty; and the transcendent point of reference 
is cardinal. Culture may represent the flowering of freedom, but freedom itself, if it is 
to live courageously, needs a heavenly vista and rugged independence. Of that, 
Christ is the great example; and the Lord’s Prayer is the essential creed. 
4.1.2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770- 1831) 
Hegel doesn’t receive the same detailed analysis as Schleiermacher; but, 
nevertheless, he was not for that considered any less important by Oman. Whereas 
“Schleiermacher was the great theologian”, it was Hegel who was “the great 
philosopher”.
121
 Despite personal antagonisms between the two thinkers, Oman 
regards their intellectual perspectives as essentially compatible. For example, for 
both “history is the revelation of God”.
122
 The chaotic and antagonistic elements of 
history are only such from the point of view of time. They have their reconciliation 
in God who is beyond all contrasts and opposites. Whilst for Schleiermacher, bad is a 
necessary part of the good; for Hegel, evil is overcome in the unfolding process of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In relation to sin, for Schleiermacher it “is a 




The difference, therefore, between the two thinkers is essentially epistemological, 
and centres on the point of contact between the individual and ultimate reality. With 
Schleiermacher, reality is known through feeling, or intuition; for Hegel knowledge 
comes through reason.
124
  Also, for Schleiermacher, we cannot know God in an 
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absolute sense but are dependent on faith that follows intuition. However, for Hegel 
there is a transparency in reason that makes for a univocal relation between human 
reason and God.  
If the Universal Mind can be interpreted by my mind, the process of 
thinking must be identical in both. There cannot be two kinds of 
thought, and hence God is not the highest feeling but the highest 




Oman acknowledges the appeal of Hegel’s hypothesis. Indeed, it is of “first 
importance that genuine faith and real freedom can never be in disagreement”.
126
 
However, as one might expect for Oman, the weakness of the whole Hegelian system 
was the loss of the individual as an independent moral agent.  
God for Hegel is not the System-builder, He is the great System in 
which everything is right because everything is in its place.
127
 
In consequence, personal freedom is lost in process and no longer a work of purpose 
and endeavour. As Oman graphically puts it, in Hegelianism the individual “registers 
on the barometer” more than doing anything “to improve the weather”.
128
  
4.2 The Enlightenment and Romantic legacies 
Having pursued the theme of freedom from the Reformation to the Enlightenment 
and through to the Romantic era, the remainder of the Kerr Lectures was devoted to 
the legacy of these contrasting though complementary movements. The immediate 
lectures were entitled, “The Revolution and Newman’s Apologia”129 and “The 
Theory of Development and Baur’s First Three Centuries”.130 In brief, these 
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illustrate how the idea of the world as process and development remained prominent 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Oman argues that the Oxford movement 
and the “higher criticism” of the Tübingen School, though implacable opposites in 
their conclusions, shared a common a priori starting point. They began with a theory 
of history before beginning the study of history. In their contrasting ways, Newman 
and Baur were impatient with the slow, irregular, methods of free enquiry; they were 
too eager for a metaphysic into which the complications of history could be fitted 
and resolved. In Newman’s case it was “various Economics of Dispensations of the 
Eternal”
131
; in Baur’s it was the thesis of primitive Christianity, the antithesis of 
gentile Christianity and the synthesis of early Catholicism. Oman writes; 
The aim of Baur’s theory is to pour the fullness of the perfected idea of 
Christianity into many vessels, and it seems to describe as much to Paul 
as to Jesus, but he is too great an historian to be able to conceal the 
unique greatness of Him who remains the Author of the Faith; nor, 
although his task is to prove development, can he obscure the fact that 
nothing ever rises higher than the religion of Jesus.
132
 
For Oman, all theories of historical determinism cannot but jeopardise the tasks and 
opportunities afforded to the free person and exemplified in Christ. There are no 
“mountain peaks of thought”, no overview that can spare humanity the arduous task 
of exploration. Freedom will always be full of pain and toil as moral options are 
sifted; and failure is often the result of wrong conclusions being drawn and wrong 
ways being taken. There is no alternative. The autonomy of the Enlightenment 
cannot be mortgaged for the illusionary security of a perfect vision, “complete” 
metaphysic or “final” revelation.
133
 For this reason, patience is the pre-requisite of 
freedom. “We see the need”, Oman writes, “of patience, the need of looking at 
history not as a large scheme, but as a record of toils and struggles of men for faith 
and freedom, struggles depending on will and character in the final issue.”
134
 In 
Oman’s thinking, the quest for freedom and the call to freedom may rock the most 
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solid foundations. It was the premise of the Enlightenment that all tradition is to be 
questioned and all knowledge interrogated. For Oman, this is a goal to be prized. 
Freedom to question, sift and even to bring down the most hallowed citadels of 
thought can be prized in the security of a love that nurtures, calls, inspires and 
forgives, the all embracing love that Christians make bold to name as God.
135
 This 
conviction proved to be the grundprinzip of all of Oman’s subsequent work. 
The final of the Kerr lectures, “The theology of experience and Ritschl’s Justification 
and Reconciliation”, and “Method and Results” take the theme of freedom and faith 
up to the period contemporary with Oman’s writing.
136
 These lectures are 
illuminating too, as Oman moves to the question of freedom and atonement. It is at 
the Cross where freedom and love meet revealing the depth and interconnection 
between them. Oman draws upon both British and German theology, showing that 
the theme of reconciliation pre-occupied theologians as diverse as McLeod Campbell 
in Scotland to Ritschl in Germany. “English theology” he believed, could never 
resolve the issue of faith and freedom with the consequence of  “all schools falling 
back in one way or another on the position that truth is what God has authoritatively 
announced”.
137
 On the other hand, the world of British theology had “a deep interest 
in the question of Atonement and its earnest endeavour to make the doctrine 
convincing to the heart and conscience”.
138
 Thus, “the greatness of the issue has not 
been altogether unperceived”.
139
 With regard to German theology, Oman critically 
examines the liberal (Hegelian), the confessional (Lutheran High Church) and 
mediating schools culminating with Ritschl, whom he takes to be a representative of 
the latter. These theologies, Oman argues, though they all perceived the problem of 
reconciling faith and freedom, halted between two opinions, never fully realising the 
priority of freedom over all else.   In the end, it is freedom itself that matters; it is the 
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sacrament of the divine in humanity; it is fundamental to the supernatural and to the 
natural alike. Oman concludes: 
In the present feeble beginnings of man’s freedom, nourished tenderly 
by God’s grace, we see the baby’s hand that holds the sceptre of this 
great realm, and we should resent nothing that displays either its 
vastness or its permanence. Thus in a higher sense than his we realise 
the force of Hegel’s great saying: “the truth of necessity is freedom”.
140
 
Oman remained ever on the side of freedom against its critics. We must, he argues, 
“never be impatient of the half done task”.
141
 That is the nature of the God given 
reality in which we live. History would have no meaning if the end was known from 
the beginning. Misery, error and chaos mean that “God is patient enough to let us 
work out our freedom, that, in the end, He may bind us with the only eternal bond of 
love”.
142
 Thus, Oman combined freedom with the idea that the universe subsists in a 
larger spiritual environment, the supernatural. The supernatural is our spiritual home, 
that is, a place where freedom and otherness or difference are sacrosanct; and in that 
reality, the autonomy of the enlightenment and the sense of oneness for which the 
romantics craved, find, Oman believed, reconciliation.  
Summary 
In relation to the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods of European culture, Kant 
was the necessary starting point. It was Kant, Oman believed, who set the agenda for 
all who followed. At the heart of his moral philosophy were freedom, dignity and 
individual responsibility. Kant was the thinker who set the ground rules for what it is 
to be a person. However, Leibnitz’s famous saying, that philosophical sects are 
nearly all right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny, was pre-eminently 
true of Kant.
143
 Those aspects of personality that are unique to each individual were 
ignored by Kant in his rigid adherence to the moral law and categorical 
                                                 
140
 Faith and Freedom, 419. 
141
 Faith and Freedom, 271. 
142
 This theme is analysed more closely in Chapter Four. 
143






 Nevertheless, Kant’s limitations were compensated for by his great 
achievement of raising the worth, dignity, freedom and responsibilities of the 
individual to a new level. 
Romanticism, in turn, sought to correct the deficiencies of the eighteenth century, 
with its strict moral definition of what it means to be a person. Several factors 
contributed to the rise of romantic sensibilities: Kantian idealism itself, evolution, a 
renewed sense of history and pietism. However, the gains towards understanding the 
rich diversity of individuality were not matched by a sustained respect for the 
individual. This, for Oman, was the great weakness of the nineteenth century 
emphasis on individuality. He expresses it most strongly as “a moral and spiritual 
danger”. The crux of that danger was the loss of a sense of God’s transcendence and 
the reduction of religion to pantheism. Thus, what personality seemed to gain 
through the recognition of individuality was imperilled in absorption of the 
individual in the various determinisms that flowed from the philosophy of Hegel. 
The latter was the great philosopher of the Romantic era, but his deification of 
human reason jeopardised human autonomy and, in consequence, the significance of 
moral struggle, born of freedom and faith, was eclipsed.  
Oman, however, saw redeeming factors in Romanticism as well as dangers. This was 
particularly so with respect to the theology of Schleiermacher. The insight that 
ultimate freedom is in God – and that piety and freedom are not alien to each other, 
but mutually edifying – was of lasting significance for theology. Oman regarded this 
insight as Schleiermacher’s greatest contribution. At the same time, the full benefit 
of Schleiermacher’s theology was not realised because his tendency was to identify 
freedom with its cultural expression: this is to lose freedom in mundane reality. 
Furthermore, freedom can never be the prerogative of cultured elites, but rather it is 
realised through the sustaining power of God for the lowliest task.   
At the end of Oman’s review of religious significance of the Enlightenment and 
Romantic periods, he traces the continuing relevance of the issue in the late 
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nineteenth century through to the twentieth. Freedom of persons remained, for 
Oman, the central question to be addressed in metaphysics and theology. 
Concluding remarks 
Oman’s understanding of the Reformation, Enlightenment and Romantic traditions 
deserves to be better known. His knowledge of the long European meta-narrative is 
comprehensive and in English there are no equivalent studies. John Macquarrie’s 
Twentieth Century Religious Thought,145 A.I.C. Heron’s, A Century of Protestant 
Theology146 or Barth’s 	ineteenth Century Protestant Thought,147 come near with 
respect to the nineteenth century; but, they do not attempt to reach back to the 
Reformation, nor do they range so freely across the disciplines of philosophy and 
theology. James Livingstone’s volume, Modern Christian Thought,148 certainly 
covers a wide terrain, but begins with the Enlightenment. The key difference 
between Oman and any of the fore-mentioned is that he sets out not simply to give an 
intellectual history, but to read history through a particular hermeneutical lens.  The 
story of modernity, or, as Oman calls it, the birth of “Modern Time”, cannot be 
separated from the question of freedom. It is the star by which Oman seeks to 
navigate impasses such as those between freedom and religion, freedom and 
determinism and the individual and individuality. The test that Oman applies to any 
particular philosophy is whether it enhances individual freedom and responsibility, or 
whether it is inimical to it. In the next chapter, the question of the contours of 
freedom will be examined in detail. 
For now, it is noted that for Oman the pearl at great price in the European meta-
narrative was freedom as a spiritual value.
149
 In that concept, Oman finds a key to 
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Europe’s diversity and chaos, and an understanding of its wars as well as its great 
synthesising movements. Freedom as a spiritual value – through periods of loss and 
times of recovery – shapes philosophy, culture and theology. In the midst of the 
shifting tectonic plates of culture, the affirmation of personal freedom through faith 
in God is a saving grace. Otherwise, the human spirit is either enchanted by systems 
of thought and ideologies, or crushed by a hopeless determinism. Freedom has the 
potential for both chaos and creativity and the human spirit must shape its own 
destiny. Paradoxically this can be done only through the discovery of, and obedience 
to God’s will. The possibility of failure is always present, and often happens. But 
still, the enduring hope is that through the apprehension of the love of God, human 
consciousness can find redemption. In that respect, faith and freedom are 
complementary gifts of God’s parental love. 
Although, Oman arrives at a reconciliation of faith and freedom in a way that may be 
satisfying to liberal sensibility, the charge may be made that his theology of personal 
freedom is intellectualist. Most people live en-cultured lives and do not have the 
level, or leisure, of detachment that Oman presupposes. Life for most people is a 
matter of inherited assumptions – national, cultural, theological. The imperative, 
therefore, towards a critical examination of values – something that Oman regards as 
essential to spiritual life – is silent in the experience of the many. The charge of an 
elitist thrust to his work would have alarmed Oman. His conviction was that God is 
involved in the detail of every life and, consequently, freedom, the gift of God and 
the task of humanity, is a practical concern, of equal moment to the artisan as to the 
intellectual. The story of the prodigal son is not amongst the best known of Jesus 
parables for no reason. It articulates a deep desire in the human condition for both 
freedom and reconciliation; and in the practical realisation of freedom the artisan 
might well be first and the philosopher last. The freedom that Oman articulates 
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intellectually will be understood existentially by the teenager who has runaway from 
home, the asylum seeker fleeing persecution, the gay person alienated from the 
Church, or the former fundamentalist alienated from the dogmatic certainties of 
preacher and sect. It may be argued, therefore, that whilst Oman’s reflections on 
personal freedom issue from a position of privileged intellectual ability, the reality of 
freedom – its loss, its betrayal, its cost, its joy – is commonplace.  
In the overall context of Oman’s work, freedom is a bridging theme, connecting 
diverse phrases of an intellectual journey. From his early life in Orkney, to his study 
of philosophy in Edinburgh, through to his reading of the formative figures in 






Freedom in its theological, metaphysical and personal 
dimensions 
Introduction: connecting threads 
Chapters one to three noted that two substantial tributaries feed into the stream of 
Oman’s thought – his Scottish experience and his knowledge of European 
intellectual traditions. We have further observed that, whether in relation to his 
Orkney cradling in the faith, his Scottish education in philosophy, or his wide 
reading in European theology, freedom as a personal value is a recurrent theme. In 
the United Presbyterian Church, with its dissenting roots going back to the Seceders 
and its liberalisation with respect to Confessional subscription, there was a healthy 
regard for freedom of conscience which other Presbyterian traditions would in time 
emulate. In Scottish philosophy, particularly in Edinburgh, where Oman received his 
undergraduate education, there was a concern for the freedom of persons in 
metaphysics distinct from absolute idealism. For example, the work of Pringle 
Pattison was a seminal voice in the development of personal idealism.
1
 With regard 
to European thought, Kant held that freedom, immortality and God are necessary 
postulates for a theory of morals and Schleiermacher saw piety and freedom as being 
correlates in religious experience. Intellectually, freedom was in the air that Oman 
breathed; and, as the previous chapter has shown, freedom was the issue he chose to 
highlight in his first venture into the arena of public lectures. His Kerr lectures, 
though encyclopaedic in their compass, had a single focus, namely, the relationship 
between freedom and faith from Luther to Ritschl. Towards the end of the lectures he 
concluded: 
Freedom is not merely the fundamental it is the exclusive basis of 
spiritual belief now left to us.
2
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Oman’s was an unwavering commitment to the idea of freedom. The term itself is 
significant: freedom as a basis of “spiritual belief”. Freedom as a purely secular 
value, Oman believed, could not be sustained, given the power of the world, the flesh 
and the devil. But, neither could freedom as a spiritual value survive if the authority 
of tradition is given preference over personal insight and conviction. There could, 
Oman believed, be no simple return to an unreconstructed, or dogmatic, creed. Oman 
considered that all attempts to defend the citadel of faith, by means of bolstering the 
ancient authorities of Church, scripture and creed, left freedom outside and in 
alienation. The urgent need, Oman felt, was to find a creative understanding of the 
relationship between freedom and faith. Thus, Oman pursues the question of freedom 
– not just down the labyrinth of history, as in the Kerr lectures – but to personal, 
metaphysical and theological conclusions. This chapter follows Oman on his quest to 
establish freedom as the ultimate value in the human heart, in the universe and in 
God. 
Themes in outline 
Section one traces the creative re-shaping of theology that occurs when personal 
freedom in a personal universe is placed at the centre of theological thinking. 
Drawing on a concept of person – which echoes that of his teacher of moral 
philosophy, Henry Calderwood – and recasting the idea of grace in personal rather 
than instrumental categories, Oman develops an ontology that is realist, personal and 
theological. Personal idealism and theological realism merge in Oman’s theology of 
the natural and the supernatural. 
Section two looks in more detail at the metaphysical implications of freedom. Oman 
was not content with a purely existential solution, prizing freedom as a personal 
attribute in an impersonal world.
3
 His bête noir was a mechanical universe and this 
section examines the sophistication of his arguments for a dynamic evolving universe 
where freedom has an important part to play. 
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Section three examines the link between Oman’s central concept of the personal 
freedom and his core philosophical-religious concepts of the holy and the sacred. The 
latter concepts are integral to Oman’s mature reflections on the religion. It is by 
personal response to spiritual environment, to the supernatural, that religious 
progress is made or loss is incurred. Both the uniqueness of Oman’s ideas of the holy 
and the sacred and criticism of them will be examined. 
The fourth section will recapitulate Oman’s criticism of mysticism. His main 
contention was that mysticism is inimical to personality. But, where mysticism fails, 
prayer enhances; Oman’s theology of prayer and his philosophy of personality are 
complementary. Prayer earths the ideal and transfigures the empirical; in prayer 
freedom is sanctified, not through being domesticated or having its wings clipped, 
rather, as it responds to the call of spiritual environment, to the call of God.  
The sixth section gives an appraisal of Oman’s multidimensional concept of freedom 
and its uniqueness. 
1 Re-shaping theology: personality and the idea of grace  
1.1 Concept of personality  
Oman’s concept of personality was noted in Chapter Two, where the similarity 
between his definition and that of his teacher, Henry Calderwood was examined. To 
recap, in his Hand-book of Moral Philosophy, Calderwood’s understanding of a 
Person reads: 
Man is self-conscious, intelligent, self determining power – a Person, 
not merely a living organism, not a mere Thing, Personality involves 




Oman works with essentially the same concept: a moral person is self-determined, 
according to his own self-direction, in the world of his own self consciousness.
5
 
However, behind the similarities of terminology, there is a difference of emphasis. 
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For Calderwood, moral precepts are intuitive and self evident; conscience can err 
only in application and not in principle. Oman, in contrast, has an evolutionary 
understanding of how moral personality grows and develops. Human conscience 
rises above moral maxims and the only ultimate authority in morals is love. 
Consequently, human beings go through many intermediate steps in the march of 
moral progress. In his own words: “we, thus, as it were, rise up on the stepping 
stones of our dead selves to higher things”.
6
   
This progressive understanding of personality is premised on Oman‘s understanding 
of the origin and nature of human freedom. For Oman, human freedom is part of 
humanity’s evolutionary heritage. In Faith and Freedom he digresses on this point. 
Homo sapiens stands in the long continuum of evolving life; and, with the arrival of 
human beings, a unique advance took place on the evolutionary scale. The term 
sapiens, itself, is indicative of the radical break with the past. With the advent of a 
knowing and willing consciousness, a new gift arrived on the surface of the earth; a 
gift not yet in its finished form, but with the promise of completion before it. Oman 
writes: “the possession of freedom draws an absolute distinction between man and 
the lower animals, relating him in an entirely different way to the world, and, 
therefore, to God”.
7
 The “entirely different way” is a significant remark. Human 
beings are rational creatures, not determined by impulse, but with freedom of choice. 
Freedom is the essential attribute that both defines what it is to be human and what it 
is to be spiritual. It is because human beings possess freedom that humanity may be 
considered sacramental. “The whole world”, Oman writes, “is a sacrament of things 
spiritual”; but, it is a mistake to stop with material symbolism. He continues: 
Nor is the highest way to place the sacrament idea in the material world 
at all, for its ultimate symbol is man not nature, and the fundamental 




                                                 
6
 “Morals”, an unpublished essay in Oman Papers, WT/ 1/12-14. 
7
 Faith and Freedom, 408. 
8




Freedom may be considered the light of divine presence in humanity. It is both a 
creaturely acquisition in an evolving universe and a divine gift which establishes 
conscious fellowship with God. It is embryonic and has the prospect of fuller 
realisation in the teleology of divine love. “God is patient enough”, Oman writes, “to 
let us work out our freedom, that, in the end, He may bind us by the only eternal 
bond of love”. To picture freedom in this way is a bold theological move; for now, 
the very thing that was thought inimical to faith, namely freedom, is the source of 
kinship with, and belonging to, God. 
The establishment of human freedom as a spiritual quality is the first link in Oman’s 
argument that personality bridges the gulf between autonomy and faith. The second 
link is found in the goals that are pursued through personal freedom. This point is 
important to Oman’s argument. Moral vision is not apart from the reality of God: 
“the will of God and the moral order are one”. 
9
 In this, of course, he reveals his 
philosophical heritage. From the realism of Henry Calderwood to the personal 
idealism of Pringle Pattison there was the assumption that moral ideals form a link to 
the transcendent. This is the background to Oman’s three-fold affirmation that God is 
known through will, feeling and intellect. Self-direction is an exercise in 
responsibility that lifts life above mere impulse to participation in moral reality. Self-
determination is a conscious decision to follow conscience rather than custom and 
habit; and, the policing of our own self-conscious world saves life from “perpetual 
domestic anarchy”.
10
 The significance of freedom, therefore, lies in the personal 
goals that it may achieve. If faith is dead without works, then one could say freedom 
is empty without works; an abstract concept apart from the positive content. 
Communion with God is contingent on freedom reaching up to highest ideals and 
following its deepest intuitions.
11
 Freedom is a promissory note given to human 
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beings, but it needs to be redeemed through action, in order that its worth may be 
realised. 
1.2 Idea of grace 
The foregoing examination of freedom and ideals enables an understanding Oman’s 
reconstructed religion. As it stands, however, it has a decidedly Kantian shape to it. 
In the absence of a theology of grace, Oman might well be suspected of reducing 
religion to morality: nothing would be further from his intention. Freedom realised in 
higher values would be, for Oman, a skeleton religion, even if such a religion were 
possible. A full appreciation of Divine reality must encompass more than freedom 
and ideals, especially as ideals are bounteous and freedom meagre. Oman, therefore, 
sought a theology of grace that would aid human beings without impinging on 
freedom, or, least of all, substituting itself for freedom. In Grace and Personality, 
therefore, Oman’s primary concern was to highlight the problematic nature of grace 
as traditionally understood. In reformed theology, grace is understood as an 
instrument of divine omnipotence. Such a concept cannot but override the autonomy 
necessary for the growth of moral personality. More than that, Oman argues, to “any 
one with a measure of an open mind”, it is becomes “distressingly evident” that if 
grace functions as irresistible might, then we must conclude that he does not care 
about the deplorable state of the world.  Oman is not convinced by compromise 
solutions which would save God’s honour by confining grace to special spheres. For 
instance, Catholic theology “ring fences” the Church as a sphere of grace apart from 
the world; and, in reformed theology, there is a distinction between efficacious grace 
and common grace.
12
 For Oman, these compromises are unconvincing.  The 




The fundamental error in each case is an error in method. Theology has traditionally 
begun with an a priori idea: from “the bare idea of omnipotence”.14 In the real world 
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of experience nothing works in that fashion. Even such matters as truth and morality 
are arrived at by the slowness of human insight and are often delayed by human 
obstinacy. Oman writes: 
When we turn from argument to reality, there is little to show that either 
truth or righteousness ever came by way of irresistible might. Progress 
winds slowly forward, fretting at every obstacle and constantly turning 
upon its path, never working with absolute things, but always with the 
struggle of human thought and purpose. The long sorrowful experience 
of the ages seems to show that the last thing God thinks of doing is to 
drive mankind, with resistless rein, on the highway of righteousness.
15
 
Grace, therefore, should be modelled on experience, rather than on a priori 
argument. Experience teaches that nothing valuable is ever taught, or learned, in 
haste. And, more importantly, the encouragement of the teacher and the freedom of 
the pupil are never alien to each other, but are complementary. This is the way of 
advancement in knowledge and truth. In a parallel manner, grace, far from working 
instrumentally and impersonally, is as personal as the most intimate human 
relationships, indeed more so. 
Oman’s classic definition of grace was accordingly that of “a gracious personal 
relationship”. But this can be misunderstood if taken apart from the rest of his 
thought. First, though, it is a personal relationship; it is never a private relationship. 
This was another weakness in the view of grace as instrumental; it favoured the 
select few, or, in theological terms, the elect. The grace of God, on the contrary, is 
extended to all and works through all. If grace, Oman writes, were merely an 
individual gift, it would be like the gift “of a fond and foolish parent”. In reality, 
grace comes to human beings for their common benefit. We are not “God’s spoilt 
children”, having bread when others have none. At least, that is not God’s design. It 
is as we live as members one of another that grace takes on reality and we are 
delivered from self regard to mutual care. The most accurate way of speaking about 
Oman’s concept of grace is to describe it as the atmosphere in which we live: in 
many instances unrecognised, or unnamed, but as real as the physical atmosphere 
that sustains life. The term “environment” in The 	atural and the Supernatural, 
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catches his essential meaning and complements the idea of grace found in his earlier 
work. Grace is personal and relational, but it is all-encompassing and is as real and 
available as the needful rain from heaven.   
In this personal world, grace is transformed from an instrument of omnipotence to an 
environment of personal nurture. Oman uses the more dated word “succour”, but the 
meaning is the same. God nurtures human beings without inhibiting freedom; and, 
our shared human experience is the field of God’s nurturing presence. The 
atmosphere of grace is transforming of the entire human perspective on the world 
and on life. Nothing is outside its sphere. For that reason, moral issues, Oman 
argued, should never be considered in isolation from religion and neither should 
religion dictate morality. Indirectly, religion should provide “the sphere in which 
persons have absolute worth and duties have sacred obligation”.
16
 When we live in 
the atmosphere of grace, therefore, nothing is changed and everything is changed. 
Moral tasks remain, but, in the light of grace, they are divine opportunities and no 
longer simply moral imperatives. Oman writes: 
If these considerations are sound, Augustinianisms (sic) have all started 
from the beginning, on the wrong road. Attention is fixed on grace as a 
gift merely given, and on works as human resolves merely carried 
through, with no attention paid to the gracious relation of the father to 




Grace introduces us to another world from that of morality, but not through the 
neglect of moral responsibility; rather, in the sphere of grace, the burden of being a 
moral person is transfigured into being a child of God in God’s family, that is, the 
human family. 
One further important factor in Oman’s theological reconstruction of grace is the 
unity of authority. Because God can be known only through experience, the question 
of whether one should obey the voice of experience or the demands of religious 
authority does not arise. Nothing is true because God wills it; rather, what is true is 
willed by God. “We believe that God is love”, Oman writes, “when we can reverse it 
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and say that love is God, that, in whatsoever weakness it may meet us, it wields the 
might of omnipotence.”
18
 Anything short of this assertion will end with dual 
authority and divided loyalty. Oman honours a single magisterium: the voice of 
experience. It marks the completion of a process which, as he observed, has its roots 
in the protestant reformation. God is finally freed from the constraint of sacred place, 
book and doctrine. Now, being in touch with God is essentially an experience of 
freedom and a reliance on love. These form one liberating whole. Thus, Oman’s 
reconciliation of freedom and faith in a reconstructed theology of grace becomes a 
radical spirituality, apposite to a world where the iconoclasm of reason has cut down 
the ancient authorities and all but banished material expressions of the sacred.  
In these ways, Oman saw the great divorce between freedom and faith as something 
that can be brought to an end. It is possible, he believed, to unite them in “an equal 
marriage”; thus, grace and autonomy may be understood as “an organic unity of 
dependence and independence”.
19
In personal experience this reconciliation is self 
authenticating; and, there need be no conflict between conscience and consecration. 
Oman sums up the reconciliation as follows:  
God cannot be served by setting conscience on one side and 
consecration on the other. To be independent moral persons, legislating 
for ourselves, so far from being hostile to true knowledge and service of 




Conscience being synonymous with morality and consecration with religion, if they 
are reconciled in personal experience of personal reality, then the ancient breach 
need not be perpetuated. Freedom and faith can share a common home and serve one 
spiritual end, the glory of God.  
Summary   
This section has examined Oman’s re-shaping of theology in order to accommodate 
personal freedom and religious authority. Oman sought a resolution through the 
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concept of personality and a revision of the idea of grace. Personality is premised on 
self-determining, self-directing, self-conscious freedom. This freedom is both the 
outcome of evolution and a divine gift. The co-ordinates of freedom are the ideals 
that appeal to conscience; and, the free pursuit and realisation of ideals is experience 
of God. However, religion is not to be reduced to morality. Whereas ideals are the 
co-ordinates of freedom, grace is the ground of both. And, being grounded in grace, 
freedom and morals alike are transformed. Grace is an atmosphere, an environment 
where the natural is bathed in the light of the supernatural. Gone is the idea of grace 
as irresistible might. Grace, being the atmosphere which enfolds all of life, is a 
common currency, not a private possession. Yet, being personal, it cannot be 
imparted impersonally, but must to be personally appropriated. In addition, it is 
important to note that Oman casts overboard all notions of authority external to 
experience. God speaks with one voice through the whole range of experience. This 




2 Freedom and metaphysics: a mindful universe 
This section moves from consideration of freedom as a personal reality to freedom as 
a cosmic reality. Most readers approach the cosmological dimension of Oman’s 
thought via The 	atural and the Supernatural, published fourteen years after the 
publication of Grace and Personality. However, a series of lesser known articles, 
printed in 1922, is invaluable for a clear understanding of Oman’s metaphysical 
thinking.
22
 These short papers show that the theological perspective found in Grace 
and Personality did not develop in isolation; also, they reveal that the arguments put 
forward in The 	atural and the Supernatural were not simply later reflections. There 
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is a considerable overlap in content between the earlier articles, written for students, 
and his magnum opus. The benefit of the former articles lies in their clarity of 
argument, unencumbered with the justifications found in the later work. However, 
the justifications are significant and illuminating, too. In The 	atural and the 
Supernatural, Oman is concerned to establish a holistic ontology contrary to Kant’s 
bifurcation of reality into phenomena and noumena and distinct from Hegel’s 
dialectical synthesis. And, not withstanding the empirical findings of science, the 
universe is part of a larger, transcendent whole, grounded in freedom and love. For 
that reason, it is a suitable environment for persons.  The universe may be described 
as mindful and it yields its secrets to honest enquiry, to reverent attitudes and to 
loving concern. This is the metaphysical perspective we find in Oman’s short papers.  
2.1 Oman’s cosmic vision 
In the shorter papers, published in the Student Movement, the vision Oman portrays 
is of a world charged with meaning, mediated through the entirety of experience and 
freely appropriated by the human spirit. It is a dialogical world, open to human 
investigation and responsive to human interest. Expressed otherwise, the universe is 
a mediator and it is by means of the world that Mind reveals itself to minds. 
However, this requires active engagement by human beings. Oman goes so far as to 
say that we must make the natural world “more diaphanous for the spiritual”.
23
 
Meaning is not imposed, but it may be discovered through sincerity of heart, 
application of intellect and commitment of will. The universe waits for the touch of 
the human spirit. Thereby, the universe opens its secrets to the searching soul. The 
sine qua non of such disclosure is openness to experience in all its facets; this is the 
first subject that Oman deals with as he addresses a wider student audience through 
the medium of his articles in The Student Movement.24  
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In “Looking Round Our Position”, the target of Oman’s criticism and wit is the 
human tendency to take a narrow perspective on life and on the mystery of the world. 
Often, he believes, this comes down to just an inexplicable mental attitude. A 
person’s age with respect to the date on their birth certificate is one thing; but, their 
mental age is quite another matter. “Some are born old and would as soon admit a 
new idea as a burglar.”
25
 The situation is compounded, Oman believed, by the nature 
of education and the emphasis on specialism. He continues his burglar metaphor.  
A great many more have their limits fixed before twenty five by their 
particular interests, which, with students, is usually their special groove 
in study; while most people at forty, if they do not close the door, keep 
it carefully on the chain, to have a good look at a new idea, and make 
sure that it is innocuous before opening.
26
 
Oman, though aware that any system of education will have limitations, champions 
the older, broader, pattern that took in as many subjects as possible for as long as 
possible. Admitting that “it did not succeed in making students learned in all its 
varied branches”,
27
 and, “with most of us did not succeed even with one”, it was, 
nevertheless, a great incentive to wide horizons. A broad education was more likely 
to leave a student both hungry for knowledge and challenged. To come to grief on 
“spherical trigonometry”, to founder on “the binomial theorem”,
28
 or not to have 
enough grasp of “ancient tongues to be classical scholars”, in itself prompts 
reverence and humility. The demand for specialism, therefore, with regard to 
university entrance requirements, was for Oman to wrong foot the student at an 
important stage in education. The harmful effect, he believed, filtered down to the 
school curriculum.  
This effect on schools could at once be stopped by the universities 
abolishing all special scholarship, and giving scholarships in all 
departments upon general knowledge and mental development 
necessary for success and freedom in any specialising. This ought to be 
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Oman, in these remarks, reflects a traditional Scottish outlook as to the necessity of 
width in education. But, at root, he is making a general philosophical point: that 
experience is wider than anything that can be measured by any one discipline. This is 
key to his argument in the next of his papers, namely that science is a tool, a very 
useful tool, for measuring those aspects of experience that are amenable to 
mathematical measurement. However, to measure mathematically is to investigate 
only one aspect of reality, namely “fixed uniformities". This, for Oman, is the glory 
and weakness of scientific enquiry. Science epitomises free enquiry and honest 
engagement, leading to knowledge and management of environment. The paradox, 
however, is that, in isolation from other spheres of knowledge, scientific knowledge 
distorts. This is principally because it overlooks its own subjectivity. It is the mind, 
the “I”, that makes all knowledge possible, and no knowledge exists apart from 
minds.
30
 Environment can never, therefore, be adequately comprehended merely in 
its physical aspect. Environment is both material and spiritual. Indeed, as James 
Ward remarked, “it is truer to say that the universe is a life than that it is a 
mechanism”.
31
 Perhaps Oman would not have expressed it quite in those terms. 
However, he certainly affirmed that the universe is the bearer of meaning to be 
appropriated in freedom.  
When the mind becomes conscious and interprets its environment by 
reason and proceeds to manage it by considered and deliberate purpose, 
environment is found to be neither adamant nor putty, but an ordered 
reliable universe, giving conscious meaning and responding to 
conscious purpose. It is an environment the order of which we only 
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Whether one can speak of the universe as “living” or not, it is, nevertheless, 
responsive to human enquiry and to independent thinking. That the universe is not 
reducible to scientific materialism, but facilitates the expansion of knowledge and 
freedom, is the theme that Oman takes up in the second of his papers. 
In “The Mathematical Mechanical Order”, Oman begins with a retrospect on 
Newtonian physics which sought to explain reality under the laws of motion. At its 
heart was the law of inertia; namely, that all motion continues as it is unless changed 
by other motion. The difficulty was to explain how a world of complex meaning ever 
emerged if reality is as precise and uniform as in the Newtonian model. Various 
theories were invented to the effect that, given enough time, and, if the process were 
slow enough, all kinds of change could emerge out of uniformity. But, comments 
Oman, “it remained perplexingly certain that a law of inertia is a law that does 
nothing except continue as it is”.
33
  Oman proceeds to argue that changes in physics, 
which have left the Newtonian model behind, mean that the idea that science can 
yield “a simple final picture of reality” is no longer tenable.
34
 “Physics”, Oman 
wrote, “no longer even professes to show us the real reality of the world. Nor does it 
profess to give us the reason why of any experience”.
35
 On this ground, Oman 
argues, science is essentially a tool, enabling real and important, but partial, 
knowledge. 
Furthermore, what science reveals is order and regularity in the universe. However, 
the case is overstated if, thereby, it is thought that freedom does not exist. It is, Oman 
argues, the correlate of order. In experience, both order and freedom are necessary; 
as, for example, with the structure of the English alphabet and the freedom it gives to 
the expression of ideas. It is as meaningless to say that all our varied experience can 
be reduced to “uniformities of measure and motion” as to say that all English 
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literature can be reduced to twenty six letters.
36
 In The 	atural and the Supernatural, 
when dealing with this point, among the several illustrations Oman employs is that of 
an organ builder. Knowledge of sound, as vibration, is essential for the construction 
of the instrument. The mathematically calculable relation of vibration to sound must 
be accurate; and the musician is entirely dependent on that accuracy if the organ is to 
serve its musical purpose. On the other hand, the music played is, in the final 
analysis, the expression of the mind of the musician. This is indicative of how, in 
general, freedom and structure are correlates in the universe.
37
  
Overall, Oman exhibits a healthy and knowledgeable regard for science; but, he is 
always intent on viewing science in a larger metaphysical perspective. The empirical 
reality of the world is important, being one half of the environment in which human 
beings live and move and have their being. The realm of ideals is the other half. The 
tragedy is that these realities often fall apart, often through the imperialism of one 
perspective. It is a human failure when this happens. The example of the organ 
builder and the organist is illustrative of how we can push one aspect of reality to 
extremes and miss the other: “it is of the dullness of our souls that we use our science 
to measure the pipes and miss the music of the spheres”.
38
  
In “The Evolutionary Historical Process”, Oman finds the opposite of order and 
regularity. The “actual changes in time” manifest “a multitudinous influx of new 
things, amid which it is difficult to find any scheme at all”.
39
 The main characteristic 
of an evolving world is that of ever new creation. This is true at all levels of 
evolution: biological and cultural and, even in the cosmic scale of things, “masses of 
worlds have been formed and the elements that compose them have come into 
existence”.
40
 Again, explanations that confine themselves to physical determinism 
are, for Oman, unsatisfactory; not least because, in excluding purpose, they struggle 
to “get beyond blind accident”. He writes: 
                                                 
36
 “The Mathematical Mechanical Order”, 125. 
37
 The 	atural and the Supernatural, 257. 
38
 The 	atural and the Supernatural, 257. 
39
 “The Evolutionary Historical Process”, 153. 
40




When we look at the actual facts of change we are faced….not by a 
process all mechanically explicable, but by its opposite. The question is 
whether we have more than accident, the result of endless throws of 




Oman’s response, as one might expect, was to posit that “the directing element in 
evolution is mind”.
42
 His argument is “that we have no right to explain the higher by 
the lower”; on the contrary, “we must try to understand the mind in its lowly 
beginnings by what it is capable of becoming”.
43
 Evolution is not merely an 
emergent process, but a teleological process, with a goal before it. Accordingly, 
purpose may be traced to the lowest levels of evolution where there is a free response 
to meaning in environment. Oman describes the process as follows: 
Even very low forms of life flow out of unpleasant liquid into a 
pleasant one. That is to say, it is acting, however feebly, on its own 
feeling, however faint, guided by its own intelligence however dim.
44
 
Thus, as Oman repeats, evolution is led from the front. The ultimate survival of the 
fittest is a spiritual survival, as creation moves freely towards the goal and purpose of 
God, which is love. However, because the goal of God’s creation can be realised 
only in freedom, the possibility of it going wrong is great. In the evolutionary 
process there is neither room for cheap optimism nor shallow pessimism, but a 
continual imperative to seek the highest. Apart from the imperative to reach forward 
to the highest and best, “fitness” is no more than “fitness to persist in a particular 
environment”. One might, accordingly, say, “the mole is as fit as the man of genius, 
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the head hunter as the philanthropist”.
45
 But, if evolution is towards the final purpose 
of love, then fitness takes on an entirely new meaning.  
In “Mind as the Measure of the Universe”,
46
 we find the reiteration of the foregoing 
points. There is a real frontier “between the individual and the rest of the world”;
47
 
Mind is the source and telos of creation; and, in freedom, the universe moves 
towards fulfilment in the loving purpose of God. Consequently, the history of human 
experience may be thought of as a long education. “It must even mean” argues 
Oman, “that the universe which gives us our experience also teaches us the standards 
by which to measure it.”
48
 This remark sums up Oman’s cosmology. The universe is 
charged with meaning,
49
 it serves a purpose greater than itself; this purpose can be 
accessed, and its meaning discovered, by individual minds acting in independence 
and freedom.  
The final point that Oman argues is that the mind is distinct from the brain. It is not a 
case of parallelism between the brain and the mind as when “mist is over the 
stream”;
50
 rather, mind is the independent, creative source of meaning. Oman rejects 
equally the materialist view of the mind as purely an epiphenomenon. The brain, as 
Oman understands it, is the receiver of sensations which the mind translates into 
meaning. Interpretation is the work of the mind. It is not that the mind imposes 
meaning after the manner of Kantian categories; rather, experience mirrors a world 
of meaning that the mind can know and express as knowledge. The mind might be 
compared to the spectacles that enable human beings to read from the book of the 
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universe, discovering its transcendent meaning and purpose. But, one needs to 
consider the place of the heart as well as that of the mind. The danger is that our 
reading may be one-sided and too intellectual. Reverence and humility are as 
necessary for meaningful reading as intellectual curiosity.  
Summary 
This exegesis of Oman’s short papers outlines a consistent ontology. The universe is 
meaningful because it is the expression of Mind. The danger is that the imperialism 
of one branch of knowledge will foreclose a vision of the whole. Indeed, the whole 
can be grasped only as vision. Reality is personal, grounded in freedom and love and, 
in that environment human beings may explore, grow, and come with the rest of 
creation to the fullness of potential in God. But Oman is not just a visionary; his 
work resembles the assembly of a jigsaw. Each piece contributes towards the whole 
and he is anxious to dispel the human tendency to take the part for the whole. Many 
things offend in this respect. Thus, Oman makes a plea for a broad education. This, 
he believed, is likely to stimulate the widest enquiry into the meaning of life and of 
the universe; and, width in education could save human beings and cultures from 
retreating into a narrow dogmatism. Unfortunately, science, which has given so 
much to humanity, is for Oman the greatest offender with respect to sectional 
interest. The nineteenth century was marked by the imperialism of a scientific world 
view at the expense of others. Oman, however, was well informed as a layman in the 
scientific field. Consequently, he was hopeful that, in time, science might be relieved 
of its more sweeping assertions. For example, in the advance of science, from a 
Newtonian model to a post Einstein paradigm, there was hope of integrating science 
into a wider ontology. The world in the light of modern physics is somewhat 
misnamed as a mechanical order; it is more of a living reality.  
Oman lamented that the new discoveries in physics were not paralleled in biology. 
However, were he alive today, it would be the link between genetics and evolution 
that would preoccupy his thinking. His argument may very well be the same: the 
evolutionary process needs also to be viewed in the larger context of transcendent 
interpretation. Oman found purpose and teleology are more conducive to evolution 




evolution are all predicated upon Mind, or God, as the ultimate reality. Oman differs 
from idealists, however, in that he does not wish to reduce reality to mind; the 
empirical reality of the universe has also a place in the divine economy. Indeed, the 
empirical and the ideal are complementary halves of one reality. In order to navigate 
the wonders of such a universe of fact and meaning, God has endowed human beings 
with freedom; and, at every level of existence freedom, in some measure, has a part 
to play.  
3 Freedom realized: the sacred and the holy 
Oman’s work centred around two foci – the personal and the cosmic. It was the fruit 
of his desire to see reality as one and whole. We live in a personal universe: the 
medium for personal experience of a personal God. In The 	atural and the 
Supernatural, Oman determines to analyse the elements that contribute to this dual 
reality. Among its themes are epistemology, the nature of religion, the evolution of 
the universe and the evolution of culture. Two things, however, are of special 
relevance. First, Oman gives considerable space to the subject of human freedom; 
and, secondly, he introduces the terms “sacred” and “holy” to illustrate how divine 
reality is made known, or revealed, to human experience. This section begins with 
the former. 
3.1 Freedom in human experience 
In Chapter XVII of The 	atural and the Supernatural, Oman takes up the question of 
freedom under the heading of “The will to live and the will to live better”. He 
acknowledges the seminal influence of William James, whose contribution to the 
subject “was true and important”. What Oman found particularly attractive in James 
was his understanding of freedom as self-creating agency, “not a mere wavering of 
the balance according to weights put on scales”.
51
 It is a pity that Oman was not more 
discursive with regard to James’ treatment of the subject. James emphasised that the 
will is free from pre-determination. This was particularly the case in his earlier 
thinking when he indentified himself as an indeterminist, believing that all future 
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determinations are down to “chance”. James believed that any other definition of 
freedom is “pretence”, somewhat like “restoring a caged bird to liberty with one 
hand, while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg, to make sure it does not 
go beyond our sight”.
52
 In his later thinking, however, James put the emphasis, not 
on chance, but on possibility. This is nearer to Oman’s understanding of the term. 
The world is saturated through and through with possibilities and these may be 
realised through personal engagement; in other words, through Oman’s triumvirate 
of self-determination, self-direction and personal self-consciousness.  
On the matter of Oman’s general relation to James, it may be characterised as a case 
of different orientation, though with overlapping emphasis. James’ idea of the 
universe as a Thou, his radical empiricism predicated on the stream of experience, his 
idea that religious belief is to be tested against practice, all find resonance in Oman. 
However, the differences between James and Oman are significant. For Oman, God 
is an experience shaping, personality reality rather than a postulate, or hypothesis, on 
which to risk faith; and, there is no sense in which human responses contribute to the 
being of God. James, on the other hand, could write:  
I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world 
may not in part depend on my personal response which any one of us 
may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital 
strength and increase of very being from our fidelity.
53
 
It is very different with Oman’s supernatural. The biblical distinction between the 
Creator and creation is maintained and God, though personal, is always transcendent. 
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In addition, just as Oman was suspicious of any confusion between the human and 
the divine, he was also suspicious of the idea that the sub-conscious may contribute 
directly to personality. For James, a psychologist, conversion and saintliness both 
may have roots in the “buried self”.
55
 But, for Oman, nothing that enters by the “trap 
door” of the sub-conscious can make a contribution to a conscious relation to God. In 
Grace and Personality, he wrote: 
Conversion is thought to rise by unrelated miracle from the sub-
conscious, like Aphrodite from the sea, only because of confusion of 
things that differ. If conversion means true awakening to our true 
relation both to God and man, and not merely amending of disposition, 
how can it be other than by conscious insight.
56
 
“Conscious insight” is, for Oman, paramount. Therefore, whilst Oman can say that 
James’ understanding of freedom as self determining agency is “true and important”, 
he would have found James’ idea of personality compromised by its liaisons. In 
Oman’s thinking, freedom exists uncontaminated by the sub-conscious. In other 




Returning to the main subject of our discussion freedom in human experience, 
freedom has always, for Oman, to be “won”. This is true both with respect to the 
natural world and the supernatural realm. In other words, the natural world offers 
obstacles to human freedom; and, in the realm of the supernatural, though it is 
fundamentally “an order of freedom”, freedom is not passively given. Freedom in 
every sphere must be actively appropriated. This takes us again to the significance of 
grace as the environment in which we live and move and have our being. One must 
not strive to be free or moral; this would lead only to a focus on self, rather than upon 
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the transcendent order. The continual feel of one’s own moral pulse can never lead to 
the freedom of the children of God. Thus, the attitude required is that of devotion. 
Piety in a wide and untrammelled sense of the word is fundamental to a life of 
freedom and goodness because it directs the whole person away from self to the 
requirements of God. Freedom is born of spiritual participation; it is never a 
“succession of individual acts” but “a steadfast choice of a world in which we are 
free in feeling as well as will”.
58
 In this way, Oman worked towards an integrated 
theology of freedom, personality and grace, premised on the reality of one 
supernatural environment. However, he also gave particular attention to the dynamic 
of freedom in human experience. The main points are as follows: 
First, freedom may be only the freedom of indifference and this should not be 
considered unimportant. Indifference positively conceived may spare the soul from 
the allurements of the world. Absence of indifference may be the harbinger of woe as 
in the starvation of Buridan’s ass. Can one attribute the ass’s starvation solely to the 
fact of his equidistance between two stacks of hay?  Had the ass been indifferent to 
the fact of there being two, the outcome may well have been other than it was. Too 
much information may overload and inhibit, unless there is the freedom of healthy 
indifference. 
Secondly, in Oman’s estimation, however, real progress in the evolution of freedom 
came when human beings discovered the power to say No! The ability to say no 
marked a real boundary between the world and the individual. No longer were 
human beings the playthings of events, desires or circumstances. This power is 
evidenced in the laws of Hammurabi and in the law codes of Deuteronomy. It carries 
through to Paul’s idea of the Spirit’s dominion over the flesh, and to Kant’s idea of 
an absolute imperative. The resulting gains are real and valuable, even if incomplete. 
The natural world – whether considered as natural disposition, lust, greed and desire 
for power or as natural relations, neighbourhood, family or tribe – may “stand in the 
sharpest antagonism” to “any right moral relation”.
59
 The power to stand over and 
against all such claims marks real emancipation. This is true, Oman argues, even if it 
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is only the freedom to bear with relations and circumstances that cannot be changed. 
The freedom to “bear with” is real freedom; but it, too, has to be won. 
Thirdly, there is emancipation more large and spacious that anything derived from 
negative commandments, important though they be. It is the liberty that comes from 
saying yes to the true, beautiful and good. It is what Oman calls seeking the “better 
country of the spirit.” He writes:   
Only as we seek a better country can we leave the worse, even though 
we must also be ready to go out, not knowing whether we go, as a way 
of seeking it. The steadfast intentness of the better country of the spirit, 
not the sporadic denials of the attractions of the lower, is a good will. 
And it has to do with what we are and cannot change, and with what we 
may become and should by right doing be changing.
60
 
Thus, freedom, in the higher sense, is the fruit of aspiration more than renunciation 
or the repression of evil. There is an emancipation that comes with reverence and 
devotion that mere renunciation can never dream of, never mind realise. The power 
to say no may have heralded a real spiritual advance for humankind, but morality 
based on renunciation will always, Oman believed, fall short of the joy of the Lord. 
3.2 The divine in human experience 
The co-ordinate of human freedom is the divine reality that manifests itself through 
the world. Only the extreme sceptic doubts the reality of the physical world; many, 
however, doubt the reality of the spiritual. Yet, no more than the physical can the 
spiritual world be proven by inference from anything else. It is a reality which can be 
known only as it is inhabited. Oman writes: 
Religion is, above all else, concerned with ‘moving about in worlds not 
realised’. We may be living by this higher environment as in water live 
by air, and be equally ignorant of the fact: and the reason may be lack 
of interest not capacity.
61
  
Whilst the natural world is known through sensation, the spiritual is known though 
the absolute values it inspires. The sacred embodies transcendent values that can be 
grasped by intuition, but never completely appropriated. The holy describes the 
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feeling that accompanies a conviction of what is sacred. The judgement of what is 
sacred and the accompanying feeling of reverence, though distinct, are never apart; 
and both are integral to the supernatural. These concepts were examined in chapter 
two, in the comparison of Oman’s sense of the holy and that of Veitch and 
Windelband. The most recent and detailed examination of them is found in Adam 
Hood, where he gives critical analysis of their epistemological foundations. Here, 
however, our concern is with the sacred and the holy as co-ordinates of freedom. The 
key concept in Oman’s thinking is that freedom evolved in proportion to the 
discovery of values. Freedom and value were birthed together in the evolution of 
human consciousness; and they grow together in human experience. Without values, 
human beings would be indistinguishable from the animal world, creatures of mere 
instinct and impulse. The first and earliest realisation of freedom, therefore, came, 
Oman believes, with humankind’s sense of the sacred, the sense of absolute value. 
Even at that early stage, in fact particularly so, freedom and value were not separate 
from the material world. Hence, the identification of the sacred with material things; 
what Oman calls the material sacred. 
The material sacred has been a liberation; but it has also been a limitation. As 
liberation of the human spirit, the sacred has embodied a sense of the infinite over 
and beyond the finite; it has embodied the call of God to duty and sacrifice. Material 
expressions of the sacred, on the other hand, have set severe limits to freedom, in that 
they are contextual. The sacred and the holy have, in primitive times, been 
circumscribed by holy places and things. Thus, the prophets of Israel protested 
against cultic worship and called people to ethical action. With time, the advent of 
the written word was an improvement, being infinitely more applicable to ethical 
actions and moral duties. Yet, it too assumed an absoluteness that is incompatible 
with the evolving, living nature of religion. For example, as a written code, the 
tradition of the prophets became more important than the spirit of prophecy. Oman 
writes: “though in all ages there has been much building of the tombs of the prophets 
to honour them as tradition and conceal their character as disturbers of tradition”.
62
 
Still, tradition can be built upon, and, where need be, departed from, and there is 
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always more radical freedom to be discovered in the supernatural. The lowest 
religion has the eschatological promise of freedom at its core, just as the most 
developed has some sense of material embodiment lingering in its self-
understanding: for example, when sacraments are considered to have some sort of 
efficacious power in themselves and are not perceived as pointers to the transcendent 
and immaterial love of God. Oman writes: 
When we speak contemptuously of mere symbols and insist that 
sacraments are special operations of grace, vehicles not symbols, we are 
merely setting the working of omnipotence above the gracious personal 




Oman’s critical attitude to material embodiment of religion – whether in sacraments 
or, as we shall see in chapter six, in institutions – arises from the idea fundamental to 
his thinking, namely, that divine-human relations cannot be tied to any one 
realisation of them. God and human beings must always grow and develop through 
personal insight and judgement. Therefore, the localising of God in any earthly 
reality cannot be reconciled to a developing I-Thou relationship that is grounded in 
freedom and love. It was Oman’s strong conviction that real emancipation is 
experienced when, in “our own independent judgement”, we stand before “the 
witness of reality” in responsibility, freedom and the power of love. He writes: 
Above the compulsion of necessary law, up to the perfect harmony of 
an obedience bound only by the free choice of love which beats with 
the heart of the Eternal, we are called to aspire.
64
 
The divine reality, therefore, that speaks through the world, from beyond the world, 
culminates in a sense of the sacred and the holy that grows and develops in tandem 
with the realisation of freedom and in parallel with transformation through love.  
3.3 Comment 
In Oman’s reflections on the sacred and the holy the evolutionary modality of 
Oman’s thinking is obvious. He was essentially an evolutionary theologian. His 
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belief is that, if the universe is evolving, then religion must evolve, and in that 
evolution are to be found the beginnings of freedom and knowledge. This conviction 
is the source of Oman’s most radical ideas. It is, for example, the ground of his view 
that finality cannot be affirmed of any revelation. Also, material sacred may one day 
be left behind as a remnant of a bygone era; and theology itself must not assume 
finality. This is like attempting to catch the eternal flow of divine revelation in the 
sieve of time. Even historical revelation, as embodied in scriptures and creeds, must 
always be treated as provisional when measured against the sacredness of freedom 
and love.  
But Oman adds the caveat: the loss of faith may be so acute that historical tradition 
may be needed to redeem humanity from the plight of unbelief, until the voice of the 
living God is heard. Historical revelation, scripture and doctrine are of value not only 
as historical landmarks, signalling the way that humankind has travelled in its earthly 
pilgrimage, but, also, they may act like a lighthouse to a ship lost in a fog. When the 
fog passes, then what matters is the new horizon. The distant horizon, however, can 
be reached only through freedom responding to the sacred; and, even then, it is never 
reached in time; freedom must anticipate the dawn of eternity. In Oman’s language: 
freedom and love are increasingly realised by those who walk in faith and not by 
sight; who travel without security, though always in hope.  
Thus, freedom was for Oman a real spiritual value and the correlate of knowledge. It 
gave his theology a radical edge that still is iconoclastic with respect to most of the 
things that Churches hold dear. F.R. Tennant comments, in his obituary contribution 
to the Proceedings of the British Academy, that Oman’s restriction of divine-human 
relations to “personal dealings” applied “to reason and conscience” “will be judged 
heretical by the larger part of Christendom”.
65
 He also questioned Oman’s basic 
premise that knowledge and freedom are rooted in the supernatural. Tennant 
acknowledged the originality of the premise, but, he asked could not conscience and 
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awareness values have “evolved from the humanness involved in sociability”?
66
 
Tennant’s attribution of knowledge and value to social intercourse has more 
resonance with the secular world of today. With respect to the former point, 
Christendom has judged Oman more sympathetically than Tennant forecast. Overall, 
Oman has been more ignored than judged. In an age of ecumenism, where the core 
doctrines of the person of Christ, and of the Holy Trinity, have proved fruitful 
common ground for the study and practice of faith, Oman reads strangely alien in an 
ecumenical context. Bevans’ study is a Catholic and sympathetic attempt to 
rehabilitate Oman in the Christian mainstream. As we shall see in our last chapter, I 
doubt whether that is where Oman would have wanted to be. His dissenting heart, his 
love of freedom, his faith in ineluctable evolution from material expressions of the 
Divine to the immaterial, would have made him an uneasy guest at the ecumenical 
table. Perhaps he would have had common cause with Quakers and Unitarians. A 
menu that is historical, ancient and non-negotiable would send Oman out to the fields 
like Esau, and far from the tent of Jacob, no matter about birth rights. Perhaps the 
leniency of criticism over the years has stemmed from only a vague appreciation of 
Oman’s more radical agenda. Oman’s key question still calls for an answer. What is 
the place of freedom in the world of faith? Or, as we might put it today: what is the 
place of faith in a world of freedom? 
4 The spirituality of freedom 
4.1 Mysticism 
This section examines what may be called the soul’s mobilisation of freedom, the 
experience of prayer. Here, too, Oman was somewhat paradoxical in his focus. On 
the one hand, his attitude to prayer and piety was insightful and generous; on the 
other, his criticism of mysticism was critical and uncompromising.
67
 Oman’s views 
on mysticism are examined first. 
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In an early article on mysticism, Oman commented: “mysticism is a phenomenon 
which always appears in times of political disillusionment and intellectual 
discouragement.”
68
 Oman continues: 
Every religion is either mystical or apocalyptic and Christianity is 
apocalyptic. That is to say, its faith is not in God as a temple of unity 
into which to withdraw and the world a distraction and an evil to be 
escaped by austerity and austere morality. It is not a faith in direct 
mystic vision, but is the victory that overcomes the world, by the 
conscious purpose in the world as well as beyond it, where all things 
may be possessed and all works for good. It works by love as an 
objective end which a good world is in spite of evil, not by love as a 
compensation for an evil world, and an escape from it.
69
 
The keys points are: there is no direct access to God apart from engagement with the 
world; experience of the rough and tumble of existence cannot be circumvented and 
the mystics are misled in thinking that there is an escape from the challenge of 
thinking. The kernel of Oman’s objection, therefore, lies in epistemology. Later in 
the article there is a paragraph which is repeated in The 	atural and the 
Supernatural;70 there he entitles it “The Unities”. It is one of the most obscure in 
Oman’s work. The essence of it I take to be the distinction between form and 
experience. He does not explain his use of the language of form; for example, 
whether or not he uses “form” in the platonic sense of ideas, or, in the Kantian sense 
of the forms imposed on experience: one feels it is something akin to the latter. 
However, Oman’s forms are not the Kantian ones of time and space, but what he 
calls the “unities”. These are three in number: the unity of reality, of the mind and of 
love. These are abstractions, in themselves and apart from experience, though this 
does not mean they have no reality. However, should one seek to know these forms, 
apart from experience, then the end result is vacuous. “Yet, even in this emptied 
state, it is felt as the universal form of awareness that the universe is one”.
71
 The 
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unity that the mystic most often seeks is the “the unified frame of love apart from all 
content”.
72
 This leads to “the joy unspeakable, spoken of by all the mystics with 
every conceivable superlative. It is in essence the undifferentiated holy”.
73
 Oman’s 
objection to the mystic way of seeking God is that it leaves experience of God 
content-less with respect to knowledge. The undifferentiated holy is like touch 
without knowing who, or what, is touched; it is like sound without knowing what is 
heard. When pursued as in the mystic way, Oman felt that the real substance of 
religion is lost; experience of life in the world is abandoned, as though it were of no 
importance to knowledge of reality. To escape from the world of concrete experience 
in order to find God is, Oman argues, something which “impresses ordinary, 
practical people as artificial and morbid and unreal; and it is the right impression.”
74
 
No reviewer has endorsed Oman’s assessment of mysticism. However, the root of 
Oman’s criticism is important to note for sake of clarification. The mystic’s attempt 
at direct experience of God, apart from temporal reality, leaves out what makes 
religion living faith. Oman elaborates his objections as follows: 
The right content of these forms is not emptiness, but a world of infinite 
variety, harmonious to the feelings, like the poet’s; a world challenging 
to understanding and in relation to one mind, like the philosopher’s; a 
world to be explained on a consistent principle like the scientist’s; of 




In this we see, again, an understanding of faith which is secular in its sensibility;
76
 
knowledge of the divine is possible only if the world and God are experienced 
together. Oman compares this to knowledge of a person. 
In real knowing we have something very like the knowledge of a 
person. We know him only by his actual manifestations, but we do not 
then use these as facts from which to form an inference. We reach 
beyond to a unity whereby all we know of him is itself interpreted and 
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becomes knowledge. This reach beyond sense makes a world out of 
sense and is the essential element in religion.
77
  
The deficit in mysticism is, thus, that it seeks to “reach beyond” experience of the 
world rather than to take the arduous way of letting God speak to us in our 
engagement with it. As a spirituality of freedom, mysticism is free at the expense of 
being empty of all that would make God real. The world of possibility is not possible 
if experience is evacuated of content. The mystic way dissolves the interactive link 
between everyday experience and the silence of eternity; prayer, on the other hand, 
finds God in the midst of earthly struggle, pain and joy. The question of the 
legitimacy of Oman’s criticism of mysticism is taken up in the appraisal below. First, 
his views on prayer are examined. 
4.2 Prayer 
Hendrikus Berkhof points out that prayer does not feature largely in works of 
theology. It is perhaps an irony that much study devoted to exploring the reality of 
God should be slender with regard to the practical experience of God. Barth, he feels, 
is an exception.
78
 One can make a positive case for Oman, too. The references to 
prayer are not abundant, but they are significant. It is in prayer that human freedom 
becomes an existential reality, through participation in the love of God. Prayer spans 
the two-fold reality of the empirical and the ideal, or earth and heaven. It is the 
practical realisation of the personal nature of God; it is the realm where God and 
human beings meet in the deepest intimacy. But, prayer is also a boundary 
experience where human freedom meets limitation in the mystery of the Divine will. 
Outside the experience of prayer, events in life may be considered accidental, 
fortuitous and indifferent to the welfare of any living thing. Within the experience of 
prayer, there is a discovery of freedom and order and reconciliation to the gracious 
purposes of God. 
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In his early collection of published sermons, Paradox of the World, Oman has a 
sermon entitled the “Laws of Prayer”.
79
 It is a vital insight into Oman’s thinking on 
prayer; and, in summary, the same thoughts are found in Honest Religion.80 The term 
“law” indicates for Oman the Divine order, but it is an order, a spiritual realm, that 
has room for human participation. Indeed, at some level, all of creation participates 
in the Divine Order; but, at the human level, the interaction is self-conscious. 
Freedom and order are expressions of God’s wisdom and love; and, nowhere more 
than through prayer does this aspect of spiritual reality dawn upon the soul. Oman 
develops this point under the heading the “laws of prayer”.  
The text Oman chosen is Luke 11:9, where Jesus tells his disciples: 
And I say unto you, ask and it will be given you; seek, and you will 
find; knock, and it will be opened unto you. 
The three laws of prayer which Oman identifies here are: the law of receiving, the 
law of finding and the law of discovery. Existentially, they are recognisable in the 
hierarchy of desire, aspiration and discovery. Desire is real prayer; more real perhaps 
than the prayer found on the lips of devotion. “Spoken prayer may be a very 
superficial asking”; and, in contrast: 
Every longing is a prayer; and our most fervent prayer is our strongest 
longing. But if that is so, for what have you prayed? For every thing 
base as well as noble, you ever set your heart upon.
81
 
Accordingly, prayer may express a bundle of conflicting ideas, or one “dominating 
desire” may surface. In any event, the law of asking and receiving applies. As the 
Buddhists say, “our lives follow our thoughts as the wheel the foot of the ox”; and, 
“every longing of the heart foreshadows some kind of realisation”.
82
 The law of 
asking and receiving is a frightening law and a call to responsibility. “Our one 
greatest need is to be truly taught to ask in Christ’s name, so that all our desires may 
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be wholly according to our Father’s love and the Father’s wisdom”.
83
 And, with 
regard to public prayer, the “ennobling of our petitions” should be “one of its most 
imperative ends”.
84
 Were the law of receiving the only law operating in God’s 
universe, it would be a chaotic place and culture would be the outward expression of 
the often utterly selfish desires of the heart. The law of receiving, so prone to 
prodigal use, is, however, limited by a higher law: that of seeking and finding.  
When prayer comes to the realisation that there is a law of seeking and finding, it has 
entered the higher realm of aspiration. A reorientation of personality takes place that 
involves feeling, intellect and will and prayer begins to focus on spiritual values. 
High ideals become active in life and there is a meeting of minds and hearts: that of 
the Divine and the human. Windows are opened to heaven and olive branches return. 
However, there is no Hegelian identity between human aspiration and Divine reality; 
God, though personal, remains transcendent and the life of prayer is a life of faith. 
This is the root of many difficulties surrounding prayer. Because answers have to be 
actively sought, and human seeking is so irregular and often misdirected, progress is 
painful, slow and frequently disappointing. But, argues Oman, if God’s good gifts 
are to be given personally, they cannot be distributed irrespective of the ability to 
understand, value and appreciate them. As he often does, he gives an agricultural 
illustration: 
The people whose soil and climate present them freely with food and 
warmth are not, in the end, so richly endowed as those who raise their 
bread from the clayey furrow and build their shelter under the biting 
wind. These blessings are not less but more beneficently given, because 
they do not say, “Here we are, put forth thy hand and receive,” but, 
“We shall be here when you dig and find”. And just as little do God’s 
gifts become less free, or less gracious, or less abundant, or less sure 
when they cease to say, “Receive”, and begin to say, “Find”. 
Of nothing is this truer than truth itself. God, we too readily assume, 
must speak and man simply receive. But it is not so now and never has 
been. God is wiser, more patient, and above all, more magnanimous.
85
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Thus, difficulties in prayer are like the stress of adolescence, the discipline of study, 
or maturing relations in marriage – they reflect the deep things in life. Difficulties in 
prayer reveal the glory of the world in which we live and the personal way of all 
progress, as well as the possibility of regress. The opposite of aspiration being sin, 
regression is an ever-present reality. When Oman speaks of sin, he does not mean 
transgression of commandments in a legal sense, but transgression against the spirit 
of the whole law in the failure to aspire and venture in faith. Sin, for Oman, is cast in 
an evolutionary paradigm.  
Thus, sin is just the higher aspect of all failure of life to lay itself open 
to the witness of its environment and to embrace and venture itself upon 
it; [break] Sin is a sin against the whole law, understanding by law not a 
statute, but the order of environment to be realised ever more fully by 
sincerity in insight, in aspiration and in consecration.
86
 
In the law of finding, therefore, the stakes are very high. The venture of faith can 
lead to the discovery of “absolute worth”; refusal can bring failure that can be 
described only as “absolute loss”.
87
 Yet, love cannot take away the frightening reality 
of freedom. Nor would love want to, because the realisation of life’s great goals and 
true purpose is contingent on personal insight and concomitant commitment. In this 
context, God’s will in human experience advances together with, and not apart from, 
prayer.  
The third law of prayer is that of discovery. Jesus said, “Knock and it shall be opened 
unto you”. Oman interprets this saying as the explanation of “the long delays to 
which we are all subjected and by which many are discouraged. For many weary 
years we may stand by doors which never open to our knocking”.
88
 The reason that 
such disappointment is our common experience is, Oman believes, because prayer 
takes us to the realm of mystery, where even our highest ideals are provisional. This 
law of limitation is at the same time the law of discovery and surprise. Mystery in 
itself is a barren concept and the seeds that grow there are often those of scepticism 
and unbelief. The vast areas of ignorance that exist in human experience appear as 
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dark and foreboding. Thus, the human inclination is to cling tightly to known 
certainties of knowledge: as when science makes a claim to possess all knowledge, 
or when finality is claimed for historical revelation. In fact, more often, 
consciousness turns away from the unknown and seeks life in the garden of routine, 
or on the merry-go-round of pleasure. Thus, secular culture has abandoned, as 
barren, the realm of the unknown; and, to an atheist, the thought of knocking on the 
door of mystery is a quixotic indulgence. Yet, argues Oman, the greatest joy of the 
human spirit lies in that unknown land. The hand that knocks on the door of mystery 
finds a paradox: the discovery that is to be beyond all our dreams is also the 
fulfilment of our deepest longings. Oman writes: 
All our best possessions come to us as such discoveries. We follow a 
flutter of white raiment, and are suddenly confronted by the face of our 
guardian angel. Or the figure in our text, after long weary years of 
knocking, the door which blankly closed our vista, suddenly opens, and 
we are filled with the sense of wonder, yet not of strangeness, for while 
it is utterly different from what we pictured, it is wholly the fulfilment 
of what we loved without knowing how to desire or pursue. Thus it is 
with the truth that sets us free, the pardon which gives us peace, the 
grace which sustains our wills, the faith which encourages our hearts.
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In this way, for Oman, prayer rests on the bosom of Divine Providence. It finds 
peace in reconciliation to God’s will, no matter how far that will is beyond human 
insight. Prayer, to borrow from the words of a medieval mystic,
90
 is a piercing of the 
clouds of unknowing with the darts of longing love. It is the deepest possible 
engagement with the mystery we call God; and, it is sustained by faith that God will 
not withhold any good gift from his children. But, it needs to be borne in mind, 
Oman counsels, that temporal reality may not be adequate to God’s best gifts, either 
being given or being received. 
God, being love, has in store for us what eye has not seen, nor ear 
heard, nor the heart of man conceived; and we wait on his purpose as 
we keep knocking at the door of life’s mysteries and unrealised 
possibilities. [Break] In that confidence let us pray – asking, seeking, 
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knocking – knowing that the blackest door of his seeming denial to be 
only the barrier that will open upon His fullest manifestation.
91
 
The final answers must await the Eschaton. Prayer, therefore, has always to reckon 
with the mystery of Providence. It must acknowledge what Schleiermacher called 
“blessings especially bestowed with necessity’s hand”.
92
 The law of necessity is an 
important concept in Oman’s thought as well; it represents unpalatable facts in life 
and death that we wish were otherwise. In The 	atural and the Supernatural, Oman 
deals extensively with the concept of necessity.
93
 Necessity, he believes, is not a rival 
to freedom, but complementary to it. In the economy of God, and in ways beyond 
human knowing, both necessity and freedom serve a wise and loving Providence. 
Indeed, comparison of Oman’s view of prayer with that of Schleiermacher reveals 
remarkable similarities. The limitation Providence has placed on human knowledge – 
even the knowledge of our Lord – is in itself a spur to reliance upon God. Thus, at 
the heart of prayer is reconciliation to the gracious, though mostly unseen, purposes 
of God. This deep reconciliation is epitomised in the Saviour’s prayer, “not my will 
but your will be done”. Necessity, therefore, is not a barrier to faith, but a doorway to 
a deeper trust in the inscrutable ways of Providence. 
God has not called us to so high a place as that our wishes should be 
prophecies; but certainly to something higher than the granting of those 
wishes should be to us the most precious evidence of his favour.
94
 
Prayer, more than anything else, illustrates that freedom is never freedom from the 
realities of the world, yet it knows a freedom that is not of this world. Oman writes: 
“Our worth is in our burden and our freedom is in the way we bear it”.
95
 It is a 
sentiment foreign to many in contemporary western society, where so many burdens, 
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for example, those of health and poverty, have been alleviated; and, burdens that 
cannot be alleviated are, in many cases, the greatest aid to unbelief. The reverence 
that waits on the slow ways of God and trusts in the final victory of love belongs 
somewhere with the “rare breeds” in the show that is modernity.  
Summary 
Mysticism, in Oman’s estimation, represents an attempt to take a short-cut to 
freedom, via a direct route, avoiding the challenges of life. The challenges of life are, 
in effect, our deepest learning experiences: both with respect to self-knowledge and 
knowledge of God. Prayer, in contrast to the short-cut of mysticism, mobilises our 
response to life, to the call of God in every corner of it. Prayer, for Oman, is the 
practice of freedom in the soul, in response to God in the world. Indeed, in Oman’s 
understanding of prayer, freedom and its co-ordinates – the holy, the sacred, order 
and providence – form one personal reality. 
Appraisal 
In the context of the early twentieth century, Oman did the theological heavy lifting 
necessary to accommodate reformed theology to the absolute value of personality 
and to a relational concept of grace. This was a bold and creative achievement. Some 
of Oman’s contemporaries made a vocational move from theology to philosophy. 
Oman stayed with theology but directed it in a decidedly philosophical direction. 
Tennant thought that Oman went so far in the direction of revision that his views 
would be considered heretical. But, his revisionism is part of the genre of liberal 
Protestantism. Experience is given a place alongside doctrine; and freedom takes 
precedence over ecclesiastical authority. However, Oman did more to question 
foundations, historical and doctrinal, than other liberal interpreters of faith. He made 
a clean break with tradition as authoritative, save in the sense of it being an historical 
element in experience; nothing historical has, in Oman’s view, authority over 
experience. This is the most challenging aspect of Oman’s theology, not only with 
respect to grace but also with regard to fundamental questions such as Christology 




the principle of personal freedom regardless of its cost to tradition. It was to Oman 
gold in the field, to be prized above all else. 
Secondly, in every sphere of Oman’s thought he maintains the priority of personal, 
with the result that he offers a holistic theology. He was not content to have an 
existential theology detached from wider cosmological questions. A theology of 
persons only makes sense in a world that ultimately honours and guarantees the 
worth of persons. This protects his theology from some of the criticisms made 
against liberal theologies that abandoned metaphysics whilst preserving the personal 
nature of the gospel. The personal nature of cosmology was as fundamental to Oman 
as the personal reality of grace to the soul; and his personal methodology was the 
complement of both.  Personal freedom is, for Oman, ontologically vouchsafed; this 
is the faith on which his own independence of thought is predicated. This 
independence saves Oman from dressing faith in any particular philosophical clothes. 
For example, nineteenth century theology often identified closely with idealism. In 
its various hues, idealism was considered a suitable vehicle for the tenets of 
Christianity in the eyes of many.
96
 However, Oman, having freed faith from the 
theological control of doctrine and confessions, was unwilling to lodge it in the 
house of a singular philosophy. Oman draws on both empiricism and idealism; the 
personal is always in the ascendant over either material or spiritual systematisation. 
One consequence is Oman’s literary style. It is a reminder of impressionism in art. 
His work abounds in free paraphrase; and, above all, it is personal impressions that 
he seeks to convey to the reader. A systematic theology would seem, for Oman, to be 
out of place in a world where personal impression is the primary witness to reality 
and from reality. Oman’s theology of personal freedom will not satisfy everyone, but 
in his emphasis on freedom he escapes the accusation that his theology, like other 
liberal theologies, was prisoner of any specific philosophical hermeneutic.
97
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Thirdly, criticism may be made of Oman’s concept of personality on the grounds of 
its incompleteness. The tripartite focus on will, feeling and intellect has much to 
commend it as a unified concept of what it is to be a person. However, Oman’s 
definition leaves out what in contemporary understanding is central to the shape and 
functioning of persons, namely, the sub-conscious. Oman’s distinction between 
disposition and character and the separation of the subconscious from personality is a 
strange distinction to make for someone whose methodology was empirical and 
experiential. In contrast to Oman’s exclusive focus on conscious personality, James’ 
concept of the “buried self” was indicative of holistic understanding of personality 
that would become commonplace in the twentieth century. Once the subconscious is 
taken into account then the idea of personal freedom becomes less idealistic and 
much more earthed, and the degree of freedom in any life problematic. Of course, 
Oman never saw freedom as absolute, and devoted considerable effort into finding a 
place for it in biology and physics, yet it is a puzzling omission that he did not with 
equal thoroughness consider the psychologically factors that contribute to the degree 
of freedom in personality. Oman said of Pringle Pattison, he never settled his account 
with Hegelianism, so it might be said of Oman that he never fully settled his account 
with Kant. Imaginatively, he set Kant’s moral imperatives in an evolutionary context, 
arguing that experience is too varied to be accommodated to the abstract and 
absolute. But equally with personality, it calls for a developmental, organic 
understanding rather than the static categories in which Oman frames it.
98
 Even the 
biblical words such as heart and spirit invite consideration of the hidden depths of 
personality. Had Oman focused on the psychological dimensions of personality, it 
would have tilted his theology more towards compassion and away from the 
moralistic tone that is sometimes heard in his sub-text, if not in his text. It was an 
omission born of Oman’s antipathy to Hegelian synthesis; perhaps even a reaction to 
his experience of the Great War. In the early phase of the war, personal responsibility 
was considered adjectival to the momentous forces that engulfed Europe and an 
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idealistic optimism was appended.
99
 Ever after, for Oman, anything that blurred the 
boundary between the moral self and the world, either inwardly or outwardly, was a 
danger and a threat.  
Fourthly, Oman’s aversion to mysticism will always invite criticism. His unease, as 
noted, arises from a desire to maintain the integrity of personality. Self may be lost as 
easily in God as in the world. Oman was prepared to concede that mystical 
experience may function as a discipline for the mind, but not as a substitute for 
engagement with the world. It is through wrestling with the natural that its depths in 
the supernatural are known.  But, surely, mystical experience need not be evaluated 
exclusively in epistemological terms. Peace and love pass all understanding. Oman 
needed to give more weight to his own idea of the undifferentiated holy as “joy 
unspeakable”, not setting it over and against the personal, but recognising it as a 
depth dimension of personality.
100
 Our personal relations have some of their deepest 
moments of intimacy not in rationality, or in activity, but in our passivity. Passivity, 
or soulful experience, need not be preparatory for anything; its raison d’être is in 
itself. For Oman, however, it seems as though moments of mystical communion 
might idle time away that could be devoted to active discipleship. In contrast, 
personal idealists like Pringle Pattison and Henry Jones with their emphasis on 
presence – God in us as well as us in God – touched on something important in the 
experience of the divine. Oman failed to appreciate that communion may be real 
apart from self-determined, self-directed, activities. Without the passivity of mystical 
experience, in some form, then Christian spirituality can easily mutate into the 
Protestant work ethic. Hence, secular norms may become so strong within the 
Church that discipleship is pressed into an entirely activist framework and becomes a 
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non-contemplative pursuit. In Oman’s quest for Christianity predicated exclusively 
on the conscious, relational, personality he overlooked, or undervalued, the fact that, 
at some point, relationship must become communion.
101
 Nothing short of 
communion can satisfy either a God of love or the deepest human needs. The mystics 
remind us of the truth that Milton discovered, when his activity was curtailed and he 




These criticisms of Oman reveal him to be a man of his time. Moral earnestness 
marked the period after the 1st World war and the importance of personal 
responsibility seemed a necessary corrective to any form of corporate thinking. 
Brunner and Barth
103
, also, were ardent critics of the mystical dimension to 
Christianity seeing it as a threat to the personal Otherness of God. Oman’s theology, 
majoring on the personal reality of God, was a creative response to the needs of the 
hour. However, personality cannot be fitted as neatly into a paradigm of will, feeling 
and thought as he attempted to locate it. The exclusion of the sub-conscious in 
Oman’s definition of a person mirrors his dismissal of the mystical with respect to 
God, and so he limits the ways the divine is known and experienced.  
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Christology: a narrative of freedom 
 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined Oman’s view of freedom as development in the 
evolutionary continuum and a divine gift.  As human beings, our vocation is to 
participate in freedom grounded in love. This participation cannot be explained in 
purely intellectual terms; the life of freedom through faith, and the life of faith in 
freedom, can be validated only by authentic living, or praxis. Freedom is 
multifaceted: it is freedom for new challenges, it is freedom from spiritual coercion; 
and it is freedom to bear with those things in life which we cannot change. As quoted 
previous, for Oman “our worth is in our burden; our freedom is in the way we bear 
it”.
1
 It is the privilege of human beings to have so evolved that consciously they have 
entered the atmosphere of freedom, love and knowledge – the spiritual environment 
that religion calls God.  
Of this vocation to a life of freedom in God, Christ is the great exemplar; no one has 
more authentically lived in the natural, nor has anyone exhibited more the freedom of 
the supernatural. Jesus of Nazareth in his life, teaching and death is a revelation of 
how, in the midst of nature, red in tooth and claw, it is possible to find not only 
reconciliation with God, but joy in God.
2
 Jesus shows how the pain of creation, 
moral evil, and depth of human alienation are transfigured in the light of divine love. 
In presenting Christ as the one in whom reconciliation to God, and liberation in God, 
is exhibited, Oman does not draw on the classical Christological tradition; rather, he 
provides a narrative Christology, descriptive rather than prescriptive, inspirational 
rather than didactic, more poetic than propositional. It is a narrative, however, set 
within a larger narrative. Christological revelation is predicated upon the general 
revelation. God is everywhere revealing himself; though, in Jesus of Nazareth, 
general revelation is more fully received and reflected. In Christ, we see the Father in 
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the fullness of his love and we see humanity in the completeness of response to that 
love. Oman writes: “Only as the Son of Man does He reveal the perfection of the Son 
of God”.
3
 One may speak of a Christology of identity. There is identity between God 
as he is in Christ and God as he is manifest through the supernatural. Oman, 
however, is tentative about speaking of God in himself; thus, in regard to the 
doctrines of the person of Christ, or the Holy Trinity, he considered them speculative 
and intellectualist.  
The identity between God and Christ does not come easy; it is the fruit of 
reconciliation. This saves Oman’s theology from the charge of soft liberalism. 
Reconciliation has a Cross at its centre and it is the major theme in Oman’s 
reflections on the significance of Christ for Christian faith. The Cross displays the  
fullest example of reconciliation history can afford; Christ crucified combines the 
depths of divine love towards the world and a completeness of trusting response 
never, before or after, witnessed by the world. In the light of the Cross, we can say 
God “is above all, through all and in all”
4
 and is present in a unique, though not 
exclusive, way in Christ.  
Themes in this chapter 
The first section examines Oman’s Christology in an historical perspective. Oman 
has been identified, alternatively, as a disciple of Schleiermacher and a follower of 
Ritschl. These contrasting evaluations of Oman arise out of the unsystematic nature 
of his work. It is difficult to locate Oman in the Christological spectrum when he, 
himself, is so critical of systematic presentation. That not withstanding, there is an 
examine of  how previous studies have drawn lines of continuity and discontinuity 
between Oman and nineteenth century theology, as well as with some strands in the 
twentieth. 
In section two the focus is on the theological premises that shape Oman’s 
Christology. The narrative of revelation in Christ stands within a wider narrative of 
revelation through creation. Oman sees these as complementary; Christ represents 
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clarity and completion of already existent revelation; and practically and functionally 
he brings the depths of divine reality to view. The philosophical antecedents of this 
approach will be explored, noting how Oman carried forward a tradition, found in 
late nineteenth century Scotland, of interpreting Christ within an already determined 
philosophical framework.
5
 The correlation between Christ and freedom is important 
in Oman’s Christology. The supernatural is an order of freedom which Christ 
embodies and represents; and so, he invites his followers to participate in the same 
divine order. This Christology of freedom stands out in the context of the early 
twentieth century; yet, it has been scarcely noticed in theology. 
Sections three and four look at Oman’s use of and interpretation of the Bible. Section 
three examines how Oman reads the Bible through the narrative of “prophetic 
religion”; it is a concept shaped by his philosophy of personality and, visa versa, his 
concept of personality had roots in prophetic literature. Section four considers 
Oman’s reading of the New Testament. Oman’s theme of reconciliation strongly 
colours his use of Christological titles his interpretation of the teaching of Jesus, 
especially the beatitudes.  
Section five examines Oman’s theology of the Cross which is, in effect, the 
background theme of all of his theology. It is a theology that is highly revisionist of 
tradition, whilst at the same time resolutely affirming of the centrality of the Cross. 
This section shall argue that Oman’s theology of the Cross brings together the 
various strands in his theological thinking. Oman saw the Cross as the ultimate 
symbol of reconciliation: the iconic meeting point of human freedom and divine 
love. The Cross is at the heart of Oman’s philosophically mediated Christology. 
1 Evaluations in scholarship 
Scholarship has found it difficult to locate Oman in the history of Christological 
thought. All agree that he is far removed from the Chalcedon tradition; but, with 
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regard to his relation to Christology in the nineteenth century, opinion sharply 
divides. George Grant’s thesis, written in 1950, began a trend in identifying Ritschl’s 
influence on Oman’s work. Oman, he writes, “was a man deeply influenced by 
Ritschl”.
6
  This estimate was followed in 1969 by Thomas A Langford in his study of 
English speaking theology in the early twentieth century. Oman’s work, he remarks, 
“though not easily categorised, reflected strong Ritschlian themes”.
7
 Grant’s study 
draws attention to the points at which Oman follows Ritschl. For example Oman, like 
Ritschl, is averse to doctrinal metaphysics and endorses Kant’s emphasis on human 
autonomy. However, more needs to be made of the differences between the two 
thinkers. In the concluding chapter of Faith and Freedom, Oman offers considerable 
criticism of Ritschl. He believed that Ritschl “was beyond question the greatest 
influence since Schleiermacher”;
8
 nevertheless, he identified several weaknesses in 
his theology. First of all, mystery must have a greater role in religion than Ritschl’s 
historicism permits. Christ cannot be a revelation pertaining to historical aspects of 
reality only; to be relevant to faith in God he must provide “a sense of passing over 
the infinite”.
9
 Furthermore, there is a mystery about Christ’s death that Ritschl does 
not sufficiently recognise. It matters greatly, Oman argues, that Christ has conquered 
death as well as sin and that there is a cosmic dimension to his work. In a way which 
we shall never be able to adequately explain, there is in atonement “restitution of the 
moral order as well as of the erring person”.
10
 With regard to miracle, Oman argues 
that, if Ritschl had not have been so wedded to a deterministic model of the universe, 
he would have been more appreciative of the new and unexpected. Ritschl did not 
sufficiently see the connection between divine freedom and miracle; and had he “set 
freedom at the heart of things, he could scarcely have avoided a frame of mind to 
which miracle would hardly have seemed strange”.
11
 Once the cosmos is understood 
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as a divinely supported and open process, then “miracle is the likeliest of all things in 
a world so marvellous and God so near”.
12
 On the question of the resurrection, 
therefore, Oman is critical of Ritschl for having dealt with it so “elusively”.
13
 Finally, 
whilst it has been Ritschl’s contribution to make theology a practical rather than a 
speculative matter, Ritschl’s focus on practice led him to undervalue the mystical 
element in religion. The mystical dimension to faith, Oman argued, cannot be 
dismissed simply as neo-platonic intrusion.
14
  
These are substantial criticisms of Ritschl and should act as a caution against 
following Grant and Langford in identification of the two thinkers. Over and above 
these specific divergences, it is important to note that Oman’s orientation was 
fundamentally phenomenological, whilst Ritschl’s was historical.
15
 Ritschl’s concern 
was to identify the co-ordinate of Christian freedom with historical revelation given 
in the New Testament. It was a project that was to have a long trajectory into the 
twentieth century and it was continued, critically, by theologians as diverse as 
Bultmann and Brunner. Oman, in contrast, sought to free faith from historical 
authority and to ground in it the present witness of God. Freed from the constraints 
of history, other than as an element in experience, Oman’s phenomenological 
understanding of faith and freedom was more radically existentialist. 
Alasdair Heron, writing in 1980, perceived the importance of experience in Oman’s 
thinking and noted a clear continuity with, and development of, the work of 
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Schleiermacher. In this, Heron was continuing an older tradition of interpretation of 
Oman found in Healey. It was in translating the Speeches that Healey believes Oman 
engaged most with Schleiermacher and came to an appreciation of his strengths and 
weaknesses.
16
 Heron repeats the points made by Healey: 
The heritage of Schleiermacher was especially explored and cultivated 
by Oman….In Schleiermacher, Oman detected three main weaknesses: 
an inadequate conception of religion, a defective treatment of human 
freedom and an insufficient appreciation of the causes of disintegration 
in man and in the world.
17
 
These observations touch on key issues. Oman argued that a weakness in 
Schleiermacher’s concept of religion was its rootedness in the thinking of the 
romantics; and Schleiermacher’s understanding of human freedom was endangered 
by his pantheistic leanings.  For example, sin was too lightly portrayed in 
Schleiermacher’s thought, being understood as a defect rather than rejection of God, 
an artistic rather than a spiritual failure.
18
 What Oman sought to bring to 
Schleiermacher, therefore, was a much stronger sense of personality; in fact, a sense 
of personality, more indebted to Kant than Schleiermacher, with an emphasis on self-
determining agency. Heron, therefore, rightly points out the central place Oman gave 
to personality. There is, in personality, freedom “to be bad as well as good”.
19
 
Accordingly, Heron believes that Oman countered the facile optimism associated 
with Schleiermacher and liberal theology. He concludes: Oman’s approach “still 
seems to many a preferable alternative to those of a Barth, a Brunner or a 
Bultmann”.
20
 This is a generous assessment from a Barthian scholar; and it rightly 
addresses the line of continuity between Oman and Schleiermacher whilst, at the 
same time, noting the greater emphasis on personality. 
In 1992, Steven Bevans took a critical look at Oman from a wider perspective; and, 
though he made the categorical statement: “Oman’s work is not Christocentric”, he 
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qualified this assertion by saying, it “can certainly be called Christo-morphic”. 
Bevans explains that Christo-morphic was a concept developed by Richard R. 
Niebhur to describe the practical import of Schleiermacher’s Christology. The 
essential idea is that in Christian faith Christ has a “person forming” function.
21
 
Bevan’s believes the concept is also an apt description of Oman’s work, where faith 
is shaped and sharpened “especially if not exclusively, by knowledge of Jesus 
Christ”.
22
 This move towards a more practical understanding of Oman’s Christology 
is helpful, but also limiting. The person-forming aspect of Christ in Oman’s thought 
can be fully appreciated only within the wider perspective of the supernatural. The 
logic of Oman’s thought is that the primary reality is God, as known through 
experience, and the role of Christ is to act as interpreter. The witness of Christ is not 
a substitute for the general witness of God; neither does it mean an exemption for us 
from the work of interpretation. Rather, Christ is inspirational, so that we may know 
God as we interpret and act in freedom. It is environment in its material and spiritual 
totality that is the vehicle for God’s call and the context of human response. Christ, 
therefore, shapes personality indirectly, neither removing the responsibility of 
personal response to God, nor replacing the primary witness of God through creation. 
In contrast, Niebuhr, following Schleiermacher, gives Christ a much more 
foundational position in Christian faith; indeed, “personal existence is qualified 
through and through” by relation to Christ.
23
 In Oman’s thought, the legacy of Christ 
is not that of magisterial authority, but of inspiring faith to explore the unfathomable 
depths of divine love in the midst of life. In his own distinctive terminology, Christ 
exemplifies and inspires the discovery of the supernatural through the natural.  
Summary 
These contrasting evaluations of Oman’s Christology arise, at least in part, from not 
giving sufficient recognition to the essentially narrative and unsystematic nature of 
Oman’s work. Oman paints a portrait rather than creates a system. And so, whilst 
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many points of similarity and difference abound, when we read Oman in the light of 
the great systematic presentations of his predecessors, this does not mean he can be 
unambiguously identified with either. The principle that Oman identifies at the heart 
of reality, namely freedom, informs the way that he approaches theology. Oman feels 
at liberty to receive light from any quarter and commits himself to no one system. 
Christ in Oman’s theology does not fit into any recognisable framework of doctrine. 
Oman tells the story of a Christ who brings to the heart the love of God, who 
challenges the mind with the truth of God and who calls the will to serve God. But 
this Christ provides no intellectual resting place, rather like the Christ of John’s 
gospel, he “makes his followers free indeed”.
24
  
The freedom of the theologian, in Oman’s view, means engaging with experience; it 
is the present that is the locus of knowledge of God. The past, of course, is a valuable 
part of experience and often a needful vantage point. In that sense, the narrative of 
Christ’s life and ministry, of his death and resurrection must not be ignored. It is a 
beacon directing the believer to the high seas and an assurance that, in obedience to 
the call to freedom, the disciple can never be outside the fellowship of the Lord. “The 
highest proof of God’s revelation is that it sets men free with the liberty of the 
children of God”.
25
 This quotation draws our attention to the underlying theme in 
Christological thinking: Christ has no finality as an historical revelation in a 
prescriptive sense; but, in terms of giving to humankind the tools for the life of faith, 
which is to live in freedom and love, he is unsurpassed. In proverbial language, 
Christ has taught us to fish rather than having given us a fish. The hermeneutical 
backdrop to this conclusion is the subject of the next section. 
2 Christology and revelation 
This section shows how Oman’s narrative of Christ completes the wider narrative of 
God’s disclosure in and through the cosmos; and, it leads to consideration of Oman’s 
theology of revelation. God is the primary reality for Oman and the contribution of 
Christ has been to bring clarification and completeness to what would be otherwise 
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fragmentary knowledge of God. Prior to the coming of Christ, “the idea of God was 
broken and he made it whole”.
26
 Christ completes revelation by illuminating the 
revelation already present, though imperfectly realised. God’s revelation always and 
everywhere abounds and it is human unresponsiveness that marks its limitation. 
There is, in fact, “no such thing as an historical revelation”.
27
 Mere “information by 
sporadic acts of omniscience” is not worthy of the term “revelation” in that it ignores 
the essential dialogue that is fundamental to knowledge of God. Oman’s view of 
revelation, therefore, echoes God’s word to Isaiah: “come now let us reason 
together”;
28
 but, importantly, the possibility of such dialogue is universal and is a 
reality where there are ears to hear, or eyes to see. Oman continues: 
A God of love must be revealing in all his intercourse, at all times and 
in all ways and not alone in special actions. The love of God and the 
fellowship of the Spirit are always and everywhere revealing 
themselves, and to restrict themselves to special channels would merely 
prove the love imperfect and the fellowship narrow hearted.
29
 
It is, therefore, within the universal that the particularity of Christ takes on 
importance. The urgent need is for an interpreter of God’s generous giving of himself 
through creation. The need is for a translator to give human voice to the language of 
God that speaks in and shines through creation.  
The whole world is the means whereby God manifests Himself, and our 




Christ meets this supreme need for interpretation and a standard of revelation. In 
Christ, the revelation of God, given in and through the world, finds a human voice. 
This leads to the question of the identity between Christ and God. It is important to 
Oman that the voice of Christ does not take on an independent authority. The 
authority of Christ’s witness comes from its unity with the witness of God, mediated 
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through creation. There are not two witnesses but one. Oman highlights this in The 
	atural and the Supernatural:  
If Jesus is in any sense a final authority in religion, it is because he 




And he repeats in Honest Religion: 
He spoke with the authority of truth manifest to all who did not meet its 
appeal with hypocrisy; and He neither used authorities nor was one.
32
 
Thus, Oman comes to a theology of identity between revelation in Christ and 
revelation given in and through the natural world. And, though he does not favour 
the classical formulation of the Word becoming flesh, the person of Christ in Oman’s 
theology is functionally at one with God. This functional identity is so much so that 
Oman says we must always go directly to Christ as the human embodiment, or 
incarnation, of the Divine. 
If the Christ of God is not one who proclaims truth altogether above our 
reasoning, but is the perfect appeal of the Divine incarnated in 
humanity which demonstrates itself direct to the nature made in God’s 
image, the first resolve of every disciple in every age is to press, 
without intermediary directly to his feet. No fellow mortal even were he 
an Apostle should intervene.
33
 
It would be a mistake, therefore, to say that Oman has no doctrine of the incarnation. 
It is not the classical doctrine, of the logos becoming flesh. Oman’s doctrinal 
agnosticism does not permit him to go in that direction. Nevertheless, Christ in his 
relation of trust towards God, and by his vocation as a witness to the reality of God, 
does, functionally, “incarnate” the divine in humanity.
34
 It is an incarnation of 
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completion which, in turn, offers the hope of a practical incarnation of the divine in 
every person. This, of course, given Oman’s relational anthropology can come about 
only through personal relationship and never by the infusion of the Spirit or by 
sacramental in-dwelling. We may say that Oman provides a functional and relational 
Christology, outwith a dogmatic structure and within a narrative framework.  
2.1 Contextual roots 
If we take a brief contextual look at Oman’s integrationist approach to theism and 
Christology, we find that it takes us back to that of the late nineteenth century and we 
need look no further than his teachers in philosophy to see antecedents to his 
methodology. For example, two of his University of Edinburgh teachers, Campbell 
Fraser and Pringle Pattison, understood Christian revelation from a general theistic 
view point. Both alike saw Christ as one who brings clarity to the idea of God. 
Furthermore, the notion that Christology and general revelation stand in a dialectical 
relation was an idea far from their intellectual horizon. Thus, Pringle Pattison, could 
say towards the end of his Gifford Lectures, 1911-1913, that the gospel of Christ is in 
effect the “open secret” of the universe. He writes: 
What was the secret of Christianity, the new interpretation of life by 
which it conquered the world? The answer is in a sense common place. 
It was the lesson of self sacrifice; of life for others, precisely through 
which, nevertheless, the truest and intensest(sic) realisation of self is to 
be attained – in the Pauline sense, dying to live, in the words of Jesus 
losing one’s life to find it. [Break] For if this is the deepest insight into 




For Pringle Pattison, the significance of Christ lies in his articulation of the “open 
secret”, the revelation ready and waiting to be discovered. This concept of revelation 
as clarification is also evident in the thinking of Campbell Fraser. Fraser reflected in 
his Gifford Lectures (1894-96) that “the universe is virtually personal, for us a 
revelation of a Person rather than a Thing”.
36
 As observed in chapter four, Fraser, 
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like Oman, believed that the universe is both natural and supernatural and on 
speaking terms with humanity. In his monograph on Berkeley, Fraser maintains there 
is a “revelation of the Universal Spirit in the Cosmos and in Christ”.
37
 In fact: 
The more articulate revelation of the Universal Spirit in and through 
Christ ultimately appeals to the same inevitable presuppositions out of 
which the optimistic theistic faith in the moral and prefect goodness of 
the supreme power emerges.
38
 
Fraser, committed as he was to the historic Christian faith, does not feel a need to 
relegate general revelation to a subordinate position. It is a mistake, he believed, to 
think that “Divine love can only come through a miraculous revelation”.
39
 General 
and Christological revelation converge and complement each other. In his 
Biographica Philosophica he wrote: 
The more vague gospel of Theistic Philosophy and the more articulate 
gospel of essential Christianity may respond to one another, each 
particularly confirmed by the response.
40
 
The continuity between Oman and his teachers is striking; and, together, they 
represent a particular way of thinking theologically. Christ does not speak into a 
spiritual vacuum, but to human consciousness already cognisant of divine reality. 
Indeed, it is a forlorn hope, Oman believed, that one should see revelation in Christ if 
one is unable to observe the presence of God in humanity. “We cannot recognise the 
Divine things of God without first recognising their presence in man”.
41
 And, more 
polemically still, he argues: 
It is unbelief which cannot see God in all things, the unbelief which sets 
God and his creation at variance, the unbelief which finds God’s 
revelation of himself by His words alien and opposite from his 
revelation of Himself by his works.”
42
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As well as having the support of the Bible for this assertion that God is known 
through his works,
43
 Oman’s integration of Christology into a general theistic 
narrative is an example of how the theistic philosophy common in the late nineteenth 
century extended into the early twentieth.  
2.2 The finality of freedom 
A Christology of completion brings with it the question of finality. Does Christ 
complete natural revelation as well as complement it? For Oman, there can be no 
completion of revelation in an evolving universe where human insight is so limiting 
and the propensity to err so great. The finality that Christ brought, therefore, lies in 
another direction. It is in the freedom that he exhibited. For example, there are many 
aspects of Jesus’ message that stand in continuity with the Old Testament, but, in the 
freedom of his life and witness, Christ stands unique.  
How great the Old Testament revelation of God was appears in the way 
Jesus started from it; and how great His revelation of the Father was 
appears in how far it went beyond what was reached by even the 
greatest of the prophets.
44
 
Jesus, in proclaiming the Kingdom, or rule of God, directs us to an eternal order in 
which “power will be content with nothing but the rule of freedom, bound only by 
love and directed only by holiness”.
45
 It is Oman’s conviction that the rule of 
freedom is primary and Christ stands out as unsurpassed in his emphasis upon it and 
in his embodiment of it. Oman writes, in the concluding pages of his Kerr lectures, 
that revelation exists as “God’s response to man’s aspiration after freedom” and it is 
human aspiration and God’s concern to satisfy it that takes us to Christ. It is in Christ 
that the human desire for freedom and divine provision are perfectly joined.  
Jesus speaks with a directness and a simplicity to the hearts made in 
God’s image, and meets them so entirely on the basis of their human 
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needs, that he stands quite alone in his significance for our freedom in 
the children of God.
46
 
This perfect union of human desire and divine satisfaction of that desire “at once 
shows the necessary relation of all revelation to Christ and the necessary 
subordination of it to the revelation in Him”. 
47
 It is a paradoxical finality that Oman 
attributes to Christ. The authority of Christ is predicated upon the freedom he 
embodied: freedom that, in the evolutionary chain, became conscious in human 
beings and has come to an unsurpassable level in Christ. One cannot speak of greater 
freedom to come because the principle has been demonstrated to the fullest capacity 
possible. But still, the principle awaits eschatological realisation in creation as a 
whole and in human beings in particular. One might argue that Oman gives freedom 
Christological underpinning. Christ embodied divine freedom to a unique degree; in 
this respect he is what Campbell Fraser called the “Ideal man”.
48
The freedom of 
Christ in his life and death, therefore, brings a transparency to the freedom possible 
in divine-human relations, and at no time before, or since, has the world been so 
diaphanous to the divine than in the divine love and human freedom manifest in 
Christ. Oman could assent to the exclusiveness of Matthew’s gospel when it says: 
“no one knows the Father except the Son, and anyone whom the Son chooses to 
reveal him”. But again, for Oman, this is a practical exhortation rather than a 
dogmatic affirmation. Only through praxis can the uniqueness of Christ come home 
to faith.  
The mystery is open for godliness, not for speculation. Not as we 
discuss the divine and the human, but as we attain to the image of God 
which is the ideal of human nature, does its perfect manifestation in 
Christ receive its demonstration. The assurance that He and the Father 
are one requires endeavour to conform our perverse wills to this 
harmony. The proof that the Son came from the bosom of the Father to 
declare him unto us depends on whether, with the spirit of sons, we are 
reaching up towards knowledge of the Father.
49
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But, even when the significance of Christ as a revelation of God comes home to 
faith, practically and existentially, the line of demarcation between heaven and earth 
is not erased. Agnosticism with regard to what lies beyond experience is, for Oman, 
not a limit to revelation to be regretted. It is a divine limit that is the necessary 
corollary of humility. In his own words: 
….we can discern – and, not then after the way of speculation, but after 
the way of faith, which however is the way of large vision of love – 
something of the ways and thoughts which are high as the place from 
which it is not given to any of us to look down, but to which it is given 
to all of us to look up.
50
  
In Oman’s theology Socratic unknowing is as vital as knowing and freedom is the 
mean between them. Freedom, so conceived, cannot but walk the humble way upon 
which truth and life depend. Christ’s finality inheres in his freedom and his freedom 
attests his finality. Oman comments: “at any time in history when we meet with 
freedom, we meet with what is final”.51 In a real sense: Ubi libertas ibi Christus. 
In the context of the twentieth century, Oman offered an alternative Christology and 
understanding of revelation to that of neo-orthodox theologians. It was a theology 
that stood in critical continuity with modernity. Garrett Green sums up the continuing 
impact of modernity as follows: 
…the great problems of theology and modernity will continue to 
challenge religious thinkers of the twenty first century: the relationship 
of religious faith to modern science, the historical particularity of the 
Bible, the authority of Scripture, the proper use of philosophy on 
theology, the truth of Christianity in a pluralistic world – and many 
others whose shape we can only begin to imagine.
52
 
Oman addressed all of these questions; indeed, they were the burden of his work; 
and, yet, he has received little attention. For Oman, the intellectual questions thrown 
up by modernity cannot be circumvented by claiming a vantage point immune from 
them. There is only a subjective standpoint in theology. Nor is it adequate simply to 
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take refuge in who Christ is; apart from the question of the how of revelation. Oman, 
therefore, sought to honour the critical questions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries; they arose out of experience and had to be addressed within the field of 
experience. It was with a degree of bemusement that Oman questioned the confident 
Barthian dismissal of experience as the sphere of revelation.  
Much of the criticism of the school is true and they have done much to 
clear the ground. I am not learned in their works and do not know all 
that is maintained, but the effort so far seems to leave more of a 
quagmire than before. Schleiermacher is denounced as the high priest 
of error. Ever since his day Protestant theology has wandered in the 
quagmires of emotion and not found objective God-given truth. This is 
preached with prophetic fire. But when you come to ask: what is God-
given truth, and what is Das Wort Gottes which is the supreme truth, 
and how do we know it is God’s word?; so far as I have read, the 
writers clothe themselves in vagueness and become abusive.
53
 
Oman was sixty-nine years of age at the time of writing and had spent his academic 
life articulating a theology that does not abandon experience but claims it as the 
sphere of revelation.  Whereas Barth reserves one corner of history as the place of 
privileged breakthrough to the ultimate,
54
 Oman posited a universal revelation 
mediated through the natural, though always above it and beyond cultural 
domestication. Barth’s fears of cultural Christianity are exorcised in Oman’s work by 
a reverent agnosticism and a sense of the Other that calls all experience to account. 
As to why British and English speaking theology should have been more captivated 
by a Barthian trajectory in the mid-twentieth century, it is a difficult question to 
answer. Perhaps the imagined certainty of revelation predicated on a privileged 
corner of history will always appeal to human insecurities. But, for Oman, the 
freedom of faith is the important and essential matter. 
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This section has argued that Oman understood Christ within a general theistic 
narrative. Christ clarifies the omnipresent revelation that humanity sees only 
imperfectly. Oman rejects the classical doctrine of the incarnation; but, on the other 
hand, he arrives at a functional, relational and incarnational understanding of the 
divine presence in Jesus. For Oman, this is not separable from the divine in every 
person. All are made in the image of God, but in Jesus that image shines more clearly 
and more brightly.  
Oman’s Christological reflection stands in continuity with the philosophical 
presuppositions of his teachers in accommodating Christology to theism. Campbell 
Fraser and Pringle Pattison saw revelation in Christ as completion of natural 
revelation and saw the relationship to religion as prophetic and progressive rather 
than dialectical. The latter perspective was going to have to wait for another day, 
though Kierkegaard had already given it voice. 
It is in the freedom of life and witness that Oman finds the uniqueness of Christ. He 
witnessed to the eternal order of freedom, he lived a life of freedom and he is the 
inspiration of all who follow him to realise in their own experience a measure of that 
same freedom. The finality of Christ is predicated on his freedom with respect to the 
natural, that is the world; and with respect to the supernatural, that is with respect to 
previously held beliefs about the holy and the sacred. This theology of freedom and 
its attendant personal, inter-subjective, understanding of revelation – and of Christ 
within the orbit of universal revelation – failed to capture the imagination of most 
twentieth century theology. 
3 Oman’s use of the Bible 
Given the location of revelation in experience, it might be thought that this 
marginalises the use and importance of the Bible. However, this was not Oman’s 
intention. Whilst the Bible is not the final arbiter in belief, it is an indispensible 
witness to faith. The Bible belongs in the stream of experience, informing but not 
dictating, illuminating but not over-riding personal insight. Somewhat analogous to 




valuable spiritual legacy, not to bind the believer to the past, but to be of practical aid 
in the present and to inspire for the future.
55
  In other words, the Bible is part of a 
continuing narrative, a narrative can be traced to antiquity and which will be 
complete only in the eschaton. For Oman, this is not an a priori assertion, as with 
positivist theologies of revelation; it is a conviction born of the nature of the religious 
narrative itself. This point becomes clearer through an examination of Oman’s 
concept of prophetic religion. 
3.1 The hermeneutic of prophetic religion 
Hermeneutics is a wide subject. Lutherans approach scripture through the doctrine of 
justification by faith, Barth through the lens of classical Christology and liberation 
theologians through the Marxist critique of capitalism. Oman’s hermeneutical lens 
was that of prophetic religion. This should not be understood simply as the religion 
of the prophets. The concept of prophetic religion refers to the living response of 
humanity to the supernatural. In an evolutionary continuum, religious sensibility has 
no resting place; the rich, diverse and unfathomable nature of our spiritual 
environment means that there will always be new insight, adaption, adjustment and 
change. Where the prophetic spirit manifests itself, things that were done in the name 
of religion for centuries will never be done again; and things once thought beyond 
the pale and taboo become new, sacred imperatives. The prophetic principle, 
therefore, is animated by the holy and the sacred and the transcendence of these 
beyond any fixed expression. Oman reads the Bible and interprets the world of 
religion from this ever moving, evolutionary perspective. Prophetic insight is at the 
apex of humanity’s religious development and Christ is unsurpassed as one endowed 
with the prophetic spirit. 
                                                 
55
 With regard to confessional theology, Oman’s experiential interpretation of the Bible represents a 
critical discontinuity with tradition. The Westminster Divines gave final authority not to the words of 
scripture verbatum, but to the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture.  Chapter One of the Confession reads: 
“The supreme Judge, by which all controversies in religion are to be determined, and all decrees of 
councils, opinions of the ancient writers, doctrines of men and private spirits, are to be examined and 
in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other than the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture”. 
Oman, however, radicalises the confession’s concept in setting the Spirit of God over and above 




This theology of religion is spelt out in detail in the last part of The 	atural and the 
Supernatural, where Oman is aware of the subjectivity of his perspective. However, 
he argues, there is no alternative but to start from one’s own personal commitment. 
“It is merest illusion to think that we can transfer ourselves to some absolute 
standpoint or do more than look from the highest standpoint we can reach with our 
best equipment of knowledge, experience and ability.”
56
 Besides, thinking issues 
through from a personal standpoint, rather than presumed objectivity, has a better 
chance of bringing one’s own views under criticism and to “a readiness to alter them 
should new light on them require it”.
57
 The end result may well be a new allegiance. 
However, whilst we may aspire to progress, and civilisations may make some slow 
advance, we must not assume superiority over the past. Oman makes some very 
cogent criticisms of western assumptions about earlier civilisations. 
There are baser and more degrading civilised idolatries than fetishism; 
there are among us economic injustices more unjust and in the end 
more brutal than among head hunters; savage promiscuity is not as vile 
a market of human beings as civilised prostitution. The noble savage of 
the eighteenth century has had the guilt rubbed off by greater 
familiarity with his ways, yet our larger life provides, if not grosser 
materialism, something more unnatural and debasing: and perhaps the 
savage has nothing to teach us about selfishness or evil dexterity.
58
 
It is to this ambiguous world where the first shall be last, and the last shall be first, 
that the Bible comes as a witness to God. The prophetic principle reads the Bible not 
as a sacred text to stifle all rivals, but as a servant text that can inform about the road 
already travelled and give hints as to the way ahead. Furthermore, the prophetic 
premise may be used to classify religion, though the resulting categories are never 
water-tight. With this caveat, Oman classifies religion under the headings: primitive, 
polytheistic, mystical, ceremonial-legal and prophetic.
59
 However, there is no clear-
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cut, or unambiguous, line of progression; and, the highest forms of religion may 
contain elements of the lowest. Prophetic religion is a principle greater than that 
which can be contained in any one religion. At the same time, there are particular 
flowerings of that principle throughout history. The monotheism of the Hebrew 
prophets represented such a flowering.  
3.2 From prophetic religion to personalism 
Oman places his discussion of the prophets and prophetic religion at the closing 
section of his magnum opus, his most philosophical work. We find, therefore, a 
direct line that stretches from his wrestling with epistemology and ontology to his 
discussion of prophetic religion. The result is that Oman makes a close identification 
between the mind and method of the Old Testament prophets and his own 
painstakingly, worked out, theory of knowledge. To recall, the core of Oman’s 
philosophy of religion is that the supernatural is known through right use of the 
natural; and the supernatural provides the meaning of the natural. Further to this, the 
supernatural is essentially personal and an order of freedom. God in his love will not 
override human insight; indeed, it is what he will always nurture. The prophets, for 
Oman, personify this personal relationship between God and humanity. They 
represent the “spiritual ancestry” to which we must be faithful, and we can be faithful 
to our spiritual ancestry only as we are resolutely independent in our own thinking.  
We must all build on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, on the 
foundation of those who obeyed the call and recognised the Divine 
teaching. To be faithful to our own insight, it must be our constant 
endeavour to be faithful to our spiritual ancestry[Break]To be true to 
our spiritual descent means to be true to our spiritual fellowship; and 
the higher our own endeavour, the more we know its dependence upon 
the good and the faithful.
60
 
In this way, Oman reads the prophets within a continuing narrative; they are links in 
a living spiritual tradition that stretches to the present.  
It is a long step from the historical circumstances of the Hebrew prophets to Oman’s 
philosophy of the natural and the supernatural. Oman is open to the criticism that he 
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too readily identified the struggles of the ancient past with the idealism of modernity 
and, in effect, made the prophets in the image of his own personal realism. A general 
criticism of this nature has been made with respect nineteenth biblical scholarship by 
contemporary Old Testament scholar Hans M. Barstad; he points out that German 
idealism so influenced scholars that “prophets appear almost as “protestant” 
theologians who invent an ethically superior religion”.
61
  Robert R. Wilson, however, 
whilst endorsing the view that nineteenth century scholars were strongly influenced 
by philosophical idealism, argues that the view of the prophets as “advocates of high 
moral and theological values”
62
 is old, with roots in Second Temple Judaism. Indeed, 
there is something perennial in the view of the prophets as personalists and ethical 
idealists. Wilson reminds his readers that appeal to the prophets as proto-personalists 
has “survived deep into the twentieth century in the work of scholars such as Martin 
Buber, Abraham Heschel and Yehezkel Kaufmann, among others”.
63
  
Oman is amongst the twentieth century thinkers who interpreted the prophets within 
a personalist paradigm. However, Oman did not press the prophets into an a priori 
ethical framework: that would have been to betray his methodology. Rather, he 
sought to recognise in the prophets ethical beginnings that would be later deepened 
and broadened, particularly by Jesus of Nazareth. Nor did the prophetic principle end 
with Jesus; it is an enduring feature of spiritual life. For Oman, therefore, the relation 
between the prophets and the idea of personality is not one of projection from the 
present to the past; it is a relationship marked by development from embryonic 
beginnings to a fuller realisation of the personal nature of reality. In other words, the 
philosophy of personality may be traced back to biblical roots.
64
 Perhaps, for this 
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reason, Oman never uses the modern term “personalism” with regard to his work, or 
to that of others.
65
 In Grace and Personality, Oman’s definition of personality, in 
terms of self-determination, self-direction and self-consciousness, is taken from 
Calderwood but is ultimately Kantian in origin. But, even older than the 
Enlightenment heritage is the biblical. In an article, written in 1906, Oman maintains 
that the idea of personality is ultimately rooted in the Bible. He writes: “The 
Christian concept of the individual…. didn’t descend from heaven without any 
indication of its coming”.
66
 The germ of individuality may be observed in Greek 
philosophy with its growing clarity of the “importance of man to himself;”
67
 but, to 
Oman’s mind, the concept owes much more to Hebrew prophecy.  
The very mark of the true prophet was to hear God’s voice only and not 
man’s and to be true to the individuality God had given him.
68
 
True individuality, therefore, is not the individual living in isolation or autonomy. 
Individuality is the individual before God. The prophetic consciousness found in 
Israel was, Oman believed, the beginning of a spiritual individualism that we would 
identify as personality.  
The prophetic principle – or equally one may speak of spiritual evolution – is 
seminal to Oman’s theology. The prophets were not simply ethical idealists before 
their time; they were rooted in their history and spoke from the particularity of 
circumstance. Oman’s bi-polar theology of the empirical and the ideal, of the natural 
and the supernatural spares him any a-historic presentation of prophecy. Continuity, 
for Oman, is not the continuity of an unbroken line in history, it is the continuity of 
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the personal spiritual environment in which human beings live at all times and 
places. History, indeed pre-history in the form of archaeology, is a record of human 
adaption to the spiritual reality that bears creation in its bosom. It is a bearing of 
love, both honouring of freedom and ever calling the things that are not into 
existence. Continuity, therefore, comes from above rather than below; and 
knowledge, ancient and biblical, modern and philosophical, ultimately coheres in one 
personal, transcendent reality. Oman writes: 
Yet the worst fault of all the – ologies – Christology, Pneumatology, 
Soteriology, Ecclesiology and the rest is that they isolate and divide 
what should be one in itself and the source of unity in all.
69
 
An anecdote illustrates Oman’s conviction that all knowledge ultimately coheres in 
one personal reality. A questioner at a series of lectures Oman gave at Auburn 
Theological Seminary, New York, in 1907, accused him of theological reductionism. 
The title of the series was “Foundations of Belief”. A report on the lectures in the 
Semi-Weekly Journal informed the readers, that Oman’s manuscript for his lecture 
“The Authority of Christ” had been stolen! and a member of the audience 
commented: “I am glad you have left us a personal God anyway, you have taken 
about everything else away”.
70
 The questioner was perceptive. Knowledge, for 
Oman, is grounded in the personal reality of God and known through freedom, love 
and holiness. His consistent belief was that knowledge, historically conditioned, 
fragmentary in nature, sometimes mistaken, always in need of revision, is the 
medium for the transcendent, that is, for the God of love who honours the human 
search for knowledge and the human longing for goodness.  
Summary 
This section has shown us that Oman took the Bible seriously, but not as an historical 
revelation in place of experience; rather, the Bible belongs in the stream of 
experience, an important reference point to the way we have travelled and an 
inspiration for the future. The Spirit, or supernatural, takes precedence over historical 
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claims to authority. The Spirit speaks in scripture and it is lord over scripture. This 
view of the Bible is predicated on the idea that religion is a living relationship with 
God and that it will always be prophetic: challenging, adjusting and adapting in its 
nature. Religion adapts to the environment of the supernatural; or, in biblical 
language, religion lives as it adapts to the constant call of God. Without constant 
response to God, religion fossilises into tradition which, for Oman, should never be 




Oman looks back to the prophets through the lens of his epistemology and theology 
of the natural and the supernatural. Oman argues for continuity from the past to 
present, in that he believes that the ideas of individuality and personhood owe much 
to the prophetic experience of being an individual in the presence of God. And so, 
whilst it is true that Oman gives the prophets a personalist colouring, he also traces 
personalism to biblical roots. Of course, if reality is personal, as Oman is insistent it 
is, one would expect such trajectories and continuities. Oman’s use of the Bible, his 
idea of prophetic religion and his personalist hermeneutic cannot be divorced from 
his philosophical commitment to personal realism. 
4 New Testament Christology 
Oman wrote considerably on the subject of the New Testament especially with 
regard to the apocalyptic. This aspect of his work is taken in the next chapter. For 
now, attention is turned to Oman’s interpretation of the Christological titles applied 
to Jesus in the New Testament and his interpretation of the teaching of Jesus as found 
in the beatitudes and parables.  
4.1 Christological titles 
Oman shows no interest in the historical origins or etymology of the titles given to 
Christ. As with the prophets, it is what Jesus reveals of the mind of God that matters; 
and the Christological titles are of value only as they further faith in the personal, 
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loving reality of God. For Oman, there are three titles applied to Jesus in the New 
Testament that are of particular importance; these titles highlight the vocation of 
Christ, which was to reveal the mind of God and to illustrate how we may come into 
accord with it. Oman reflects on these titles in Honest Religion.72 
First of all, the term “Christ” has an “intimate connection” to the idea of the 
Kingdom, or rule of God.  By means of his teaching, and the manner of his “living 
and dying”, Jesus has given us a picture of that rule. It is a rule of love which, in the 
spirit of Hosea, patiently bears our sins and failures so “that it may make us sons of 
God in His freedom”.
73
 The title “Christ” is intimately connected not just to the 
Kingdom but to the Cross. The idea of the Kingdom of God, Oman maintains, if 
isolated from the Cross, quickly takes on worldly dimensions of might and dominion. 
The Cross is the window into God’s being, and there we see a heart of love that is 
non-coercive, a love that longs for humanity to be reconciled, to come home to the 
Father’s house. Neither, as we shall see below, does the Cross carry with it any 
connotation of “compensation to God”, as if God needs to be reconciled. This “is just 
a harking back to the old religion of fear, which the commendation of God’s love on 
the Cross was to cast out.”
74
  
Secondly, the term “Lord” supplements the meaning of “Christ”. Whereas, Christ, 
the “anointed one”, reveals to us the nature of God’s rule, Jesus the “Lord” reveals 
how we may experience that rule. It becomes our experience as we share in our 
Lord’s freedom and victory over the world. The paradox, however, is that, to be free, 
we must bring every thought into captivity to Christ as Lord. This requirement for 
total obedience is, paradoxically, the source of individuality and freedom. For this 
reason, Jesus “objects to being called Lord”.
75
 What Jesus requires is that we offer 
the same “kind of obedience to God as His”. When we consider Jesus’ own 
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obedience to God we can never doubt the radical freedom that accompanies it. This 
radical freedom is our highest calling and it becomes a personal reality if we pursue 
it with faithfulness and diligence. Jesus as Lord sets us free because he was: 
….the most independent of all thinkers, the greatest of all innovators 
and the most calmly heroic of all conquerors [break] nor has he lacked 
followers who have found, just in his obedience, deliverance from 




Of course, without the revelation of God as love, the obedience upon which freedom 
is predicated will be beyond the reach of frail humanity. Insight into God’s unfailing 
love and generous grace are the prerequisites of obedience. And so, the third term, 
“Son”, describes the unity of love and obedience in the life of Jesus and in the lives 
of his followers. 
In Oman’s theology, the term “Son” captures the essence of the other two titles. It is 
by being perfectly the Son that Jesus manifests both the Father’s rule of love and 
human reconciliation to that love. The Son, being reconciled to the Father in and 
through the Cross, becomes the inspiration of reconciliation for everyone who hears 
the gospel. Oman, as noted, interprets Christ in functional and relational terms. The 
son-ship of Christ “was neither physical nor metaphysical, but is a relation to God 
through which He was sure of revealing the heart of the Father and of all things 
being given Him of the Father that he needed”.
77
 The son-ship of Christ, however, 
was not just a vertical relationship with God. It is a horizontal relationship with 
humanity whereby Jesus stands in solidarity with all God’s sons and daughters. Jesus 
was not the son of God in any selfish or exclusive way. His son-ship was perfect, not 
in being isolated from humanity but through being indentified with humanity in its 
alienation from God. Jesus’ son-ship was, in fact, no different from ours “except in 
originality”; it is son-ship that we all “ought to have”.
78
 And we do have that filial 
relation, when we come to have the mind of Christ and come to share with him a 
sense of the Father’s love. In his unbroken intimacy with God and deep solidarity 
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with humanity, Christ both stands in the tradition of the prophets and surpasses them. 
The prophets experienced “bitter contrast” between the world around them and the 
experience of God in their “inward promptings”. But with Christ, all things worked 
together for God and the “light of God’s infinite purpose of love” ever shone upon 
his soul, and so, with us too, we can enter “this fellowship, divine and human”.
79
 
In this manner, Oman put selected New Testament titles for Jesus into the service of 
his theology. A similar criticism to that invoked with regard to his appeal to the Old 
Testament prophets may be made. On the one hand, Oman’s use of Christological 
titles is not alien to their meaning in the New Testament or in the Christian tradition. 
The work of Christ is one of reconciliation. On the other hand, Oman gives the terms 
Christ, Lord and Son an exclusively personal meaning. He sets aside much of the 
historical nuance and depth of meaning that biblical scholarship unearths. 
Consequently, his interpretation of New Testament terminology will not be satisfying 
to many readers. At least two sets of reader will find Oman’s interpretation 
inadequate. First, those who find the New Testament a fertile ground for faith 
precisely because of its diversity, inconsistencies and loose ends will want to dig 
more deeply. This is the type of faith that lives with the search for the Jesus of 
history, not as a problem, but as a liberation and inspiration. Secondly, those who 
value the coherence that Trinitarian theology brings to the diversity of the New 
Testament – like Oman’s questioner at Auburn Seminary – will be dissatisfied with a 
personal theism that marginalises the doctrinal tradition. But for those who value an 
I-Thou model of faith, Oman will have a much stronger appeal. Oman presents a 
Christology which – like all existentialist, or personally grounded, Christology – 
speaks to the heart and sets experience above historical detail. Oman leaves the 
reader with a faith in Christ our contemporary, a faith which travels lightly with 
respect to tradition. 
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4.2 Beatitudes and parables 
Oman gives an interpretation of the beatitudes in part two of Grace and Personality.  
The beatitudes, he argues, should be read as manifestation of grace. It is not an 
interpretation that is readily apparent to the reader, to the preacher, or indeed to the 
New Testament scholar.
80
 The connection between the beatitudes and grace is, again, 
predicated upon Oman’s ontology. The blessings that the beatitudes bestow are 
contingent upon a realisation of transcendent values of the sacred and the holy, 
together with a deep dependence on God’s constant love and succour. If this 
metaphysical framework is not borne in mind, Oman’s commentary on the beatitudes 
can make rather obscure reading. In the light of the philosophical tenets of Oman’s 
philosophy, however, they become lucid and illuminating. In essence, the beatitudes 
amount to joy in the Lord because he can be totally depended upon in every 
circumstance. Without the comfort of this insight, the Sermon on the Mount becomes 
more moralistic than anything that could be conjured up by the most severe of the 
Pharisees. As purely moral precepts, they are “a ground of despair and not of 
blessedness”.
81
  Happily their essence does not lie in “resolution and effort”, but 
upon insight into God’s all embracing love which enables in proportion as it 
demands; and, therefore, the beatitudes are “the good news of glorious freedom and 
not a moral code to enslave by impossible rules of refraining from evil”.
82
  
Oman’s meaning becomes clearer in his commentary on the various beatitudes 
themselves. He divides them into three groups which correspond to self-
consciousness, self-direction and self-determination. [As noted in chapter four, these 
are categories which define what it is to be a person in Henry Calderwood’s Hand-
book of Moral Philosophy and which Oman repeats in his definition of personality.] 
He admits that “this may seem a very technical scheme to apply to the Beatitudes: 
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and it is not suggested that Jesus constructed them after that pattern”.
83
 So from the 
outset, Oman acknowledges a philosophical perspective; though in his spiritual 
realism he claims a religious intuition at one with the witness of Jesus. 
Taking the first group of three, Oman sees in them a particular consciousness, what 
Jesus calls poverty of spirit, mourning and meekness. This consciousness is the 
ground of happiness, because it is receptive to love as the meaning of the world. 
Human emptiness is open to divine fullness and disenchantment with the world rests 
in the assurance of a purpose beyond it. In the service of God, what is weak, broken 
and fragile becomes the vehicle of divine strength. Faith in God changes everything, 
though empirically all may remain the same. Intuition of love as the meaning of 
creation lifts the soul into a new, divine, world of belonging. The goodness of God’s 
love makes all things new. 
The second group of beatitudes speaks of blessed self-direction. Oman warns of the 
inadequacy of rules in this sphere. True happiness is born of what the heart actively 
seeks. In longing for justice and for mercy and purity of heart the soul finds its true 
sphere of belonging in the supernatural. The search, the journey and arrival are, 
however, contingent on faith accessing and practising the values of the Kingdom of 
God. Thus, purity of heart sees God because, like God, it is kind to the evil and the 
unthankful. The contrast with conventional morality is stark. Oman concludes: “as 
the demands of outward respectability do not grow less harsh as they become more 
superficial, the mere moralist ends as a death’s head at life’s feast”.
84
 Life’s feast is 
the joy of the Lord, experienced in receptivity and sharing. 
The last group of beatitudes is concerned with self-determination. This is a happy 
though difficult path. There is no such thing as easy-going peace, there is no cheap 
grace. The world offers persecution to the self-determined soul that actively serves 
God in the spirit of Christ. Final victory can only be teleological; but, even here and 
                                                 
83
 Grace and Personality, 96. 
84




now, peace is experienced and the earth is sanctified thereby. The “crowning victory 
of our self-determination” is “serenity in conflict” and “assurance of triumph”.
85
 
This brief synopsis gives a flavour of Oman’s compact and powerful commentary on 
the spirituality of the beatitudes. Of particular importance are Oman’s convictions: 
that the beatitudes are concerned with intuition and not abstract reasoning; neither 
are they concerned with rules, even the highest. Furthermore, relation to human 
beings always comes before relation to God. And morality, if it is not to slide into 
social convention, or become crucifying of the weak, needs the salt and light of love 
and compassion. Thus, Oman remarked to his students that nothing has had a more 
profound effect on the morality of the world than the gospel, yet in itself it is not a 
morality.  However, without a hermeneutic shaped by the combination of personal 
idealism and realism, it is doubtful whether Oman, or any one, would read the 
beatitudes quite in this fashion. We see the backdrop of the natural and the 
supernatural, the empirical and the transcendent and, especially, the unity of these 
concepts in the personal. Experience is transfigured in light of the transcendent; and, 
transcendence cannot be apprehended except though the empirical. As with the 
prophets and with the person of Christ, the greatest of the prophets, the teaching of 
Christ in Oman’s reading is a charter for personal freedom. Resting in divine love, 
the soul is free with the freedom of Christ.  
One could turn, also, to the parables and observe the influence of Oman’s 
philosophical realism, especially in the epistemological assumptions employed. For 
example, Oman, as we saw, posited the highest form of knowing to be that of the 
poet, artist and child. In all three, intuition is at its widest and deepest. It is with 
analysis and explanation that knowledge of reality narrows down. The parables, for 
Oman, exhibit this intuitive knowledge and they display poetic awareness. The 
parables of Jesus were “made memorable and poignant by figure and parallel, mostly 
from life’s common things, and often by poetic form, rising to poetic beauty”.
86
 It is 
an understanding of the parables premised again on Oman’s distinctive epistemology 
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and ontology. Across the whole breadth of his New Testament interpretation, the 
same hermeneutic applies. 
Summary 
This section has drawn our attention to the New Testament input into Oman’s 
Christology. The priority of the personal is very evident when Oman discusses 
selected titles that the New Testament gives to Christ. The historical roots of the 
Christological titles do not concern him; it is the reconciling work of Jesus that is the 
centre of his thinking. The meanings of the terms Christ, Lord and Son are predicated 
upon the personal communion that Jesus enjoyed with the Father and the personal 
relationship he shared with humanity. Jesus was the reconciled One and becomes the 
reconciling One when we participate in the same relationship of freedom, love and 
holiness that he shared with the Father. 
The teaching of Jesus serves the same end as his person. The beatitudes teach us how 
to be reconciled to God. Oman provides an original interpretation and we argue that 
it would have been scarcely possible without his specific philosophical background. 
The beatitudes describe how, in the reality of personal experience, we can experience 
the happiness of the transcendent in the midst of the harsh realities of the empirical 
world. Happiness is a question of mind over matter because mind is ultimate; 
however, mind needs the reality of matter in order to realise the ends of love. 
One other vital piece of Oman’s Christological narrative needs to be examined, that 
of the Cross and its importance for faith.  
5 Oman’s Theology of the Cross 
This section focuses on Oman’s theology of the Cross. It is the centre-piece of his 
portrait of Christ. Grant makes the comment that, “Christology for Oman proceeds 
from the intuition that all our existence must be judged in terms of the Cross”. 
87
 It is 
a perceptive observation which challenges the idea that Oman has no Christology. 
Rather, the focal point of his Christology is in his theology of the Cross. This section 
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will argue that Oman’s theology – his philosophy of the natural and the supernatural, 
his emphasis on human freedom and divine love, his characterisation of Christ as the 
interpreter and embodiment of divine reality – all of it, in the language of piety, 
meets at the foot of the Cross. But, first it is helpful to clear the ground of two 
theologies of the Cross that Oman rejects. He was particularly critical of both kenosis 
and of legal theories of atonement. 
5.1 Kenosis 
The theory of kenosis, or the self-emptying of God in the incarnation, was a well 
established theology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both in Britain 
and in Europe.
88
 The theory offered the prospect of holding on to the traditional 
divine attributes of Christ whilst recognising his real humanity. Ritschl, in contrast, 
argued that, for a realistic understanding of Christ’s divinity, we must abandon 
speculation about divine attributes and find Christ’s value for faith in his humanity. 
Ritschl wrote: “It is nothing else than mythology that is taught under the name of 
kenosis of the divine logos.”
89
 Oman stands in this critical tradition, finding the 
divinity of Christ manifest in his humanity, though not by the hypothesis of the 
hypostatic union.
90
 Indeed, Oman goes in a more existentialist direction than Ritschl, 
arguing that we have faith in Christ, “not primarily as He meets us in Scripture or in 
doctrine, but as He meets us in life. When He is hungry, the blessed of the Father 
feed Him; naked, they clothe Him; sick and in prison, they visit Him”.
91
 And, with 
respect to the principle of kenosis, Oman adds: 
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If the love of God is thus the inmost nature, as well as the deepest 
meaning of His outward working, that should be the only possible 
revelation; and we should never think of God as in Christ merely in 
condescension to the limits of our humanity. Through Christ we must 
think of the order of the Beatitudes, where all knowledge of Christ is 
related is mediated through a right relation to man.
92
 
There is, therefore, no shedding of divine attributes with Christ’s appearance in the 
world, nor a divine majesty to be taken up after the Cross. This would make Christ a 
temporary revelation and deprive his sufferings of their value as a window into the 
heart of the eternal. To think of Christ as humbling himself that he might later be 
exalted is, for Oman, as ridiculous as thinking that “Lincoln hewed wood as a step to 
the presidency”.
93
 The negative outcome of kenosis is that it has left the Church with 
two pictures of Christ: the Christ of glory and the Christ of humility. Sadly, observes 
Oman, “she is apt to serve one and despise the other”.
94
 The sufferings of Christ were 
not “an exceptional incident in the Divine method, but a manifestation in time of 
what is eternal”.
95
 Therefore, the only supremacy, power or might found in God is 
that of love. The abiding temptation has been for the Church to elevate the old order 
of government to the throne of the universe, forgetting “the supremacy of the 
everlasting order of love in freedom and freedom in love”.
96
 A two stage theology of 
Christ, from glory to humility and back again, has left the lust for power intact in 
humanity and the Church with ready justification for the sanctification of the worldly 
lordship. Kenosis wants to have a real humanity, but still to hold on to a monarchical 
God, waiting to assume control when the work of humble Christ is complete. In 
Oman’s work, the ground of his criticism of kenosis is practical; latent power will 
not remain for long latent. In any event, in the divine economy there is no power 
apart from the power of love.  
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5.2 Legal interpretation of atonement 
Oman has equally trenchant criticism of legal interpretations of atonement as he has 
for kenotic theories of Christ’s person. His key objection is that legal categories can 
never penetrate to the root of personal relations; of nothing is this more true than the 
family. The law may act as a guardian of individual rights, but the dynamic of family 
life depends on the core values of love, sympathy, sacrifice and encouragement. 
What is true of family relations is true of divine-human relations. To characterise 
them as being in essence legal is to distort them. It was not accidental that Jesus 
spoke of the Kingdom of God using family terms. The following long quotation is 
important for understanding Oman’s argument. 
Love cannot be interpreted from the outside. All that can be done from 
without is to attempt to translate it into self-love, which is necessarily to 
obscure and pervert it. Not till we find ourselves in a larger, fairer 
world, where the supreme certainty is of a different nature, where a 
golden chain links God to man, and love, not self love, is the first 
certainty, can we perceive the meaning and glory of God’s Atonement 
for sinful man. In this strange new world, where to gain our world is to 




It is a radical re-orientation of the doctrine of atonement that Oman provides. It has 
the great advantage that it cannot be interpreted in a self-centred, individualistic 
manner. “The Cross speaks to us within the family of God” and to seek selfish 
advantage from the message of the Cross is to misunderstand the reality that it 
reveals. The Cross manifests the true nature of the spiritual environment in which we 
live and it calls us to live in this environment as we bear each other’s burdens in the 
spirit of love. This is a new world alien to our self centred natures; so alien that 
atonement itself has often been falsified into a self-serving contrivance. Oman reads 
legal theories as examples of such contrivance: 
If the theory of substitution, legally interpreted, has, as it doubtless has, 
brought peace to burdened souls; if it has not hardened them in self 
love, but has delivered from self as well as sin, the reason is not that the 
theory is capable of some subtler legal interpretation which makes it 
truly meet some more comprehensive legal application which removes 
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the difficulty of government in God. The true reason is that the Cross of 
Christ has, in spite of the theory, interpreted and displayed to burdened 
souls the new world in which hard legal conditions do not obtain, but 
where these legal frontiers of our personality have been lost in our 
deeper moral fellowship with our Father and our brethren.
98
 
This quotation fleshes out Oman’s concept of atonement. It is not substitution per se 
to which he objects, but substitution legally interpreted. In all loving relationships 
there is substitution; that is why forgiveness, healing and renewal are sacrificial for 
the one who dares to love. Such atoning love is evidenced in “a mother’s tears and 
prayers”.
99
 Legal categories can add nothing to the reality of loving relationships; 
love has nothing to do with individual merit or condemnation; love introduces us to a 
new world, the world of God’s family, where the real sin is to seek to isolate 
ourselves from others. Salvation is a family affair, as wide as humanity, and it has no 
reality apart from loving our human sister and brother. Christ manifested this new 
world in his undying love, suffering yet victorious. Again, the world “manifest” is 
important to Oman’s understanding. The Cross is not an isolated event, as our 
participation is not an isolated event; the Cross is a revelation of the divine world of 
loving relationships. He speaks of “atonement” rather than “the atonement”. Oman 




Oman’s criticism of a legal understanding is illuminating and important. It speaks to 
believers who feel uncomfortable with the characterisation of divine human relations 
in legal terms. It points to the danger of self-righteousness that has often 
accompanied a legally appropriated relationship to Christ. Evangelical faith becomes 
unwittingly built on the individual ego and legal terminology reinforces the self and 
its privileges before God. In contrast, Oman’s emphasis, that there can be no relation 
to God apart from our relation to humanity, directs us to the vital relatedness and 
corporate nature of the gospel. Ego religion gives way to soulful awareness and the 
legally saved self is no longer the centre of salvation. Oman argues his case on the 
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three-fold grounds of the image of God in every person, the testimony to God‘s grace 
in the whole range of human experience and the corroborative witness of the New 
Testament. It is interesting that, here too, Oman appeals to the New Testament 
witness as corroborative. God is always and everywhere appealing to his image in 
us, so that we might recognise our common humanity and responsibility towards  
each other. However, this witness is better attested in the Cross, where “we see the 
gracious relation of our Father towards us,[and] as nowhere else, is the utter service 
of our brethren, unconditioned by our merit, shown to be the essential spirit of His 
family”.
101
  Oman’s understanding of atonement goes a long way towards saving his 
theology from the charge of individualism, or elitism. There is no salvation apart 
from the salvation of my sister and brother; we are saved for the good of the human 
family and not for the private good of our own soul. 
5.3 An atoning order and icon 
In the foregoing criticisms of both kenosis and legal interpretation of atonement, we 
have hints as to the orientation of Oman’s own thought. The death of Christ on the 
Cross has always been for Christian faith an historical act, and more than an 
historical act. Though no particular doctrine of the atonement has ever been given the 
imprimatur of orthodoxy, and the Church has valued the insights of tradition, the 
atonement has been regarded in all instances as an act of God. In one sense, Oman 
would assent wholeheartedly. But it is not the act per se that is important for Oman, 
but its sacramental or symbolic significance. In a sermon entitled, “the Light of the 
World”, Oman comments: 
If Christ is come a light to the world, it can only be because He 
manifests the eternal principles of God’s rule in it. Seeing they are 
eternal principles they cannot be adequately wrought out in time; and if 
they are such that, in defeat and agony and death, they can make us 
more than conquerors, quite obviously defeat and death cannot be the 
end. Yet eternal principles are not merely for eternity, but there can be 
no time or place where they are not valid. If we think there is a time or 
place in which we may not safely stake our souls on them and entrust to 
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their working all our interests private or public, the idea that we believe 
in Christ is mere illusion, and, if He is light, we are in darkness.
102
 
Various facets of Oman’s theology of the Cross coalesce in this single quotation. The 
Cross manifests the eternal principles that govern the world. Being ideals they cannot 
be fully expressed in empirical reality; and we note the recurrence of Oman’s reserve 
with respect to finality. However, in the Cross, there is a manifestation of eternal 
principles that is adequate for faith in each and every circumstance. In fact, to ignore, 
or be indifferent to the manifestation of the eternal in the Cross is to court moral and 
spiritual disaster. Atonement for Oman, therefore, is at the heart of the Kingdom, or 
rule of God. The disclosure of God’s rule of love in the Cross inspires faith “in the 
manifestation of what we may call an atoning order, understood by the sufferings of 
Christ and our partaking in them”.
103
The verbal adjective “atoning” is a vital 
qualification to the idea of God’s rule. Because God’s rule is atoning, it cannot be: 
the order of the world without limit or suspension, like the law of 
gravitation, because it is the nature of love to endure restriction and 
even rejection, seeing it has respect for persons with their 
responsibilities in the world they create for them selves and cannot be 




The Cross points to a rule of love strong as it is gentle, patient as it is mighty,  
victorious as it forbears, suffering as it is the expression of eternal peace. This 
theology of the Cross is only speculation apart from participation in the reality to 
which it points. We are called to “live in it, and not merely for it, so that we can 
afford to be gentle towards all men and do our tasks positively and in the spirit of 
peace, and cease to strive and cry.”
105
 One may even change the language and speak 
of an atoning environment. The spiritual environment in which human beings 
consciously live, an environment of freedom and love, is characterised by the light 
that shines in the darkness of the Cross. Our spiritual environment recapitulates the 
experience of Christ, sin still wrecks havoc and love suffers to uphold the freedom, 
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dignity and responsibility of humanity. Oman’s theology of atonement is, thus, 
noticeable for its distinctive features and the Cross is important for its iconic value. 
Atonement is a verb rather than a noun; it describes the spiritual dynamic in which 
we live, where love is actively bearing human failure and sin. The Cross is iconic in 
that it symbolises the reality of divine-human relations – human freedom, divine 
love, the rule of God, the sovereignty of grace – all are brought to focus in the image 
of Christ crucified.  
Lastly, it is notable that Oman’s in theology of atonement justification from 
sanctification are never apart but related in the experience of reconciliation.  In other 
words, there is never an appropriation of forgiveness apart from a change of heart 
and the beginning of moral awakening. Writing on the subject of justification, Oman 
comments: “moral sincerity alone it asks and makes no inquiry regarding moral 
attainment.” Oman never ceased to be a theologian of repentance. Though 
forgiveness is extended to the worst of sinners and God’s love is ever available, 
moral awakening to the sense of the good betrayed, abused, or neglected is a 
precondition of appropriating forgiveness. Oman appeals to the experience of the 
prodigal son who “came to himself”.
106
 In that existential act the son found at once 
his father’s forgiveness and reconciliation to the ways of the home he had left. Oman 
writes of this two-fold experience of forgiveness and reconciliation: 
….returning means going back to God all the way, to God as he is, and 
not, as, before we come to ourselves we would wish him to be, and 
finding ourselves at home in household as He appoints it, an not as we 
would appoint when we prefer to it the far country.
107
 
It is a stout defence of moral reality in conjunction with forgiveness and a 
determined avoidance of cheap grace. For Oman, even vicarious suffering which lies 
at the root and the marrow of divine love cannot remove the necessity for “going 
back to God all the way”. Forgiveness is powerless, no matter what the high cost 
paid in the heart of the lover, until the first steps towards reconciliation are taken by 
the one who is in alienation from the good, the true and the beautiful. God’s grace, 
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therefore, brings with it not only the opportunity for participation in God’s 
redemptive love but, also, the possibility of loss. As noted in chapter one,
108
 though 
ever hopeful, Oman was not a dogmatic Universalist. He wrote: “Just because every 
human personality is so definitely individual we cannot be sure that, in the end, there 
may not be a lost individual”.
109
 Our hope is in the character of God and that the 
mystery of evil ultimately comes under God’s sovereignty. He continues: “The 
Christian hope is not in man but in the character of God and we cannot suppose him 
under any necessity to continue evil for its own sake”.
110
 Thus, the cosmic victory of 
the love manifest on the Cross is assured. 
Finally, in one of his sermons Oman provides an interesting reflexion on the crucifix. 
He describes seeing a large crucifix in the cathedral in Louvain. “It is a very rude 
piece of carving and yet the artist had made it say what he apparently wished it to 
say.”
111
 The image was one of “a soul over whom all the billows of calamity had 
rolled and left him broken and stranded on the shores of time”.
112
 But, adds Oman, 
the piety which had brought many thank-offerings to the shrine for cures showed a 
more profound understanding of “the Master’s suffering than the artist”.
113
 “In spite 
of their superstition”, he writes: 
They knew at all events that his suffering over comes suffering. They 
saw his rent flesh, but they saw his Divine majesty gleaming through it. 
Christ’s sorrow for them did not ultimately mean suffering and defeat, 
but joy and victory.
114
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This appreciation of the crucifix is interesting. It is an indication of Oman’s 
appreciation of catholic piety; and more significantly, it is interesting that he saw the 
crucifix as an image of his own deepest, religious convictions and a visual 
simplification of reconciliation and participation in the love of Christ. Oman’s 
theology of the Cross is perhaps redolent of an older medieval piety than the forensic 
theology of the Reformation. 
Summary 
Oman’s theology of the Cross, we have argued, together with his other interpreters, 
is at the centre of his theological thinking. Oman’s critical stance towards kenosis 
and legal interpretations is sustained by an appeal to personal relations as being at the 
heart of reality. Oman speaks of atonement rather than “the atonement”; love ever 
suffers in the world, just as it ever gives hope of final victory. Oman’s theology of 
atonement is participatory and forgiveness co-dependent on reconciliation. This does 
not detract from the centrality of the Cross to Oman’s theological vision; but, the 
Cross does not have the forensic significance it has in Reformation theology. This 
leaves the question whether Oman has given sufficient priority to grace over 
repentance. Participation and reconciliation remain fundamental to Oman’s theology 
of disclosure and clarification of the personal reality of God in Christ. The 
background hermeneutic of the inter-relation of the natural and supernatural finds 
iconic focus in the Cross, and – in the unlikely source of catholic piety responding to 
a Christ via a crucifix – Oman sees the deepest truths of Christ’s Cross expressed. He 
is Christus Victor. 
Appraisal  
This chapter has surveyed the broad parameters of Oman’s Christology: it is 
narrative rather than systematic; it is incarnational in an economic rather than in an 
ontological sense; it is rooted in the concept of prophetic religion; it draws upon the 
New Testament and the central focus is upon the Cross. The following points 
illustrate some strengths and weaknesses.  
Oman’s Christology is philosophically mediated, but this is not made sufficiently 




and idealism to a theology of personal reality. It would be hard to imagine Oman’s 
portrait of Christ apart from this philosophical framework. Christ embodies this 
ontology, he lives in the atmosphere of the natural and from the environment of the 
supernatural; thus, the personal nature of reality is disclosed in the triumph of Christ. 
He is victorious over the impersonal and de-personalising realities of life in the 
world. Yet, Oman’s readers, especially the “working men” who were receptive to his 
work,
115
 probably had no awareness of philosophy. Even the preacher, who reads his 
books for edification, is unlikely to make a connection between Oman’s Christology 
and his philosophy. If the philosophical under-pinning of Oman’s Christology were 
clearer, it would remove some of the obscurity that clouds aspects of his writing. 
Secondly, the corollary of Oman’s philosophical hermeneutic is the supportive, 
rather than determinative, role played by the Bible. Most interesting and valuable to 
his theology is Oman’s delineation of the prophetic principle. And yet, there are 
streams and eddies of the Bible that are valuable in themselves; and Oman may be 
accused of channelling them with too much intent into a prophetic paradigm and 
personalist metaphysic. This criticism, however, is not fatal to Oman’s theological 
endeavour because, for him, it is not the historical context or the etymological roots 
of words that determine the spiritual relevance of scripture. It is the transcendent 
reality in which the text coheres that matters. Oman’s spiritual realism always 
triumphs over historical particularity; the value of any text lies in its witness to 
freedom in the love of God, no matter how primitive or elemental that witness may 
be. 
Thirdly, one is brought back, therefore, to the fact that freedom is both the creative 
principle and the control factor around which Oman’s builds his Christology. 
Freedom, as explored in the last chapter, is fundamental to Oman’s theism. The 
freedom of human beings is the correlate of the personal nature of God. Christ comes 
at an apex of a long line of development. In Christ, the self-transcendence of the 
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universe and the self-conscious transcendence of humanity come to a flowering.
116
 
Christ exemplifies the freedom at the heart of a universe, evolving into the loving 
purposes of God. It is Christ’s combination of radical freedom and utter devotion that 
make him a revelation of the divine in humanity. Grant, more than any other scholar, 
appreciates the heart of Oman’s work when he says: “The Father’s love and man’s 
freedom to partake of it are of the essence of Christianity. All else is but relative and 
changing”.
117
This is the sum and substance of Oman’s Christology. In Christ, 
freedom and love were linked as never before, or since, and the possibility of such 
freedom and participation in God’s love is made immediate to all who hear the 
gospel. That immediacy does not compromise God’s freedom to make his love 
known anywhere at any time, but in Christ it finds an unsurpassed clarity.  
Fourthly, Oman’s narrative form is an appropriate vehicle of delivery for a 
Christology that is more about vision than historical authority. Oman desires a vision 
of things whole, but not totality. The latter is not a human possibility and claims to 
completeness invariably distort vision of reality. For Oman, the light shines through 
the cracks in the roof of the house of knowledge, as much as through the carefully 
constructed windows. It is a perspective in keeping with his epistemology; where he 
commends artistic sensibility as being most open to the higher reaches of knowledge. 
It is not unexpected, therefore, that in his own work he should have a narrative, 
rather than a systematic approach. Oman’s narrative Christ reveals and then steps 
back; he stimulates vision and does not direct. Christ is a great exemplar of the 
narrative method, especially as a story teller who committed nothing to writing. As 
Oman recounts, Jesus relied on God’s ability to witness to himself and he sought to 
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be no authority apart from God’s continual witness in and through the panoply of 
existence. Narrative is as old as humanity: seers, sages, poets, prophets have from 
time immemorial given human voice to the voice of God. And, Oman continues: 
This was crowned by Jesus, who used the simplest and most popular 
speech; and had leisure of mind to turn his teaching into parable and 
memorable saying; drew his illustrations from field and sky, farmer and 
merchant, creditor and debtor, the house mother and the children’s play; 
was pitiful even amid the sternest rebuke.
118
 
The narrative method has an illustrious history. And today, Christian faith is born out 
of the narrative of Jesus and is authenticated in the narrative of experience. For 
Oman, to become fixated with historical critical questions – which freedom, of 
course, sets us at liberty to pursue – is to miss the point of Jesus’ story. We must not 
become arrested by the text; it is a point of departure to the realms of spirit where 
text has no power to determine the limits of thought, conscience or action and where 
faith is of God alone. In Oman’s theology there is no neurotic anxiety that asks for 
infallible, written proof of divine reality. Rather, the narrative of Christ testifies to a 
divine presence that is self-authenticating: speaking to the heart, stimulating the 
mind, engaging the will. The story of Christ in its radical freedom transcends 
attempts to capture it in historical absolutes. The gospel story illuminates experience 
and introduces the liberty wherewith Christ has set us free.
119
  
Fifthly, Oman’s doctrine of the atonement is a bold attempt to relate holiness and 
love in a unified rather than a dialectical way. In any theological schema morality 
and grace, holiness and love are never easy to reconcile.
120
 Oman’s theology of 
forgiveness in and through reconciliation is one way in which moral requirements 
and unconditional forgiveness can be brought together. In preaching and in pastoral 
application, however, care needs to be taken lest the integral nature of holiness and 
love should mask the free grace essential to the gospel. The burdened soul, already 
morally oppressed, weighed down with guilt and shame, will need the unconditional 
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word of forgiveness. That is imperative. On the other hand, the aggressive and 
controlling abuser can hardly receive forgiveness in anything other than a vacuous 
sense if the pain of the victim has not awakened a moral loathing of the crimes he 
committed. The gospel cannot, therefore, be communicated apart from context, or 
without sensitivity to circumstances and, most of all, without wrestling with the 
mystery of holy love. Moral reality and free grace cannot be separated without doing 
harm to both; Oman’s theology of reconciliation, participation and homecoming 
represents one way of bringing them into creative and relationship.   
Sixth and lastly, Oman’s sharpest critics will be those who start with the premise that 
an authoritative historical revelation is necessary to the coherence and endurance of 
Christianity. Such a critic may even argue that the dependency on the Bible in 
Oman’s work is inconsistent with his experiential methodology. In other words, 
Oman’s theology bears the hallmarks of foundational revelation to a degree greater 
than acknowledged; otherwise, his theology would not have the Christian focus that 
it does. If theological thinking were left to the whims of experience then a hopeless 
pluralism would be the result. The hub of historicist criticism is that there is no 
necessary line of development from religious experience to the Christian tradition. 
Oman accepts that no one starts with a tabula rasa; theological thinking is tradition 
conditioned, in his own case by Christianity. The wisdom of tradition is a 
promontory that provides large vistas that would be impossible without it. Others, of 
course, begin with different cultural perspectives and it is inevitable that we inhabit a 
world of competing, conflicting, ontological claims. That granted, God is his own 
witness in whatever language and cultural medium the divine is recognised and 
Christian commitment can acknowledge its historical roots without deifying them. 
Personal freedom stands between gratitude for the past and openness to the future 
and personal faith need not be afraid of religious plurality. God has many children of 
different skin colour, of language, of gender, sexual orientation and of belief: any 
one feature is as important to God as the other. Love is the only necessary canon in 
religion as in life.  Even this insight is not exclusive to Christianity, though it 
received particular expression in the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The gap between 
historicist foundations and Oman’s experiential method is thus un-bridged and itself 




the Church? Is it the servant of our freedom or a limit to our liberty? These are the 








Ecclesiology: looking for the city that is to come 
In some order of love and freedom, that is in some kind of Church, the 
historic struggle of mankind must be gathered up, and if it is not being 
served by the present churches, then the supreme effort should be to 
recall them to their task. 
1
 





The Church was of no minor interest to Oman. This fact has been recognised by 
Healey and Grant both of whom discuss Oman’s ecclesiology, though coming to 
opposite conclusions. Healey defends Oman against the charge of neglecting 
institutional expressions of faith and Grant repeats the charge, arguing that Oman 
undervalues the concrete and particular.
3
 This is a question to be kept on hold. In 
either conclusion, the Church remains an important feature of Oman’s work from 
beginning to end. Oman’s first book –apart from his Kerr lectures and his translation 
of Schleiermacher – was The Church and the Divine Order; published in 1910; and 
in his posthumous, Honest Religion, published in 1941, he returned to the theme of 
“the Church and the Churches”.
4
 The Church may be termed the meeting point for 
Oman’s seminal ideas. The Church inhabits the creative boundary between the 
natural and the supernatural; it stands in a prophetic trajectory that reaches its climax 
in Christ. Alternatively, the Church is the outcome of the long continuum of 
evolution; it is the fruit of human adaption to the spiritual environment in which all 
of creation subsists. The Church, in the language of the New Testament, is an 
apocalyptic community; it is prophetic of the new heavens and new earth to be 
revealed. All of these ideas combine to provide the architecture of Oman’s 
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ecclesiology. This chapter explores these trajectories and follows them through to 
their practical conclusions in Oman’s often misunderstood ecclesiology. 
Themes in outline 
The first section will focus on the relationship of the Church to Christ. That the 
Church was founded by Christ is fundamental to Oman; but he does not draw normal 
historical conclusions from the fact. The authority of tradition – either in the 
Protestant form of the scriptures and doctrine or in the Catholic form of infallible 
teaching – should not, he believes, be substituted for the self-authenticating witness 
of God in the present. It is Oman’s conviction that Christ’s vision of the Kingdom of 
God and his founding of a community that lives in obedience to that vision is not 
predicated on a continuing magisterial authority in institutional or historical format. 
On the contrary, the only authority that Jesus exercised and the only authority he 
warranted for the Church is that of spiritual insight speaking to spiritual insight. This 
spiritual foundation determines all that Oman understands by the Church. 
The second section takes up the theme of the apocalyptic. It is a theme that sets 
Oman add odds with much of contemporary scholarship but in considerable harmony 
with some in the nineteenth. These historical comparisons and contrasts are 
examined. It becomes clear that Oman understood the apocalyptic primarily as a 
philosophy of history rather than as prophetic of eschatological events; this is 
important for his view of the Church as a sign of unfolding cosmic reality. The 
Church in the language of the New Testament is an apocalyptic community between 
earth and heaven, but always – when true to its divine vocation – leaning towards 
heaven. 
The third section looks at the evolutionary presuppositions of Oman’s ecclesiology. 
An evolutionary world view allows Oman to situate the Church in a dynamic 
continuum. The self-conscious spiritual evolution of humanity that is historically 
evidenced in the history of religion, which comes to flowering in the prophetic 
traditions of Israel, and in Christ par excellence, continues in the Church.  This 
evolutionary view of the Church is fundamental to Oman’s conviction as to the 
provisional nature of doctrine and tradition. And, again, the primary reality is the 




The fifth section examines Oman’s ecclesiology in the context of nineteenth century 
ecclesiology. Oman acknowledges the influence of German scholars Loofs and 
Sohm. However, as in all of his work, Oman’s individuality shines through; and 
though scholarly context illuminates the influences on his thinking, the sui generis 
nature of his work remains its most distinguishing feature. These explorations further 
show the contrast between Oman and Barth. 
The fourth and last section examines the practical implications of Oman’s 
ecclesiology with regard to institutions, ministry and people and sacraments.  
1 The Church of Christ 
Oman mentions Jesus’ founding of the church in two places in particular. In The 
Church and the Divine Order he devotes the second chapter to the subject of “Jesus 
as Founder”;
5
 it follows on from the initial theme of prophetic preparation. In Vision 
and Authority, second revised edition, Oman returns to Jesus’ relation to the Church 
under the heading, “The Founding of the Church”.
6
 In these books, separated by 
nearly two decades,
7
 Oman does not vary from his central arguments. In summary, 
Oman contends that Jesus gave to the Church its foundational vision, the dream by 
which it lives and the method by which it carries out its mission.  
The vision Jesus gave to the Church was apocalyptic and it will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. The essence of it, however, was Jesus’ conviction of a 
spiritual reality, ever ready to break into the human realm wherever human lives are 
open and receptive. “The fundamental conviction was that the true divine order is 
ever ready to break into the world, if men will only let it break into their hearts”.
8
 
The vision was realised in Jesus’ own person and for that reason there is a note of joy 
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in the New Testament.
9
 Significantly, the vision Christ gave to the Church is never to 
be identified with worldly realities, no matter how exalted or worthy. Oman 
comments: 
Jesus did not, with the Catholic theologians identify the Kingdom of 
God with the Church, nor with modern theologians since 
Schleiermacher, with the progressive amelioration of humanity.
10
 
The Church, therefore, must always point away from itself. Even the personal sense 
of divine love which is real to the disciple must not be taken as an end in itself; it is 
prophetic of a blessing that will embrace all.
11
 Jesus’ relation to the Church, 
therefore, is that of inspiration, directing his disciples throughout all history to the 
transcendent reality of God’s love upon which all other blessings are contingent. 
The Church’s dream is to see vision become reality. The Church is a community that 
dares to live by the values of the Kingdom of God, the values of freedom and love, 
the values Jesus disclosed and which are the antithesis of the power structures that 
prevail in the world.  
Instead of an ecclesiastical programme and incipient hierarchy, we 
have, therefore, a society organised on the sole basis of love and 
equality and mutual service.
12
 
Sadly, Oman argues, this dream which was the true foundation of the Church has 
suffered shipwreck over the millennia. The Church has sought security in 
institutional authority instead of spiritual freedom. “The Church, it is said, also 
needed the conservative method of all society, meaning by that an authority in which 
first is first and last last.”
13
 With this way of compromise for the sake of self-
preservation, Oman will have nothing to do. It is the point at which the radical import 
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of his ecclesiology is felt. To follow Oman’s interpretation of Jesus’ vision, and of 
the Church’s dream, is to depart from the ecclesiastical emphasis of two thousand 
years. The Church in its varied communions has looked backwards for historical 
legitimisation rather than forward in faith and hope. It has sought security in the very 
things that Oman regards as provisional and relative: Bible, creed and institution. 
Turning to the method that Jesus has bequeathed to the Church, Oman takes up a 
similarly radical stance. One is amazed, Oman argues, that Jesus, whose teaching 
was of such import, refrained from giving it written expression. This omission could 
not have been accidental on Jesus’ part. “It shows”, argues Oman, “the kind of 
authority He desired for it, and what kind He did not desire”.
14
 Oman continues: 
Instead of giving it a final form, which would secure a full and precise 
account capable of accurate transmission, He addressed Himself to the 
few who partially understood Him, leaving, doubtless, many a precious 




The salutary lesson, to Oman’s mind, is that Jesus never intended anything he said to 
become “an imperative authority” which in the nature of the case would be “an 
enslaving authority over mind”.
16
 Jesus’ only method was “to trust the insight and 
faithfulness of souls that love Him”.
17
 It was to this Church, the community of 
faithful souls that love him, that Jesus “gave the task of transmitting His teaching and 
depicting His life”.
18
 This could be done only when the story of Jesus life and 
teaching was written in the manuscript of loving hearts and faithful lives. The written 
manuscript could then take its place in the larger living witness of lives made free 
and hearts transformed in Christ. The Church, Oman believes, has communicated the 
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Oman was aware that his argument for freedom in relation to written authority falls 
on deaf ears and the Holy Spirit is often called upon to bolster any perceived 
deficiency in the written records. For example, in order to  preserve the absolute 
authority of the written word, appeal is made to the “special endowment of the Holy 
Spirit”.
20
 Oman acknowledges that Jesus promised the Holy Spirit would bring to the 
disciples’ remembrance all the things he taught them. But, Oman argues, this is no 
argument for infallibility; it is an argument for “living transmission”
21
 – and by 
“living transmission” Oman means Christian praxis. The Spirit brings to 
remembrance the things not in the first instance “to be recorded, but to be lived”.
22
 It 
is continuity of Christian life and witness that has preserved the gospel and the 
community that lives by it. All else is subsidiary to self-authenticating authority of 
the Christian life which is, in effect, vision turned into reality; dream and method are 
empty concepts apart from the Christian living.
23
 
Oman, therefore, places Jesus unmistakably at the centre of the Church in a unique 
way. The Church, when it follows the vision of her Lord, acknowledges his authority 
in a way that surpasses anything that could be affirmed by the written word. Christ 
reigns by the only authority he would ever wish to have: the authority of mind 
speaking to mind, of heart to heart and soul to soul. It is, argues Oman, the only 
authority that the Church should ever seek to have; it is the only authority that unites 
faith and freedom; it is the only authority that marks the difference between the 
Church and the world. There is a sense in which liberal Christianity has always 
recognised the spiritual nature of Christ’s authority and the inviolable place of 
conscience and freedom. However, the final break with the authority of tradition has 
never been made in Churches that claim orthodoxy. As a result, the conflict between 
freedom and faith, between the demands of conscience and the demands of tradition, 
is apt to recur. Oman’s radical option of placing the authority of Christ on the side of 
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personal freedom would appear to be the only true reconciliation of faith and 
freedom and the only exclusive spiritual foundation for the Church of Christ.  
Summary 
Oman places a high premium on the fact that the Church is the Church of Christ. 
Jesus Christ has shared with the Church his vision of the Kingdom of God and the 
Church lives by the dream of that vision becoming reality. However, Christ’s method 
is the key to both the vision and the dream. The Church is called to be a society 
totally different from the principalities and powers of the world. It is to be a 
fellowship of freedom and love where the Lordship of Christ resides in the self 
authenticating appeal of his life and teaching. This is the only authority Jesus ever 
sought and the only authority the Church should ever seek.  
2 The Apocalyptic 
If the vision Christ gave to the Church is its exclusive foundation then the content of 
that vision becomes a matter of import. This introduces a second feature of the 
architecture of Oman’s ecclesiology, namely, apocalyptic literature. It was in the 
language of the apocalyptic that Jesus’ vision was mediated and the birth of the 
Church cannot be understood apart from Jesus’ use of apocalyptic ideas and his 
transformation of them. This introduces a wide theme which is navigated as 
summarily as possible. 
The apocalyptic is a many-sided concept. Within Old Testament literature the 
apocalyptic texts are somewhat exotic and stand in contrast to the historical, legal 
and poetic narratives. Some scholars view apocalyptic texts as foreign intrusions into 
the Jewish tradition, with roots traceable to Persia and Zoroastrianism; this 
imputation of foreign origins tends towards negative appraisal. On the other hand, 
others have argued that the apocalyptic horizon may be traced to the wisdom 
tradition within Israel, or it may be a modification of prophesy.
24
 In New Testament 
scholarship, apocalyptic literature has also provoked continuing debate. 
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Contemporary New Testament scholar, Benedict T. Viviano, suggests that studies of 
the apocalyptic have fallen into two categories: the historical and the theological.
25
 
The historical studies of the late nineteenth century were concerned with the ethical, 
liberal Jesus whose teaching represented a spiritual kernel which could be detached 
from an apocalyptic husk.
26
 A volte-face came with the work of New Testament 
scholars, Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer,
27
 who argued that Jesus is 
inseparable from the apocalyptic milieu in which he lived and, consequently, the 
gospel is deeply rooted in apocalyptic expectations. These expectations were time-
conditioned and unfulfilled. The historical origins of the Jesus traditions have 
remained the focus of attention for many inside and outside the Christian faith; and 
the quest for the historical Jesus has been ever renewed. 
Whilst historical enquiry has often proved threatening to the integrity of traditional 
belief, theological thinking has proved more encouraging. Eschatology has been a 
creative starting point for Christology in theologians as diverse as Barth and Tillich 
in the mid-twentieth century and Moltmann and others at the beginning of the 
twenty-first.
28
 Viviano writes: “the heroes of historical truth are Weiss and 
Schweitzer, and the heroes of theological truth are Moltmann and Metz”.
29
  
Oman belongs to the theological end of the spectrum; however, care needs to be 
taken with definitions. New Testament scholar John Dominic Crossan points out that 
if the terms apocalyptic and eschatology are equated, then “confusion reigns within 
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 In his opinion, the apocalyptic is best considered as one of the 
subdivisions of eschatology. Certainly, it has been eschatology in the wider sense 
that has been prominent in theology. Eschatological events, namely the death of 
Christ, the resurrection, ascension and parousia, have proved central to Christological 
thinking, offering a biblical metaphysic of openness and hope. The Kingdom of God 
inaugurated by the crucified and risen Christ is, thus, the ground of reality now, as 
well as a herald of the world to come. As one theologian sums it up, “promise is the 
leading category in eschatology”.
31
  
In Oman’s work the twentieth century correlation between eschatological events and 
Christology is absent. Oman’s concern is with the apocalyptic as spiritual vision 
rather than event. In this way, Oman circumnavigated the rocks of historicism and 
the unfulfilled apocalyptic of Weiss and Schweitzer. His argument challenged the 
view that Jesus shared the primitive, cataclysmic assumptions current in his time. 
How, asked Oman, could one so spiritual be so mistaken about the nature of reality? 
The apocalyptic mind of Jesus was not dominated by the materialism of his 
contemporaries; on the contrary, Jesus looked for a new spiritual order in preference 
to a political Kingdom or violent supernatural intervention. In Oman’s estimation, 
the apocalyptic sensibility of Jesus is more akin to poetry than to politics; in fact, the 
rejection of a political kingdom was inherent in the way of the Cross.  
The Church past and present must in some sense have an apocalyptic outlook if it is 
to be true to the vision of one she calls Lord. For Oman, this means the paradox of 
continuing other worldliness as well as continual reception of the world as a gift. 
Religion is always “in need of some kind of apocalyptic outlook;
32
 some sense that 
life is not good in itself but only good when we overcome it through faith in a rule 
which God himself will introduce”.
33
 The apocalyptic imperative, in other words, is 
fundamental to the Church if it is to follow the way of Jesus. In platitudinous 
                                                 
30
John Dominic Crossan, “Eschatology, Apocalypticism, and the Historical Jesus” in Marvin Meyer 
and Charles Hughes, edited, Jesus: Then and 	ow (Harrisburg, PN: Trinity Press, 2001), 91. 
31
 Gerhard Sauter, in  “Protestant Theology”  Handbook, 259. 
32
 Divine Order, 39. 
33




language, the Church must be in the world but not of it. And, in Oman’s 
philosophical terms, the Church realises its apocalyptic identity when it lives in the 
spiritual atmosphere of the supernatural, known through the sacred and the holy, and 
inspired by the memory of the Holy One, Jesus Christ, her Lord. 
2.1 Oman and the Book of Revelation 
Oman’s own excursion into the realm of New Testament scholarship provides useful 
insight into his particular understanding of apocalyptic literature. His first venture 
was the Book of Revelation: Theory of the Text34 which was a theory of text, 
translation and commentary. Dissatisfaction with the result led him to a second 
publication: The Text of Revelation: A Revised Theory.35 Interestingly, the genesis of 
Oman’s interest in the Apocalypse came almost by accident. Having attended a 
seminar by F.C. Burkitt,
36
 he came away with “the vague idea, that to think about 
religion, without knowing a little about its documents, is not much more use than to 
be a pundit on its documents, without doing a little thinking about religion”.
37
 In any 
event, with the help and encouragement of a number of scholars, among them F. C. 
Burkitt himself and T.W. Manson
38
, one of Oman’s pupils, he published the Book of 
Revelation in 1923 and the Text of Revelation in 1928. A. E. Brooke, in his reviews, 
was proverbially damning through faint praise. On the first work, he commented: 
“brilliant and suggestive as it is, it is not convincing”
39
; and with regard to both 
publications, he left the matter open as to the worth of Oman’s endeavours: “students 
must judge for themselves whether these explorations are convincing”.
40
 Two points 
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were in contention: whether the text of the Book of Revelation was originally 
comprised of twenty-seven equal sections; and, more germane to our discussion, 
whether the inspiration that gave birth to the Apocalypse is intuitive and spiritual or 
crudely materialistic. Oman rejoined, with Brooke in mind: 
One critic dismissed the previous book as the work of a twentieth 
century philosopher, who had no understanding of the mind of a first-
century Christian. In any case, the criticism can only apply to the 
commentary, which might be all wrong yet the re-arrangement of the 
text right. In the order of probability interpretation must necessarily be 
last: and till the other probabilities are settled, it (the commentary) had 
better not appear at all as in the present book.
41
 
Oman added no commentary to the second book. Yet, he never departed from his 
conviction that the original apocalyptic hope centred on the transcendent Kingdom of 
love, which can at any time transform the heart and, with it, all things. In his 
commentary, Oman wrote of the Apocalypse: 
Our author seems to have written in a period of transition between two 
ways of thinking of the second advent. From Judaism Christianity 
inherited the idea of the Kingdom of God as a catastrophic change.  
But, possibly from the beginning, interest was transferred from outward 
circumstances to a new relation to God, whereby any sudden change in 
the order of the world depended on a change of heart.
42
 
Thus, in his studies in the Book of Revelation, Oman re-iterates the theme central to 
his Christology; that Jesus stood on the shoulders of the prophets and went beyond 
them in his visionary insight.
43
Jewish prophecy ran aground in national and 
materialist expectations; but, in Jesus the intuitive spirit rose to new heights. Jesus 
saw the Kingdom of God as a spiritual rule of love; this was “the nerve and sinew of 
Christ’s teaching”.
44
 In the course of its history, the Church has repeatedly fallen 
short of Jesus’ ideal and betrayed “God’s way of the patient endurance of love, 
however long”.
45
 The way of patient love – a love that can never be fully realised 
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under temporal conditions – is, Oman believed, the only adequate basis of Christian 
belief and fellowship. The Church must live by Jesus apocalyptic insight and practise 
– to use special metaphors – here below the love that is from above.  
The prophetic hope is in a Day of the Lord, and not in a steady, if slow, 
success in reforming the world; because, being concerned with the 
central reverence of our hearts, it looks forward to a day of 
enlightenment and not a day of amendment.
46
 
Oman, therefore, in contradiction of Schweitzer, saw the apocalyptic far from being a 
time conditioned, redundant idea; but, rather, essentially an insight into the nature of 
reality. Oman told his students, “The prophets, Jesus and the Apostles may not have 
had great historical perspective, but they were men of great religious insight”.
47
 
Oman’s work on the text of the Book of Revelation may not have received the 
approval of his peers, but it did not shift him from his fundamental convictions with 
regard to apocalyptic literature: that it is essentially visionary rather than prophetic of 
world events. In his commentary, Oman was not directly concerned with the Church, 
but the premise of his work was that the apocalyptic vision of Jesus lives on in the 
expectations of the Christian community and Christian experience presages a new 
heaven and a new earth. 
2.2 A nineteenth century perspective  
To position Oman’s theology of the apocalyptic in context one needs to go back to 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two points of comparison may be 
made: the first is with Old Testament scholar R. H. Charles.
48
 Oman makes a passing 
comment in his preface to the Book of Revelation that, with regard to the text, “he 
had not entirely escaped the influence of Dr. Charles and certain German writers”.
49
 
However, beyond the details of the text, there is broad similarity between Oman’s 
interpretation of the apocalyptic as a religious philosophy and that of Charles. 
Contemporary New Testament scholar, Adela Yarbro Collins, indentifies Charles as 
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a distinctive voice at the turn of the nineteenth century. Charles, she writes, defended 
the value of apocalypticism against scholars like Harnack and argued “against most 
scholars of his time that the move from prophecy to apocalypticism was not decline, 
but advance….”
50
 Yarbro Collins adds, Charles “rightly rejected the view, common 
then and now, that apocalypticism is pessimistic”.
51
 This positive assessment of 
Charles is borne out if one considers, for example, Charles’ monograph, Religious 
Development between the Old Testament and the 	ew Testament.52 Charles argues 
that apocalyptic intuition was a development from the particularity to universality, 
from prophetic comment on circumstances to that of insight into the ultimate nature 
of reality. He writes: 
But whist prophecy and apocalyptic occupy to some extent the same 
province, the scope of the apocalyptic is incommensurably greater. 
[Break] While the ordinary man saw only the outside of things in their 
incoherence and isolation, the apocalyptist sought to get behind the 
surface and to the essence of events, the spiritual purposes and forces 
that underlie them and give them their real significance. With this end 
in view apocalyptic sketched in outline the history of the world and of 
mankind, the origin of evil its course, and inevitable overthrow, the 




Charles concludes that the apocalyptic is best understood as the spiritual refinement 
of the prophetic tradition and “apocalyptic and not prophecy was the first to grasp 
that the great idea that all history alike, human, cosmological, and spiritual, is a unity 
– a unity following naturally as a corollary of the unity of God preached by the 
prophets”.
54
 The similarity to Oman is uncanny, not only in placing the apocalyptic 
at the heart of biblical theism, but in positing the apocalyptic as unifying vision of 
the empirical and the ideal. And, like Oman, Charles saw apocalyptic awareness 
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reach its zenith in Christ. The apocalyptic was a preparation for the day when “with 
the advent of Christ we enter a new and larger atmosphere recalling and yet far 
transcending, what had been best in the prophetic and apocalyptic periods of the 
past”.
55
 For Charles and Oman alike, the apocalyptic is fundamentally the apex of 
prophecy and more, the epitome of personal religion.  Charles comments that, in the 
progressive religious development, some may “assimilate and verify the truths of the 
past and thus preserve the spiritual tradition”
56
; however, “there are others who do 
more: they not only verify the religious truths of the past but they add to them others 
won in personal communion with the immediate Living God”.
57
  
Yarbro Collins, in her essay, concludes that, “given the desirability of constructing a 
public New Testament theology and the diversity of the Church, it is wise to affirm 
that apocalypticism may be related to theology in a variety of ways”.
58
 These ways 
stretch from Max Horkheimer’s
59
 non-theistic interpretation to that of Hal 
Lindsey’s
60
 fundamentalist reading of the Book of Revelation. Charles she considers 
to be in the middle of the spectrum; yet, his perspective is different from the “the 
liberal strategy of deriving abstract ideas from the narrative detail of the texts”.
61
 
Unlike “advanced liberals”, Charles did not see ethics as the kernel and apocalyptic 
as husk. “In the language of his time, Charles affirmed the unity of form and content 
in apocalyptic texts, arguing that apocalyptic texts as such are imbued with ethical 
import”.
62
 This may be said of Oman, also; he accepts the religious realism of the 
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text and its relevance to the present. This comparison, with British scholar Charles, 
sets Oman in a tradition apart from “advanced” liberalism; rather, he belongs to the 
tradition of spiritual realism that sees continuity between the text and contemporary 
reality, between then and now, Like Charles, Oman saw the roots of religion in 
personal communion with the immediate Living God; and the Church, when true to 
the apocalyptic vision of her Lord, becomes an apocalyptic community which sees 
the temporal in the light of the eternal, the natural in the perspective of the 
supernatural. 
The second point of comparison is an example drawn from German scholarship, 
from the work of Wilhelm Baldensperger (1856-1936). Wilhelm Baldensberger 
published many works on the apocalyptic and the role of the apocalyptic in primitive 
Christianity.
63
 Like Charles and Oman, Baldensperger regarded apocalyptic literature 
as the outcome of development within prophetic consciousness. At its best, 
apocalyptic vision raised religious consciousness above the particularity of national 
interests, freed it from material expectation of a this worldly kingdom and saw the 
supernatural, not as a sudden disruption of the temporal process, but as a lifting up of 
the historical into the transcendent. Oman summarises this transcendental perspective 
of apocalyptic visionaries with the following poetic expression quoted from 
Baldensperger:  
They dreamt of a fashioning of earthly existence into the likeness of the 
world of angels and the stars.
64
 
It was Baldensperger’s argument that the transcendental tendency in Judaism was 
strong and took various forms. In the pharisaic movement piety focused on 
conformity to the law as a preparation for the age to come. Jesus, in contrast, worked 
a transformation by setting the legal framework aside. In his life and teaching, 
apocalyptic sensibility became an entirely personal, spiritual force. Consequently, for 
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Jesus, the old contrast between the present and the future was dissolved, as was the 
expectation of an earthly kingdom. The transcendent reality of the Kingdom for Jesus 
was a present reality; and, at the same time, there was a noticeable release of 
Messianic expectations from the political ideals and “transference of the ideal into 
the supernatural”.
65
 This visionary aspect also helps explain departure from piety 
orientated on the law. The law by its nature is designed for the maintenance of a holy 
community, whereas the apocalyptic spirituality characteristic of the teaching of 
Jesus gave prominence to the individual and to the direct influence of God upon the 
heart. Baldensperger wrote: “The flight into the super-sensuous is with strong 
religious personalities inseparable from retreat into one’s own heart”.
66
 This 
apocalyptic spirituality carried forward into the community of the spirit inspired by 
Jesus. 
In The Church and the Divine Order continuity between Oman and Baldensperger is 
marked and obvious. In particular, his argument in the first chapter, “The Jewish 
Preparation”, follows the “transformative” argument we have outlined. The Church, 
Oman concedes, may have had the expectation of an immediate parousia; but this 
was not dependent upon any temporal kingdom. At the core of the Church’s religious 
sensibility was the faith inspired by Jesus that: 
faith in God’s rule was no more a matter of time’s accidents but an 
immediate sense of God which ….sustained in them the belief that love 
not power is the final order of the world, that indeed in the last issue 
love alone is irresistible might, the one thing which knows us 
altogether, and which in the end we shall altogether know.
67
 
And so, in company with Charles and Baldensperger, Oman adopts a transformative 
idealism with respect to the apocalyptic. The apocalyptic ideals of later Judaism 
were, in the teaching of Jesus, given their most profound spiritual interpretation. 
Love is not an ethic that needs to be imported into a primitive metaphysic. The 
intuitive grasp of the cosmic significance of love for each human heart and for the 
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meaning of history animated Jesus’ teaching; and it sustained the faith of his earliest 
followers. In Oman’s reading of the New Testament, apocalyptic sensibility 
integrates cosmology and ethics; it links the historical Jesus with primitive 
community and, being essentially an insight into the ultimate nature of reality, it 
rescues the idea of the Kingdom of God from being a distant time-conditioned idea 
to that of being an existential reality. The apocalyptic is in essence a faith in “God’s 
rule of love” and as such it was, and is, the “religious basis of the Church”, a basis 
that “had no source but the original and undivided consciousness of Jesus, and it only 
continues to exist where faith is quickened and sustained by His spirit”.
68
  The 
apocalyptic ideas that Jesus used and transformed are, therefore, ever relevant to the 
spiritual well being of the Church, if it is to be the community of Christ.  
2.3 Postscript: Oman’s dissatisfaction with his own work 
Most of the detailed discussion of the apocalyptic is found in The Church and the 
Divine Order. It is, however, important to note that Oman considered the book one of 
his “poorest efforts”.
69
 However, it is perhaps poverty of outcome, rather than of 
outlook that Oman has in mind. Healey is of the opinion that, despite the self-
criticism, “the main theme of the book has an important place in an exposition of 
Oman’s total point of view”.
70
 Oman may well have felt his work was insensitive to 
historical nuance; and even more so that, in emphasising the ideal of the Church, he 
did not do justice to its human reality. Certainly, this was a criticism made in review. 
David Frew commented in the Expository Times: 
The author’s conception of the Church, it will thus be seen, is an ideal 
one – sublime enough, perhaps to inspire further developments, and 
true enough to be a guide and stimulus to superior souls, but probably 
in the present state of existence, impractical for average human nature, 
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and that after all forms the great mass of the material with which the 
Church has to deal.
71
 
One might defend Oman by repeating that his intent was to emphasise the vision that 
Jesus provided. God is personal, transcendent and loving; God is present to the 
human spirit, inviting participation in the work of divine renewal. The promised new 
heavens and the new earth of the New Testament begin in apocalyptic awareness. 
The human experience of the righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit heralds 
coming cosmic renewal. The existence of the Church is a sign of the final 
sanctification of the world through renunciation of human possession and the 
acceptance of the world as God’s gift. The inclusiveness of Oman’s vision rescues 
him from the charge of “superior” individualism. 
Summary 
This section has sought to contextualise Oman’s theology of the apocalyptic and to 
show its relevance to his ecclesiology. Historical study of eschatology in the 
nineteenth century proved a challenge to traditional belief, especially the work of 
Weiss and Schweitzer who posited an apocalyptic Jesus. In the twentieth century, 
however, theologians returned to the theme of eschatology; and, linking it to the 
resurrection, found it to be a fruitful field for Christology. Oman stands outside this 
perspective. In continuity with a tradition found in scholars such as Charles in Britain 
and Baldensperger in Germany, Oman emphasised the apocalyptic aspect of 
eschatology as a religious insight into the meaning of the universe as both a material 
and spiritual reality. Jesus was not a mistaken millennialist, but rather a seer and 
prophet perceiving the ultimate meaning of the world in God. The Church stands in 
continuity with Jesus as a community that lives in openness and hope, trusting only 
in the power of God to renew the earth, through freedom, love and holiness. Oman 
would have endorsed the words of Charles, that the apocalyptic “speaking 
historically, was the parent of Christianity”
72
; and, with Charles, Oman saw 
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apocalyptic consciousness as vital to on-going Christianity and to the authenticity of 
the Church of Christ.  
3 The Church in an evolutionary paradigm 
If the apocalyptic may be thought of as the classical intellectual architecture of 
Oman’s ecclesiology, then, evolution may be considered as ecclesiology in a modern 
architectural idiom. As noted in chapter four, for Oman, evolution is a spiritual 
concept. The moral and spiritual catastrophe that apocalyptic insight prophesies may 
be thought of as failure to adapt to the spiritual order which is the ultimate 
environment of all life. In the physical environment there is vast evolutionary waste; 
and in the spiritual environment there are consequences to choice no less perilous. 
Sin is not merely transgression, but radical evil, a defiance of spiritual realities. 
Oman sums this parallel as follows: 
Thus sin is just the higher aspect of all failure of life to lay itself open to 
the witness of its environment and to brace itself to venture upon it; and 
the difference from any other evolution is in the environment of 
absolute quality of which man has become conscious and in which he 
may realise in himself absolute worth and failure as absolute 
loss.[Break] Sin, therefore, is used for anything which comes from 
seeking the perfect order in absolute conscientiousness, or in other 
words the whole mind of God, known or unknown.
73
 
Spiritual environment gives no respite from duty and discipline; and these are all the 
more unrelenting in that no law can give them adequate expression. Were it not for 
the reality of God’s patient love, unlimited forgiveness and his will to bring creation 
through pain to new creation, then the moral and religious imperatives would be 
more indicative of a cruel task master than a loving Father. The positive corollary is 
that, in every human advance in freedom, love and holiness, the sanctification of the 
world is a step closer to realisation. Oman sees the growth in humanity of freedom, 
love and holiness as presaging the renewal of all of creation. The “Kingdom of God”, 
he writes,  
Is not concerned merely or even mainly with the things we call sacred, 
but is the transformation of man first and, through this great change, of 
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all his surroundings, even to the material nature which is now his foe 
only because of anxiety on the one hand and misuse on the other.
74
 
Of this all-encompassing spiritual renewal, of humanity and creation, the Cross 
remains both the ultimate sign and supreme inspiration; indeed, for Oman, the Cross 
points to the only way whereby human beings may adapt to their ultimate spiritual 
environment. At the end of Vision and Authority, Oman repeatedly links the Church 
to the evolutionary and the spiritual significance of the Cross.  
The supreme task before the Church is to learn from the power of the 
Cross. It introduces a new religious order; and this brings in its train a 
new political, social and religious order. If we care to use such 
language, we can speak of a new stage in development, the introduction 
of a new principle of evolution. The individual struggle may still go on. 
There may be selection of the fittest. But the fitness is not mere strength 
to seek and devour prey. It is the freedom of self restraint, regard for 
others, submission to the guidance of love, in short it is fitness for our 
place in God’s final order.
75
 
It is an inspiring vision, particularly in accord with the theology of St Paul, where 
creation awaits the manifestation of the sons and daughters of God;
76
 and where the 
renewal of the human spirit is the forerunner of the renewal of the whole of creation. 
As Oman remarked, the Apostle “was something of an evolutionist”.
77
 
In this evolutionary paradigm, the Church has a high calling, not to save itself but to 
be a sign of salvation, not to reform the world on the world’s terms but to point the 
world to the Kingdom of God, the final order of freedom and love. Oman’s 
evolutionary perspective was another factor in the subsidiary place given to 
institutional structures. Human history in the macro scale of evolution is miniscule 
and the part cannot determine the whole. Faith has a wider horizon and truer spiritual 
belonging than either history or institutions can embody or express. As he 
commented: “the earth is not merely as a material particle in endless space but is of 
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 In the grand horizon of spiritual reality, the 
particularities of ecclesiology are of value only as they serve ends beyond 
themselves. The Church, therefore, when true to its calling, is always liminal, 
between heaven and earth, apocalyptic and evolutionary. The Church is institutional 
only as a necessity of historical existence; its true being is found, not in history, but 
in the service the transcendent order of freedom and love. Though Oman felt the 
inadequacies of his labours in The Church and the Divine Order, he never departed 
from the assertion:  
In some order of love and freedom, that is in some kind of Church, the 
historic struggle of mankind must be gathered up, and even if it is not 
being served by the present Churches, then a supreme effort should be 




This section re-visited Oman’s idea of evolution as a spiritual process. The Church 
stands in a continuum which stretches from a primordial past, through a process of 
development to the self-conscious imperatives of the present. Institutions are the fruit 
of human adaption to the natural and supernatural, to the challenges of environment 
both material and spiritual Human history is minute on an evolutionary scale; 
however, it is the field where the seed of the Kingdom is consciously sown, though it 
is God who provides the harvest. 
At the Cross, a definitive evolutionary step was taken and a new principle of 
evolution revealed. Love, not self-love, belongs to the final order of things and it is 
the end to which creation moves. The Church is the community that realises in its 
fellowship the power of the age to come, the power of love that sanctifies life and 
presages the sanctification of Creation.
80
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4 German nexus 
To contextualise Oman in the field of ecclesiology is not an easy matter. In the 
preface to The Church and the Divine Order he confesses that many influences may 
have been unconscious. “Perhaps” he adds, “I should emphasize my obligation to 
Sohm and Loofs. Next to them I am indebted to many discussions with my 
colleague, Principal Skinner, than to any writer on the subject.”
81
 As noted in the 
previous chapter, John Skinner was an Old Testament scholar, Principal at 
Westminster College, and obviously he was deeply concerned about the Church. 
Oman gives no indication of what his discussion with Skinner entailed. Oman quotes 
Loofs twice; once to the effect that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority in 
faith and morals can never bear the fruit of radical freedom inherent in the gospel; 
the other highlights the abiding influence of neo-platonism in Augustine’s writings.
82
 
Friedrich Loofs was professor of Church History at Halle from 1888-1927. He was a 
pastor and social activist. Loofs’ academic interest was mainly patristic; but he also 
had an interest in the history of dogma. He has been regarded as a sui generis 
theologian who sought to combine piety with modernity.
83
 This is, perhaps, the point 
at which their thinking joins. Both Oman and Loofs emphasised the Reformation as 
the re-discovery of the freedom in Christ, each had an aversion to speculative 
Christology
84
 and both considered that the essence of the Church lies not in 
institutional expression, but in the quality of the fellowship that it engenders. The 
primitive Church, drawing its inspiration from Jesus, was not a hierarchical 
community but one of mutual service. In a University sermon on the Holy Trinity, 
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Loofs’ conceded that the Holy Spirit may work through the Holy Catholic Church; 
but; the Church is not thereby endorsed in an institutional sense; “it is not an outward 
and visible organisation: it is a fellowship of believers”.
85
 That the Church is 
essentially a fellowship of believers is elemental to Oman’s belief that the Church 
“catholic” is found wherever two or three meet in Christ’s name;
86
 and central, also, 
to his subordination of structure to personal relations.  
Oman gives more references with respect to Sohm, especially in the area of transition 
from the apostolic community to early Catholicism. Sohm was a pioneer of the view 
that the early apostolic community was charismatic in nature and that the concept of 
legal authority was a later intrusion.  Sohm’s thesis provoked heated debate which 
still echoes to-day. Rudolf Sohm (1841-1917) was professor of legal history at 
Leipzig from 1887 and his specialism was in Roman law, before turning his attention 
to Church law.
87
 His famous monograph, Kirchenrecht, was published in 1892 and a 
second Volume posthumously in 1922.
88
 In summary, Sohm’s thesis was “being 
charismatic in origin and nature, the Church is a spiritual and supernatural entity, 
independent of any human, ecclesiastical organisation and, therefore, free from any 
human law.”
89
 In practice, this meant that in the early Christian community there was 
no governing office and leadership was by those spiritually gifted; apostles, prophets 
and teachers.
90
 It was only in the post apostolic period that bishops were allowed to 
become office holders, changing spiritual endowment into a power inherent in 
permanent office.  
Enrique Nardoni, writing from a Catholic ecumenical perspective, gives a good 
overview of the reaction to Sohm’s thesis. Historians did not refute Sohm’s thesis, 
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but sought to soften and limit it in various ways. For example, Adolf von Harnack, in 
a long article in Protestantische Realenzyclopädie, drew upon the image of the 
Church in the Didache and argued for two parallel ecclesiastical organisations; one 
universal and charismatic, the other local and administrative Charism.
91
 In the 
twentieth century, Hans von Campenhausen, in his Ecclesiatical Authority,92 argued 
for the existence of a non-charismatic Jewish Church in Jerusalem and for the 
existence of Pauline Churches, “characterised by total exclusion of any human order 
or authority, entirely under the sway of the Spirit”.
93
 The issue was also taken up by 
Ernst Käsemann,
94
 who argued for continuity between Paul and early Catholicism 
with regard to the sacraments, but for discontinuity with respect to office and 
authority.  
Nardoni comments that Sohm’s thesis was substantially supported by Protestant 
scholars. Also, Catholic scholars, since Vatican II, have sought a synthesis of the 
charismatic and the legal. Indeed, all Catholic scholars since Vatican II have shared 
the conviction that “Paul initiated a pneumatological approach to the Church which 
is of immense significance”.
95
 Nardoni, strangely, makes no reference to Barth. In 
Church Dogmatics Barth makes an uncompromising attack on Sohm’s thesis and has 
as his targets both Sohm and Emil Brunner. Brunner accepted the premise that the 
Church was, and is, essentially a spiritual community. Barth, in a way consistent with 
the rest of this thought, gave his criticism Christological grounding.  
The terms used by Rudolph Sohm and Emil Brunner after him to 
describe the essence of the Christian community, evade the 
Christological question and answer. As they see, the Church is a 
spiritual and voluntary community, the Church of love and faith 
(invisible according to Sohm). Or, according to Brunner, it is a “pure 
fellowship of persons, a fellowship of brothers, or a living fellowship. 
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What Brunner calls the fellowship of Christ does not differ in substance 
from what Sohm calls the spiritual Church and the Church of love. For 




Contrary to his opponents, Barth places law at the centre of the Church, namely the 
law of Christ. The Church is a “Christocracy” a “fellowship of law, a fellowship 
ordered by the superior law of Jesus Christ”.
97
 Barth believed that in Sohm’s thesis 
the terms ‘spirit’, ‘voluntariness’ etc, supplanted the law of Christ. In fact, the most 
damaging feature was that they were used “at the decisive point where reference 
should be specifically to Jesus Christ”.
98
  
Barth’s sharp criticisms might well be directed towards Oman, as against Sohm and 
Brunner. Yet, paradoxically, Oman’s concept of the atoning rule of God revealed 
through the Cross, though different from Barth’s dogmatic concentration, draws the 
sting from Barth’s criticism. Barth’s fears, born of experience, that the Church may 
keel over when it needs to stand up to evil, can be alleviated by Oman’s alternate 
theological vision of the Church. Oman’s central idea of the Kingdom of God, as the 
rule of atoning love, offers no evasion from the evils of the world. The Cross faces 
the darkness of evil; and the Church, when it embraces the Cross, shares in Christ’s 
suffering and victory. Perhaps Oman’s totally Cross-centred view of the Church’s 
life is only semantically different from Barth’s concept of the Church as a 
“Christocracy”. The premises of Oman’s theology and those of Barth may be 
diametrically opposed, but in praxis, in the call to faithful witness, both find the word 
of God in the Cross. 
4.1 Oman and Sohm 
Oman comments that, in relation to the development of the institutions of Catholic 
Christianity, whether one agrees with him or not, “every serious student of the 
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subject must take account of Sohm’s explanation”.
99
In effect, Oman is too eclectic a 
thinker to put all his eggs in Sohm’s ecclesial basket and he draws upon other 
scholars, not only Loofs, but Edwin Hatch
100
 and Adolf von Harnack.
101
 His relation 
to Sohm might be termed “qualified acceptance”. With regard to the specifics of 
historical development in the early centuries, Oman took issue with Sohm at various 
points. He did not accept Sohm’s view that there was a distinction in the apostolic 
community between elders and bishops and that the community did not have 
corporate and representative governance.  More importantly, he did not accept 
Sohm’s juxtaposition of spiritual gifts and legal authority. In relation to the last point, 
he felt that Sohm had imported into the concept of authority the monarchical idea of 
the ruler and subject. Nothing could, however, be further from the lordship of Christ. 
Sohm had failed to see the kind of power that Christ exercised, a power which, 
through the continuation of his spirit, the apostolic community also exercised. 
Spiritual authority is to be first in service and last in pre-eminence; authority means 
ruling with the patient love of the Cross, with the assurance of the final vindication 
of resurrection. Therefore, Oman argues, the spiritual, charismatic nature of the 
Christian community in the apostolic age need not be at odds with the “law” of 
Christ. Christ’s law is the law of love, authoritative as it is personal.  
Another point of departure from Sohm is found in Oman’s attitude to the institutional 
Church. Sohm had much more hope that the Church may be renewed through its 
institutions rather than in spite of them. In his Outlines of Church History, Sohm 
gives his prognosis for the future of Christianity in Germany at the end of the 
nineteenth century. He feared that the materialist philosophies, predicated upon 
evolution, were inimical to the future of faith, at least in the short term. There is no 
sense, as with Oman, that evolution is capable of spiritual interpretation. Sohm builds 
his hope on the Confessional movement, as well as the positive side of the 
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movements for Protestant Church unity. Whilst Oman recognised the value of 
renewal movements, we need only read his strictures on the Oxford movement and 
his lukewarm acceptance of the union of the United Presbyterian and the Free 
Church of Scotland,
102
 to see that his vision and hopes for renewal were not focused 
on institutional recovery. In 1928 he wrote: 
All forms of religious worship may suffer by the shaking of the old 
foundations. The churches may undergo a period of eclipse. As now, 
constituted, none may come unchanged through the crisis. But all 
search for God’s ultimate authoritative word to man is vain, till we 
know that the cause of the Churches is not the cause of religion, 
however ultimately they may be allied, and till we know that the 
Kingdom of God is not forwarded by a great deal that exists 
conspicuously in all churches.
103
 
Oman’s apocalyptic sense of history and the evolutionary trajectory of his thought 
gave birth to more radical thinking. He was more iconoclastic with regard to 
institutions than Sohm; and more radical in his expectations.  Oman’s sights are not 
on tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, but upon the long vistas of the ages. In 
Sohm we have a sense of spiritual crisis in Europe and in Oman a similar recognition 
of the encroaching secular reality; but, with Oman, there is the hope that calamity 
will bring in its wake not renaissance of historic faith but spiritual awakening beyond 
mere institutional renewal. The expectation is for new wineskins as well as new 
wine. 
In the end, historical contextualisation of Oman’s ecclesial vision is frustrated by the 
prevalence of his ideal of the church over its historical reality. If one were to pinpoint 
the role of history in Oman’s ecclesiology, it would be that through the New 
Testament we have the primal vision of Jesus and the record of the practice of that 
ideal in the primitive Church. The primal, apocalyptic vision must be taken up afresh 
in obedience to the call of the present. Oman was under no illusion about the 
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momentousness of this undertaking for each new generation; but, it is a task 
incumbent upon the Church. There is infinite distance between the world and God 
that can be bridged only by the freedom of human response to the love of the Cross. 
Love is both nurture and fire. The patience of God will not coerce: but, neither will 
the holiness of love leave the Church in a state of inertia; it is ever being tested by 
fire. For Oman, testing by fire may take two forms: “it may be the fire of persecution 
or the fire of doubt”.
104
 The second of these, Oman felt, was well on its way. It was 
not a cause for retreat, but for expectation of a new thing that the Lord might do. 
Oman’s thought takes flight from history in order to disabuse it of absolute claims 
and, paradoxically, in order that the transcendent call of God may be discovered in 
and through it. As ever, the natural is known through the supernatural and the 
supernatural irreducible to the natural. 
Summary 
This section has sought an historical context for Oman’s ecclesiology. His theology 
of the Church bears some resemblance to those of Loofs and Sohm. They share the 
belief that primitive Christian community was a fellowship, directed by the spirit, 
under the rule of love. Oman and Sohm differed as to points of historical detail and 
his evaluation of historical development in subsequent centuries takes a more radical 
trajectory. In the historiography of Church history, Oman stands out in his adherence 
to the ideal Church over the empirical. The consequence of his idealism was a radical 
iconoclasm with respect to the claims of historical institutions. Oman’s radical 
ecclesiology is in proportion to his vision of the Church as a work in progress, in an 
evolutionary continuum, in an apocalyptic horizon and in the providence of God. 
5 Institutions, ministry and sacraments 
The foregoing section has explored the foundations of Oman’s ecclesiology in 
apocalyptic sensibility and an evolutionary world view followed by an examination 
of nineteenth century context. The next section will consider Oman’s attitude to 
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ecclesiastical specifics: Church organisation, the function of ministry and the place 
of sacraments.  
5.1 Institutions 
The Church always manifests itself in some form of community, even if it is two or 
three gathered in Christ’s name. At the same time, it is impossible to think of the 
Church as a separate entity from the world. The “true Church”, Oman writes:  
…cannot be separated out from among men, gathered into one pure 
society, organised according to the Divine ideal, and directed 
exclusively to Christ like activities, because the Kingdom of God she 
serves cannot be so separated and distinguished. The things of the spirit 
and the things of the flesh cannot be separated even in one soul.
105
 
The old conundrum of whether the church is visible or invisible does not arise. The 
Church is visible when it is leaven in the dough. However, as dough it can make no 
lasting claim to empirical durability. The true Church is the ideal Church that 
embodies the values of the Kingdom of God and reflects the light of Christ in the 
world. Oman continues: 
All else passes; and if any part of our experience has entirely failed to 
leave some result of faith and hope and love we have lived in vain. 
Therefore, the work of any Church is in vain which is not helping to 
rear the eternal Church in which these spiritual goods are the true and 
abiding possession; and which is not hastening on the day when other 
bonds are unnecessary, because all are one in Christ.
106
 
It is thus that Oman introduces the reader to an ecclesiology, idealist and visionary, 
and empirically variable. Institutions, no matter how revered, are “at best an 
imperfect and passing means”.
107
 The corollary of this transience is that Oman is 
appreciative of the potential for any ecclesial institution to be a vehicle for the divine. 
Thus, with respect to the Confessional movement in nineteenth century Germany, he 
commented: “what gave it vitality was the revival of practical religion which passed, 
                                                 
105
 Vision and Authority, 345. 
106
 Vision and Authority, 346. 
107




not over Germany alone, but over a good part of Western Europe”.
108
 On the other 
hand, the merit of his own non-conformist tradition lay, he believed, in the personal 
freedom and responsibility it gave to the individual. “The temper of non-conformity 
is to have a large faith in the self-direction of the human soul, and a relatively small 
faith in human regulations.”
109
 It is “the temper” of non-conformity that commends it 
to Oman; not its democratic structure per se. “Christianity is not individualism 
tempered by the ballot-box” and “Christ has little flattering to say about 
majorities”.
110
 The more any Church leans towards personal freedom, the more it is 
of the world to come; the more it rests upon history and tradition, the more  it will 
quench the Spirit and lose its dynamism. Oman pointedly sums up the relationship 
between the Church and the Kingdom of God as follows: 
The whole question is, whether the Church is a prophetic society 
because it is historic, or a historic society because it is prophetic. Only 




Oman’s ecclesiology represents the triumph of a biblical idealism, though without 
detachment from the empirical.  As in his Christology, the mediating influences of 
Scottish philosophy are apparent and his theology of the Church illustrates the 
application of his via media between idealism and realism. 
Of primary importance to Oman is the question: what sort of authority do Churches 
exercise? If the Kingdom of God is an order of freedom and love then this must be 
reflected to the maximum degree possible in church life. Personal insight must take 
precedence over every outward authority. And, even though Churches by their very 
nature are corporate, the corporate must make space for the freedom of the 
individual. “The help of others is essential, but the authority of others is 
stagnation.”
112
 Oman sees a parallel between religion and science where the human 
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search for knowledge “must regard only truth”.
113
 The same realism is required in 
religion, namely a belief that reality will not deceive the earnest seeker. The search 
for God must be “in humble freedom, with a far higher assurance than the material 
world can give, than that which he seeks is active to make its self known”.
114
 Thus, 
the spiritual person “has at once the child’s modesty and the child’s confidence”.
115
 It 
is an approach which counters the criticism that religion is based on archaic authority 
and unable to amend, change or learn anything new. This personal emphasis may 
make high demands upon the individual; but the other side of the argument is that 
there are no religious elites. A Galilee peasant may discover more truth than the 
learned teachers of the law; and the discriminating mind may see “in the woman old 
and poor, in the threadbare gown and the old fashioned bonnet, the beauty of 
holiness and the dignity of Christ’s gentleness, and be able to treat her in every 
relation of life as the guest who has been honoured to sit at Christ’s right hand”.
116
  
The ability of each soul to know God directly and in ways transcending institutional 
authority was always, for Oman, fundamental. His spirituality was highly person-
centred, and his understanding of the Church was built from the bottom up. The 
Church’s sure foundation is one soul open to the reality of the divine. Oman appeals 
to Jesus in the gospels as an example of this conviction in practice: 
We must begin as far back as our Lord did. All His beginnings are with 
individuals. The only condition of acceptance is to worship in spirit and 
in truth. One person in his heart worships God, and to this no increase 
of numbers, no consecrated building or large assembly can add 
anything. For our own assurance in this approach, the revelation of the 
Father testifying to the Son, and the revelation of the Son witnessing to 
the Father are adequate grounds.
117
 
From the personal inevitably follows the inter-personal. The Church begins when the 
two worshipping hearts come together. Oman continues: “The Church of Christ has 
not begun till two have met in Christ’s name, till, in the simplest act of association, 
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the spirit of fellowship that is in Him has found expression”.
118
 And with the 
beginning of fellowship, in the name and faith and love of Christ, there is no end to 
its widening circle. The two are never content until they become three and “the spirit 
of love that is in Him has begun to enlarge its sphere of blessing”.
119
 However, given 
that the essence of the Church is in the quality of its fellowship, expansion can never 
make it more catholic than the primary fellowship of the two or three. Indeed, no 
earthly institution can exhaust the heavenly reality of the Church. “It is an atom, but 
an atom which holds in potentiality the glory of the universe.”
120
 
It would be a misnomer, therefore, to say that Oman has a low view of the Church. 
Yes, it is low if historical continuity, or liturgical antiquity, be the yardstick; but, if 
vision of what the Church may become is the measure, then Oman’s ecclesiology is 
of the highest order.  His bottom-up thinking is full of possibility, the possibility of 
realising the height, and depth, the breadth and length of the love of Christ, as well as 
the fullness of God that surpasses all knowledge.
121
 Worship and fellowship in 
Christ’s name connect with the love at the heart of all reality.  And so, existentially, 
the outcome of Oman’s apocalyptic and evolutionary parameters is that there can be 
no institutional ceiling to truth or love. In practice, any soul that lives consciously in 
the sphere of the spiritual may witness to the reality of God, and more authentically 
than the most illustrious ecclesiastical tradition, or prestigious Church. 
The man who works in this sphere is a true Church builder. His scope 
may be small, his Church may be only a friend, a family, a hamlet 
observant of his walk and conversation. But eternity is before him, and 




By accumulative argument, Oman brings home to the reader his unwavering, perhaps 
one might say unrelenting, conviction of the primacy of God in the personal 
experience of ordinary people and the corresponding secondary role of ecclesiastical 
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institutions. The point is summed up as follows: “the first and last question for every 




Oman made these remarks in his revised edition of Vision and Authority, published 
in 1928, and one cannot help thinking that he may have had the prior criticism of his 
ecclesiology in mind. Frew, as noted, reviewed The Church and the Divine Order 
with the comment that Oman pitched the reality of the Church so highly that his 
vision “is impractical for average human nature”.
124
 And so, in his re-issue of Vision 
and Authority, Oman places the Church in the heart of human nature and in personal 
relations. He is at pains to show that both Christian life and fellowship are essentially 
rooted in the transcendental possibilities of ordinary human beings. However, in 
2007, R. Buick Knox revisited and repeated the criticism. Knox was Professor of 
Ecclesiastical History at Westminster College
125
 and, in his history of the College, 
remarked: 
For many people the institutional and traditional structure provided the 
necessary framework for personal faith and ‘now and again Oman tends 
to put asunder what God has joined’.
126
 
Like Frew, a hundred years earlier, Knox’s criticism was that Oman failed to 
recognise the importance of the concrete realities for faith and took an unhelpful 
flight into the idealism. Knox’s affirmation of the importance for faith of the 
particularity of tradition and settled liturgy undoubtedly carries weight. Oman 
himself concedes that “as long as we are in the body, we cannot be independent of 
forms and organisations and ceremonies, and customs in respect to them…no one 
maintains a robust religious life unconnected with any of them.
127
 The foundational 
premise of Oman’s theology that the natural and the supernatural are always 
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interrelated could not but acknowledge the importance of institutions. His critics 
failed to see this connection. Oman’s trenchant criticism of institutional religion, 
therefore, was qualified. It is the backward glance of institutions that troubled him. 
Once organisations turn inwards to their historical credentials, or their illustrious 
past, then – in a manner analogous to a self-focused, spiritual life in individuals – 
they become more self-righteous than righteous. Institutions fail when inward 
looking; but, on the other hand, they serve God’s purpose and human need when 
open to the beckoning of heaven. 
…customs and institutions by themselves are apt to fail when most 
needed, yet, if not by themselves but sought for purposes beyond 
themselves, they may be our required succour: and honesty with our 
limitations should compel us to admit the need.
128
 
In Oman’s evolutionary, apocalyptic trajectory everything lives through openness to 
the transcendent, “by every word that comes from the mouth of God”.
129
 His 
criticism is not of customs and institutions per se, but of those which domesticate 
transcendence. And so, as Oman stood at the crossroads of declining religious 
practice, his fear was that the forms of religion would continue, but with a dangerous 
severance from reality. Knox’s criticism misses this seminal point. At the micro, 
personal, pastoral level, Oman would have welcomed Knox’s insight into the fact 
that there is no such thing as faith divorced from context. But, in the larger context of 
religious decline, Oman was attempting to find a vision consistent with the primal 
vision given by Jesus. Institutional maintenance, valuable in its own right, is never 
pregnant with vision. Oman’s faith over-reached the institutional to the ideal, with 
the trust that the divine is always becoming manifest in new and unexpected ways. 
The human requirement is ever the trust of the child and the vision of the poet. Oman 
must have the felt the weight of isolation on this matter. It is a singularly “Oman 
vision”, that the future of the Church lies with new apocalyptic sensibility.  
Theological thinking on the subject of Church decline, in Oman’s era as to-day, was 
committed to reform and renewal of current institutions. Any providential possibility 
of post-institutional Christianity was ruled out a priori.  
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Instead of seeking life first and waiting till it create its own regulation, 
the hope is that regulations will do as well as life. That some larger idea 
should be working out in the universe than in any actual organisation, 
even one’s own is a hypothesis beyond the working theory.
130
 
One senses that Oman caught the spirit of secular Christianity that was to come in the 
nineteen sixties. But it also would have been too earth-bound. Oman’s kindred spirits 
are, perhaps, those who today emphasise the spirituality of nature; and who, taking 




5.2 Ministry and people 
Oman writes about ministry from within his non-conformist perspective. In the 
previous chapter, the quotation from his paper given to minsters, entitled “The 
Exposition of the Word”, illustrated how exclusively Oman identified ministry with 
preaching. To repeat: 
Knowledge of the scriptures is the true qualification of the minister. He 
no longer assumes to absolve sin; he only dispenses sacraments because 
it is convenient; he cannot claim superior piety or superior gifts, or 
experience of men and of life, but he ought to be able to say as none of 
his other hearers can: ‘Thus said Isaiah’ and ‘Thus said Paul’ and ‘Thus 
said the Lord Himself’, and if he wants to find a better commission he 
is hard indeed to please.
132
 
The quotation is as revealing for what it rejects as for what it affirms. The priesthood 
of all believers is written large upon it. Any idea of the minister giving absolution is 
ruled out axiomatically and the reference to administering the sacraments as a matter 
of “convenience” suggests that, for Oman, presiding at the Lord’s Table or 
administering baptism might well be carried out by a lay person. Indeed, from an 
accompanying sermon entitled “Presbyterianism”, it is clear that Oman rejects the 
idea of a lay-clerical distinction. The sermon was preached at an ordination of elders 
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and the script is couched in the most charitable language. He affirms his belief in 
“the holy Catholic Church, in the deep and true sense of recognising all faithful 
followers of Christ by what ever name they be called”, and continues, “it would be 
our constant endeavour to enlarge our charity”.
133
 However, Oman takes the 
opportunity to repudiate all hierarchy. He argues for the equivalence of the terms 
elder and bishop and for the eldership as a representative, speaking “from the midst 
of the people” in contra-distinction to a bishop who “speaks above the people”.
134
 It 
is, he concludes, “the real intention of Catholicism in all its phases” that “the Church 
proper is the clergy”. 
135
 It was unlikely to have been an ecumenical occasion, 
beyond, perhaps, the inclusion of other non-conformist clergy. Had he lived in the 
post war era, it would have been interesting to see how Oman would have reacted to 
Vatican II and the concept of the ministry of the whole people of God.
136
 Perhaps, he 
would have welcomed it as a step in the right direction; but it would hardly have 
gained fulsome acceptance. The claim to authority in faith and morals of the Vatican 
Council itself would have been a stumbling block to Oman’s conscience. He 
concludes his address to the elders and congregation: 
Nothing, we hold, has done more to mislead men about Christ than this 
notion that His Church can consist of officials and that His faith can be 
taught from outside, and a man’s conduct directed by any authority than 
God’s spirit in his heart.
137
 
All authority is vested in individual conscience in the fellowship of Christ. In 
keeping with his relational Christology, he affirms: 
Those of us who are Elders magnify our office because we magnify the 
first great office, which is to be a brother of Jesus Christ, heirs of God 
and joint heirs with Christ, because we magnify the priesthood of all 
believers – as a royal priesthood. There is no dignity that can be higher 
than theirs, no way of knowing the truth that is surer than their gift of 
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“United intercession” suggests a Presbyterianism that is corporate, yet honouring of 
individual conscience. It is an idealised Presbyterianism, free from legalism and 
clericalism; and, maybe, more free from lay power struggles than Presbyterianism 
ever is in reality. In any event, the importance of the Church as “people” stretches 
further back than any one Church tradition. “It is not in the last issue” he writes, “for 
Presbyterianism that we stand, but for Christianity and we would be far from any 
assertion that would un-church others. Our main task is to preach Christ and to make 
manifest our fellowship with all them who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity”.
139
 
With respect to ministry, Oman’s valuable practical guide, Concerning the Ministry, 
a compendium of casual Saturday afternoon talks, delivered when Oman had ended 
his week’s lecturing, re-affirms Oman’s belief that preaching is the minister’s 
fundamental calling. The book is rich in insight into the pitfalls in the minister’s 
vocation, stressing the evils of busyness and many of the things that are now 
emphasised in ministerial formation. Many practical insights arise from Oman’s 
eighteen years experience in Alnwick. These are delivered with wit and are always 
challenging. Even in 1979, the book was required reading for ministers in the 
Presbyterian Church in Ireland.
140
 The most noticeable thing about this book, 
however, is the exclusive emphasis on the minister as a preacher. There are pastoral 
asides, but the core of the book is concerned with homiletics. The early chapters 
address the issue of the minister being a prophet of the people and to the people. The 
whole series of talks is premised on the ministry being one of reconciliation. The 
primary purpose of the ministry is to follow the “long way” of bringing people to the 
realisation of the friendship of God and to trust in his wisdom and love, commended 
in the Cross. There are many other “shorter” ways of serving the Kingdom as, for 
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example, a social worker or as a member of parliament.
141
 But the vocation of 
ministry is premised on the belief that only reconciliation to God can ultimately 
“make a better people and a better world”.
142
 Oman’s affirmation of reconciliation to 
God as the only ground for ministry, and of Christianity itself, is left as a challenge 
which has no ambivalence. 
Perhaps no-one has any right to be in the ministry at all unless he is 
quite convinced, not only of the value of this way, but that there is no 
other way. Perhaps no one is quite a Christian who is not.
143
 
Thus, as in all Oman’s free ranging theological thinking, his reflections on ministry 
come ultimately to focus on the Cross where Christ manifests in time God’s eternal, 
atoning love. The Christian ministry, like Christianity itself, rests on the reality of 
reconciliation to God through the same Christ and the same love. 
5.3 Sacraments 
There is little about sacraments in Oman’s published work and yet the premise of his 
theology is fundamentally sacramental. The natural world is symbolic of the 
spiritual; the supernatural is apprehended through the natural. In comparison with the 
sacramental lavishness of creation, attempts by the Church to create an exclusive 
sacramental system are flying in the face of God’s glorious provision. These points 
are expressed in Oman’s Kerr Lectures; and, in this instance, he makes little 
allowance for Catholic sensitivities. He writes: 
The Roman system, being the work of many centuries, has, in a high 
degree, the rounded completeness…….Yet it is only a narrow 
interpretation of God’s ways, for, if the whole world is a sacrament of 
things spiritual, the sacraments of the Church must be great symbols 
laden with a world of meaning, but to narrow the sacramental efficacy 
of all material creation down to the narrow wonder-working of material 
substance debases and does not glorify the idea. Nor is the highest way 
to place the sacramental idea in the material world at all, for its ultimate 
symbol is man not nature, and the fundamental error is the denial of that 
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The essential sacrament of the universe is the human spirit. In human consciousness 
the material and the spiritual meet as nowhere else.
145
 In his lecture notes, Oman 
comments: 
There is only one sacrament in the last issue which is life. Sacraments 
are really the crown and perfecting of this continual revelation, showing 
us by the very simplest symbols that God speaks to us in all of life.
146
 
Thus, the sacraments of the Church, in employing water, bread and wine, “the 
common things in daily use”, give expression to “the concentrated essence of the 
sacramental life”. This is an important concept in Oman’s thinking about the 
sacraments. The particularity of the Church’s sacraments functions centrifugally, 
illuminating the sacramental meaning of the whole, i.e. the whole of life.  Oman 
continues: 
They presuppose that there is more in nature than an appeal to the 
senses, more in the gift of food than to eat of the loaves and be filled, 
and that we ought therein to see the miracle of a gracious God 
manifesting Himself in goodness.
147
 
Inherent in sacramental sensibility is the awareness that the world cannot be 
encompassed within a purely materialist paradigm; that life is a gift from God and 
that grace is ministered to us though the whole range of human experience. Such 
awareness can be neither explained, nor contradicted, by a strict naturalism; it is the 
fruit of “a general feeling towards things, an attitude of soul”.
148
  
The particularity of the Lord’s Supper, however, conveys something beyond general 
awareness of the divine; it is a sacrament of reconciliation. In other words, it is 
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symbolic of an end to human alienation from God and the acceptance of God in all of 
life. Christ exemplifies this reconciliation, accepting life as a gift, not just when he 
contemplated the beauty of the lilies in the field, but even in the experience of the 
Cross. It is the Cross that makes the totality of experience the sacrament of God. 
Oman writes: 
The special rite which connects this sacrament of life [bread and wine] 
directly with the Cross forbids us to rule out any part of experience, and 
teaches us to find in agony shame and death the manifold wisdom and 
measureless love of God.
149
 
For Oman, the Lord’s Supper is “pre-eminently the sacrament of reconciliation”.
150
 
But again, its power is centrifugal. From the centre point of God’s reconciling love in 
the Cross is birthed the revelation that: 
…the whole world is God’s temple, wherein our common life and all 
our dealings with our brethren, amid all the wickedness of man and 
even the fears and agonies and corruption of death, are ministers of God 
for the deliverance of His children.
151
   
There is nothing, therefore, that in some way does not serve God’s love; there are no 
distinct realms of the secular and sacred; “the world is our spiritual possession”.
152
  
This is a powerful and suggestive orientation of the sacramental theology. It escapes 
the legal interpretations of the atonement that Oman found morally objectionable; it 
links the sacrament of the world to the deeper sacrament of the Cross; and now the 
pain of the world, as well as the beauty of the world, is seen in the light of God’s 
sovereign love. It is a sacramental theology that speaks peace to the soul, not just 
because sin is taken up into God’s heart on the Cross and forgiven, but because the 
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natural pain of creation, suffering in animals, the suffering of the elderly, the children 
in the cancer ward, the millions of starving, the mercilessness of natural disaster, can 
all be left, to use the old language of piety, at the foot of the Cross. The peace of the 
Cross is a peace deeper than human brokenness; it is a peace that bridges the gulf 
between God and creation. The Cross is the sacrament, the symbol, of an ontological 
bond that, though fractured, cannot be severed; indeed, in the love of God in Christ 
that bond is healed and restored. The Cross reveals a loving God that endures failure 
and hopes eternally. In the world of time and space, the Cross is the final reality. 
There are several practical aspects to this sacramental theology. First of all, Oman is 
comfortable with the various names by which the Lord’s Supper is recognised. 
Before it was a religious rite, the holy supper was an Agape, a fellowship meal. It 
was abuse and misrepresentation that caused the practice to be dropped in the early 
Church.
153
 Secondly, the term Eucharist was for Oman a term that has been sadly 
neglected; one presumes he is referring to neglected usage within Reformed practice. 
Eucharistic language encapsulates two necessary elements: those of thanksgiving and 
victory. He remarks: 
Originally the idea is thanksgiving for victory. We have too much 
neglected this notion. [The sacrament] is not a mere recollection of 
suffering, but of victory over the world and the worst that it contains.
154
 
Thirdly, and most importantly for Oman, communion takes on meaning only in the 
context of koinonia. “Communion is fellowship in Christ’s spirit manifest in His 
people.”
155
 He is strongly critical of the idea of communion as a special channel of 
grace to the individual; and, also of the idea that it is a religious rite administered at 
the prerogative of clergy. Communion with Christ becomes real in the fellowship of 
love and forgiveness shared in the Christian community. In his lectures to his 
students he warns and questions: 
The Church is not an organisation, not a horde of individuals, but a 
koinonia. The great question is: Is the Church an organisation of a 
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fellowship there with common purpose? The answer to this will decide 
the nature of the sacraments.
156
 
Oman is in no doubt as to his answer. The common purpose of the Christian 
community is to live in the spirit of a family; this is its best witness to the world and 
its deepest experience of Christ. The Church is a family where human failings are 
borne with patient love; it is a fellowship that encourages the struggling and 
despairing; and it is a community that praises God for the hope of final victory in all 
things. Christ is manifest in this koinonia. 
It is interesting that Oman’s theology of the sacraments is closely allied to his 
ecclesiology. His emphasis on koinonia complements his aversion to the Church as 
structure and institution. The sharing of bread and wine as an expression of 
communion with Christ in and through the fellowship of believers was, he believed, 
fundamental to the Church from earliest times. He comments: 
The meaning of the rite is a participation in a way of suffering by which 
we triumph and enter the Kingdom: it must be understood in the light of 
the apocalyptic hope of early Christianity.
157
 
Nor was fellowship intended to be exclusive; but, rather, emblematic of the wider 
family of humanity, of which the Church, as a people reconciled to God, is prophetic. 
Quoting St Paul, Oman says, “Christ is the head of everyman – not the head of the 
Church…”.
158
 In his focus on communion as koinonia, Oman provides a helpful 
nuance to his emphasis on faith as personal. Faith always remains personal, but not 
apart from, nor in conflict with, the inter-personal. From that point of view, the 
sacrament of admission, the sacrament of baptism, is symbolic of the Church as a 
personal and corporate reality. The sacrament of baptism is symbolic of “its first 
condition, a change of heart”.
159
  
Had Oman been a systematic thinker, his theology of the sacraments would have 
been second only in importance to his theology of grace and personality. His 
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thinking with regard to sacraments is creative in its linking of nature, the Cross and 
community. It is a pity the reader has to search for through scattered references in 
order to build up a picture. However, the criticism made by Helen Oppenheimer,
160
 
that Oman’s theology of grace is too exclusively relational, still stands. She posited 
that sometimes we hunger for grace in us. Oman’s concentration on the experience of 
Christ, in and through community, does not quite meet the need; but, it does give a 
convincing theology of Christ with us. The thrust of Oman’s theology is so entirely 
outwards, from institutions, from sanctified formulae, from special channels of grace, 
that he might well respond: breathe the air around, seek not an oxygen mask from 
heaven, taste the water of life, do not bottle the Father’s goodness. In these imagined 
replies, we see the potential of Oman’s theology of the sacraments not only to direct 
the eyes of the Church out beyond its boundaries, but to raise self-interrogating 
questions. How does the soul experience Christ? What is the nature of Christian 
fellowship? Can the “born again” experience be something more than a personal 
piety? Can sacramental practice be more than nurture for the individual soul? 
Oman’s theology of the sacraments sets all these questions in the context of 
koinonia. Regardless of what one might think of the particulars, the broad conclusion 
would appear to be sound. 
Summary 
This examination of the practicalities of Oman’s ecclesiology reveals him to be both 
tolerant of institutions and revisionist. All ecclesiastical traditions may act as 
vehicles for the transcendent; but, in Oman’s view, the non-conformist traditions 
offer the largest scope for personal freedom. Within non-conformist ecclesiology, 
Oman would seem keen to erase clergy-lay distinctions, with the possibility of lay 
administration of the sacraments. The primary role of the minister is preacher and 
teacher and that specialism should be maintained at the highest quality possible. It 
would have been interesting had Oman written more specifically about the meaning 
of ordination. His views are hinted at rather than explained; but the revisionist 
tendency of his thinking is obvious. 
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Oman’s theology of the sacraments is the most creative of his specifics. The linking 
of nature, the Cross and communion sets the sacraments in a holistic context. More 
particularly, Oman’s focus on koinonia integrates sacramental presence and 
fellowship in a way that transcends individualism as well as sacramental exclusivity. 
Had Oman given it more systematic presentation, it would have been a theological 
gift of importance. Overall, Oman’s treatment of institutions, ministry, people and 
sacraments reveals a side of his thinking that is otherwise lost. His theology of 
practice was rooted, tolerant and creative in its suggestions. 
Appraisal 
This chapter has sought to unearth the foundation principles of Oman’s ecclesiology. 
It has been argued that apocalyptic sensibility and a spiritual concept of evolution 
shape Oman’s theology of the Church. These ideas co-here with his core values of 
grace and personality and complement his metaphysic of the natural and the 
supernatural. From these varied angles, Oman offers a theology of the Church that 
takes its meaning not from history but from the transcendent, from what Oman calls 
the “everlasting order of love in freedom and freedom in love”.
161
 The Church exists 
between the ideal and the empirical; in proverbial language, it is in the world but not 
of it. As the Cross of Christ is a prolepsis of the ultimate reconciliation of the world 
to God, so the Church is a community of the reconciled in waiting. It is one of the 
peculiarities of Oman’s ecclesiology that he arrives at a concept of the Church 
consistent with the New Testament via an idealistic rather than an historical route. 
Perhaps that should not surprise the reader, given the idealistic presuppositions of the 
New Testament itself.  
Secondly, though Oman’s ecclesiology approximates to the New Testament vision of 
the community of Christ, it is not easy to classify in terms of traditional models of 
the Church. A methodology of “a truly empirical inquiry” that “works with all 
experience possible for us to have”
162
 has the effect of knocking many a priori 
theologies of the Church off their pedestals. The historical starting points that mark 
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most ecclesiology - Roman Catholic, Lutheran or Reformed - are not ignored but 
merged with broader religious and philosophical presuppositions. Oman’s 
ecclesiology, accordingly, is somewhat exotic in a modern ecumenical perspective. 
Take, for example, an evangelical work on ecclesiology like that of Vel-Matti 
Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to Ecclesiology163 – it is difficult to find an appropriate 
slot for Oman’s particular vision. The nearest to Oman’s point of view in the various 
essays is that entitled “The Church as Fellowship: Free Church Ecclesiologies”.
164
 
Oman does stand in the radical Reformation tradition of the priesthood of all 
believers, unmediated access to God and the Church as primarily a fellowship. 
However, such comparisons disguise as much as they reveal. Oman’s foundational 
principles of apocalyptic sensibility, evolutionary spirituality and personal realism 
take the reader into strange territory that the biblical radicals of the Reformation 
would not have dreamt of. Oman’s ecclesiology, of course, has affinity with the 
spiritual radicals of the Reformation who prized the Spirit over text. Oman belongs 
in this radical continuum, acknowledging the entirety of experience as the sphere of 
divine revelation and fellowship. 
Thirdly, the continuity between Oman’s ecclesiology and his Christology is 
substantive. In Pauline language, for Oman, the Church is “hid with Christ in 
God”.
165
 As noted in the previous chapter, Christ embodies the freedom at the heart 
of a universe that is evolving into the loving purpose of God. In Christ there is a 
unique combination of freedom and utter devotion to God that makes him a 
revelation of the divine in humanity. Expressed in Oman’s primary categories, it is 
“in Christ” that the natural to the supernatural are reconciled and the philosophical 
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divide between empiricism and idealism is bridged. The Church is wherever this 
ontology of reconciliation is realised afresh.  In that sense, the Church is truly 
fellowship with the crucified and risen Christ, but within a larger, theistic narrative 
than most Christ-centred doctrines of the Church allow. Christ belongs to, clarifies 
and completes a narrative that is as old as humanity. The Church too is as old as 
humanity, as a community expressive of freedom and love, to whatever degree. 
However, in the light of Christ’s revelation, the Church is wherever the two or the 
three meet in the fellowship of his love and are obedient to his heavenly vision. 
Fourthly, there is a real sense in which Oman’s ecclesiology represents a creative 
return to the New Testament. The dominant themes are the apocalyptic vision of 
Jesus, the priority of the Kingdom of God and love as a principle of fellowship. Like 
the true revolutionary, Oman endeavours to return to origins, to purity of vision and 
to seminal inspiration. His reaching back over generations of tradition to the primal 
vision of Jesus will leave the historical sensibility frustrated. Most theology is a re-
visiting and a re-working of tradition. In contrast, Oman’s approach was essentially 
visionary, linking the primal vision of Jesus to his deepest convictions about reality. 
Such a perspective, of course, demands great faith in the present reality of God. Like 
the pool at Bethsaida, history affords only moments of such vision – as in the 
Reformation and its prodigy, the Enlightenment – and even then the absence of 
needful alertness may miss the opportunity afforded. As Oman comments in his 
lectures to students: 
Apocalyptic is not the slow moralisation of the race but that which 
comes with great disaster. The very material success of a civilization 
may end in its spiritual disaster. The supreme thing in the end is what 
we worship, the faith by which we live, the love by which we cherish. 
[Break] But in history, the higher in a civilization never emancipates 
itself from the lower except through catastrophe.
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Oman’s theology of the Church reaches beyond institutions and is at once a return to 
the historic centre and to a prophetic of dawning reality.  






Fifthly, it is obvious that Oman’s ecclesiology will not satisfy a traditionalist 
sensibility. For example, in the eyes of many, the wisdom inherent in tradition, creed 
and office is too precious and too necessary for Christian identity to be sacrificed to 
subjective vision. Ignorance of tradition and the absence of historical perspective 
account for the plethora of denominations and the self-serving spiritualities that 
characterise modern Protestantism. Oman would be unimpressed with the 
phenomena of mega churches and spiritual fantasy; he would, surely, identify with 
the traditionalist critique. Indeed, to the shallowness of much of Protestantism in the 
twenty-first century, Oman’s remarks about Jansenism are apposite. The Jansenists, 
Pascal included, combined institutional reverence with the freedom of the soul before 
God. That combination, and the need that called for it, is, Oman wrote in his Kerr 
lectures, “always tending to occur”; and, he continues: “it some day may be of vital 
importance to the Christian Church”.
167
 This conservative view is a minor key in 
Oman’s ecclesiology which, like everything else, is contextually determined. One 
can only speculate, but it may be a word that Oman would utter to the Church of 
today. In ecclesiology, as in all else, Oman’s thinking can take either a radical or a 
conservative turn; it is inspirational rather than directive and leaves the reader with 
the freedom and responsibility to make up his, or her, mind. Thus, on the one hand, 
liberal sensibility will find in Oman’s work a theology of the Church consistent with 
an evolutionary world view, predicated upon a new world order and confident of the 
Kingdom already present in hearts that love the Lord. Divine presence heralds the 
sanctification of the world and the coming new heavens and new earth. But, on the 
other hand, there is too the voice of realism, saying that institutional religion may in 
certain circumstances be the guardian of freedom. These major and minor chords in 
Oman’s ecclesiology make it worthy of serious study in an age of secularism and 
religious fundamentalism.  
In sum, personal freedom is the ground of Oman’s ecclesiology but it is always 
freedom under, or with, God. With respect to his own ecclesiology, his drawing of 
diverse themes into one coherent whole, his eclectic use of sources, his dialectical 
relation to the thinking of others and individuality of his  presentation, illustrate a 
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mind for which freedom is a cardinal value. Of course, freedom was not only 
something exhibited in the creativity of his own writing; freedom was a fundamental 
premise of his metaphysics. Ideas exist against a horizon of freedom. The uniqueness 
of Christ is in the way he embodied freedom and introduced his followers to it. In the 
horizon of freedom, knowledge claims new territory, faith does new things, love 
bears with failure and death holds no terror. The Church embodies all these things, 
and more, for it knows the freedom of a new order to come, the freedom wherewith 







1 Contexts:  a summary 
F. R. Tennant in his review of The 	atural and the Supernatural commented that it is 
“a work inspired by experience and outlook of pronounced individuality”.
168
 This 
judgement may be applied to Oman’s work as a whole. The benefit of this study has 
been that it has unearthed the contextual richness of Oman’s work and has revealed 
the “pronounced individuality” that Tennant commended. Oman’s knowledge of 
European intellectual traditions was extensive. This is remarkable in one who had no 
formal education in Orkney.
169
 But, with acquisition of a high level of literacy in 
German, Oman was able to access and engage with the wide sweep of European 
philosophy and theology. Though Oman may have been impatient about providing 
footnotes and bibliography, the European dimensions of his thinking are clear. In the 
past, not enough attention has been given to this important facet of his work. Oman is 
usually credited as being a liberal Protestant thinker in the tradition of 
Schleiermacher. However, his concept of person, with its strong emphasis on moral 
autonomy, owes a great deal to Kant. As well as having knowledge of the work of 
major historical figures, Oman was familiar with the contemporary scholarship in 
church history, biblical studies and theology. This is demonstrated in his critical 
awareness of the work, for example, of now largely forgotten figures such as Sohm, 
Loofs and Baldensperger. Though Oman’s relation to European thought has been 
highlighted in this contextual study, his relation to European thought is far from 
exhausted. It is an area of Oman scholarship that merits further research.  
Whilst the influence of European thought is acknowledged by Oman and by his 
reviewers, recognition of the Scottish dimension to his work has been marginal. The 
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exception has been Stephen Bevans’ helpful biographical details about Oman’s early 
life in Orkney. This thesis has expanded upon Bevans’ work, identifying Oman’s 
early life experiences as holding the key to his core values. The first influence was 
that of Oman’s roots in Orkney and the spiritual environment of the United 
Presbyterian Church. The genesis of Oman’s love of personal freedom may be traced 
to early formative impressions. Factors were at work in Oman’s life, before and after 
the Robertson Smith trial, that contributed to his settled conviction with regard to 
freedom as the essential spiritual value. Oman’s life in Orkney and his education in 
Edinburgh were accumulative in their effects, elevating freedom to a position of 
practical and existential importance. For example, the existence of denominations 
was illustrative of ecclesiastical liberty going back to the Reformation. Orkney itself 
was a microcosm of Scotland, with three strands of Presbyterianism. At a human 
level, Oman seems to have had a particularly tolerant up-bringing, where difference 
was respected and where the idiosyncrasies of personality enriched community life. 
In Orkney also, Oman’s experience of the numinous set personal experience above 
creed and orthodoxy and Oman’s Church, the United Presbyterian, nurtured liberty 
of opinion. For example, more than any other branch of Presbyterianism, the 
tradition of the Seceders sought to relieve ministers and elders of those aspects of 
confessional subscription that were injurious to conscience. Thus, the United 
Presbyterian Church was first to introduce a Declaratory Act in 1879. The formidable 
figure of John Cairns, whose irenic and catholic spirit directed the Declaratory Act 
through the General Assembly, proved to be an abiding influence on Oman. Cairns, 
though more committed to confessional standards than Oman would ever be, 
impressed upon Oman the priority of character over creed and doctrine. At least, this 
was the aspect of Cairns life that Oman chose to highlight: Cairns exemplified grace 
and personality.  
Over and above Church influence, the impact of Oman’s education in philosophy in 
Edinburgh must be taken into account when tracing the roots of Oman’s emphasis on 
personal freedom. When Oman began studying, all his philosophy teachers were 
emphasising freedom as an important element in metaphysics. Henry Calderwood 
stressed the centrality of personality as self-directing, self-legislating and self-




Berkley; and Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison was the pioneer of personal idealism. 
Oman could not have failed to be challenged and stimulated by this philosophical 
climate. After the First World War, the emphasis on personality, freedom and 
responsibility was especially strong amongst Oman’s contemporaries, for example, 
William Ritchie Sorley and Andrew Seth Pringle Pattison. It is not co-incidental that 
both Sorley and Pringle Pattison lost sons as casualties in the war. Oman’s particular 
contribution to the intellectual ferment and moral heart-searching that accompanied 
the sacrifice of a whole generation was to think theologically about the issues that 
concerned others philosophically. His seminal work, Grace and Personality, was a 
labour of creativity aimed at bringing theology into harmony with the highest 
insights of philosophy and philosophy into harmony with a spiritual anthropology. 
Thus, the fundamental principle of personal freedom was to change Oman’s 
understanding of grace, from being an instrument of omnipotence to being a 
relationship of nurture. The groundwork for the personalist theology that emerged in 
Grace and Personality, and which was extended and developed in Oman’s 
subsequent work, could hardly have come about from merely sitting in Robertson 
Smith’s heresy trial. Whilst not wishing to under estimate the emotional impact of 
the trial, Oman’s philosophical study gave him critical tools which he used to great 
effect; he challenged all systems of thought that threatened personal freedom and its 
correlate responsibility. 
2 Personal freedom: a unifying principle 
If, in Oman’s cultural contexts, one finds the seeds of personal freedom, it is in his 
work that one finds a highly individual flowering of the same. Oman is difficult to 
categorise as a theologian precisely because of the way his mind ranged freely across 
philosophical and theological boundaries. The result is scholarship that is à la carte 
with the imperative of personal choice. Oman’s work exemplifies his philosophy of 
personal freedom: the freedom of persons to form judgements, to make decisions and 
to mark the boundary between self and totalising systems. Oman draws from diverse 
and often conflicting perspectives and weaves them into a coherent narrative. This is 
the glory and the frustration of his work; he is never amenable to classification and 




systematic theology and though he recognised the need for systematic thinking for 
the sake of clarity, systems were, for Oman, a veil over the complexity of reality.  
However, freedom is more than a personal methodology in Oman’s work. Freedom 
is the method a God of love uses to bring an otherwise unintelligible and disparate 
universe to final unity. It is in the freedom of personality that, for Oman, the essential 
clue to the meaning of the universe is found. The freedom of persons is a mirror of 
the ontological freedom at the heart of all things. This conviction is at the root of 
Oman’s criticism of philosophies of the Absolute that would make personality 
adjectival, rather than substantial and constitutive of reality. To be a human being, 
Oman ever insisted, is to be conscious of a spiritual freedom that relates self to 
ontological totality However, such freedom is a work in progress, embryonic, 
evolving and in need of nurture. In this, Oman was both the heir to Kant and a critic. 
Oman could not accept Kant’s bifurcation of reality into the ideal realm of freedom 
and the empirical realm of necessity. Oman’s ontology was holistic and interactive. 
God is not a mere moral legislator but an educator, a nurturer of persons, the 
encourager of loving relationships, as well as being the transcendent ground of all 
good. Divine love works with infinite patience to win human hearts, minds and wills. 
This, Oman argues, is the truth of Schleiermacher’s emphasis on feeling, Hegel’s on 
mind and Kant’s on will. 
At some point early in his career – he gave the Kerr Lectures in 1906 –Oman came to 
see freedom as the ultimate spiritual value. It was a visionary moment: it determined 
his understanding of evolution, his metaphysics, his reading of history, his revision 
of the reformed theology his narrative method and the entire panoply of his thought. 
The complexity of ideas and the coherence of Oman’s thinking were alike the fruit of 
the final and ultimate importance he ascribed to personal freedom in a personal 
universe. 
3 Consequences: a reductionist, an apologist of a 
visionary? 
Alan P. Sell tells an anecdote about a visitor to Cambridge knocking on Oman’s 




fisherman, the face of a scholar or the face of a saint?
170
 When the reader has 
finished reading Oman’s books, he or she might well ask: is this the work of a 
reductionist, a Christian apologist or a spiritual visionary? The answer will to a large 
measure depend on the criteria brought to the study. For some, like the questioner at 
the Auburn Seminary, Oman will appear to have pruned the Christian tradition so 
drastically that the faith once delivered to the saints is a mere rump. To others, Oman 
will have cleared away the dead wood of tradition so that the essential core of faith is 
again discernable. And, to another reader, Oman may well appear as a visionary 
whose work was prophetic of the way ahead for a post-Christendom era. In this 
section these three reactions are examined. 
3.1 A reductionist 
The charge of reductionism was most often made by Oman’s reviewers with respect 
to his ecclesiology. Knox and others felt that Oman had marginalised the importance 
of institutional frameworks for a vibrant faith. Healy, on the other hand, defends 
Oman, arguing that the non-institutional thrust of Oman’s work must not be 
exaggerated. This thesis has argued that a distinction must be made between pastoral 
concern and religious vision. Oman would not have wished to take away from any 
believing soul the comfort of creed and institution. But, together with pastoral 
empathy Oman held a vision of a new dispensation where Christian faith and 
fellowship would live and prosper without institutional props. In Faith and Freedom 
he wrote: “every living institution ought to be attempting to abolish itself; every 
statutory arrangement should be anticipating a higher than legal obedience; every 
appointment by men for others should contemplate itself as a discipline for teaching 
men to recognise no appointment but their own”.
171
 It is a bold vision of non-
institutionalised freedom and fellowship in the love of God. But, as has been argued 
in chapter six, Oman recognised the necessity of the institutional Church in the 
interim. If humanity could handle the fullness of freedom, God would grant it 
immediately; but, given human spiritual capacity, it would be more of a burden than 
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a blessing. “Therefore”, he writes, God “appoints a statutory element in life and 
religion to be a substitute for freedom when men are weary of it and a discipline 
when they misuse it. It is legitimate though only as a resting place”.
172
 Oman’s 
reductionism of the Church, therefore, is real but qualified; the realisation of the ideal 
Church in time and space is contingent upon humanity coming of age. In an evolved 
spiritual maturity, humanity would be able to live in harmony with love and in the 
enjoyment of freedom; but that is an apocalyptic hope. Meantime institutional 
Christianity is a comfort to the soul for whom God–apart from the tangible reality of 
pulpit, altar and pew – may seem a distant dream. 
Oman’s valuation of the institutional Church as provisional will not reassure those 
who believe the Church is God’s chosen instrument of grace. Oman’s apocalyptic 
vision marginalises the historical, whether in the Catholic sense of the Church as a 
divine institution, or in the Protestant perspective of the Church as the normal vehicle 
of salvation.
173
  Grant observes that, for Oman, “the Church is the only organisation 
where its ideal is its essence”.
174
 Thus, Oman’s theology is always shedding the 
historical forms of yesterday. It is always reforming. His ecclesiology cannot escape 
the charge of historical reductionism, though it is so for the highest motives. The 
empirical Church can only ever be an approximation to the ideal and should never 
seek to supplant it. In Oman’s ecclesiology the unique calling, and special mission, 
of the Church is to be a prophetic witness: to be in the forefront of not just 
proclaiming a new divine order, but of realising that new reality in practical 
fellowship. The Church, as an institution, will always be needed, especially when 
humanity uses freedom destructively, perhaps even to the point of apocalyptic 
disaster. Like the symbolism of the church steeple, earthly reminders are needed of 
heavenly reality. The Church is always provisional; and it is necessary through being 
provisional. 
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Oman’s radical relegation of the historical Church is one element in a larger 
theological revisionism. Oman relegates the Bible and historic creeds to the authority 
of experience; and, the magisterial place he gives to experience over the Christ of the 
creeds may be considered a marked departure from Christian tradition. It is a 
departure born of Oman’s willingness to sacrifice historical authority for the gain of 
freedom. Until the critic finds a better solution to the question of the relation between 
freedom and historically conditioned authority, Oman’s vision remains a durable and 
creative hypothesis. If faith is to be reconciled with freedom and freedom with faith, 
a transcendent perspective is required; Oman finds that perspective in the divine love 
that is parent to both faith and freedom and which shows no favouritism to either of 
her children. 
In relation, specifically, to Christology Oman’s reductionism is not simply a 
subordination of the historical to the ideal, but an elevation of the personal and 
practical. The importance of Christ for faith is not what can be said of him 
dogmatically, but what is experienced of God through his inspiration. “Christ is the 
supreme revelation only as he is the supreme reconciliation.”
175
 A charge may be 
made that Oman has reduced revelation in Christ to “method”. Christ is the 
revelation of the method whereby God can be known at all times and in all places. It 
is the disciple who appropriates the faith, freedom and love demonstrated by Christ 
that perceives his uniqueness and finality. Oman sums up this Christology of praxis 
as follows: 
Its finality is not as a body of truth which makes of no account God’s 
patient wisdom in overcoming unbelief, manifested in all human 
history, but as the embodiment of a relation to the father, the perfection 
of which we prove only as we use it to interpret His relation to us in all 
things and at all times.
176
 
Oman’s existential Christology will be unsatisfying to the critic who places primary 
value on the divine origin and status of Christ, as the precondition of his redeeming 
work. Oman’s primary emphasis on personal experience leads to a tectonic shift from 
the person of Christ to his work. Christ’s being is predicated on his doing. 
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Reconciliation becomes foundational and with it Oman’s theology of the Cross. 
There is, in the classical sense, an ontological deficit in Oman’s Christology. 
However, one could argue that ontological deficit is compensated for by Oman’s 
concentration on the Cross as an icon and symbol. The ontological dimension is 
dispersed and is present in cosmic disclosure and spiritual anthropology. Christ is the 
template for anthropological homecoming to God and for the teleological fulfilment 
of creation in God. Ontology is disclosed in the human and cosmic dynamic of divine 
love. Love bears the burden of estrangement and alienation, it is the ontological 
alpha and omega of creation, it reveals to the human heart the way of reconciliation 
and redemption. Method may sound an inadequate word to describe the glory that 
was in Christ. However, if the Cross is the disclosure of the divine method whereby 
God loves his enemies, is kind to the evil and unthankful, and gives creation a future 
beyond entropy: can there be any greater epiphany or revelation of the glory of God? 
3.2 A radical apologist 
The foregoing criticisms of Oman as reductionist of the fullness of historical 
Christianity invite a fuller appreciation of his own apologia for Christian faith. 
Whilst Oman had no interest in defending Christianity lock, stock and barrel he was 
keen to set forth the core of Christian faith which for him was the love of God 
attested by Christ. What Oman means by love is always synonymous with the 
unveiling of love in the Cross.
177
 The love of the Cross is multifaceted: comforting, 
patient, long-suffering and victorious. The Cross reveals that “God’s will is love and 
his goal is freedom”.
178
 Consequently, Oman offers the reader, therefore, a theology 
that is stripped of some of the worst accretions of history. There is no violence in 
God, no coercion, no holiness at variance with love, but rather a holiness which is the 
fire of his love. The traditional attributes of God’s omniscience and omnipotence are 
transfigured in the light of the Cross; there is no power or dominion apart from 
suffering love. But, love suffers only as a means to an end; its task is ultimately to 
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The ontological depth of love disclosed at the Cross, bridging the natural and the 
supernatural, carries forward in the stream of time in the experience of reconciliation. 
Here, too, the apologetic power of Oman’s theology deserves attention. Oman’s is a 
theology for the public arena. Chapter five noted how Oman refused to divorce 
justification from sanctification and insisted that both are integrated in the experience 
of reconciliation; and, whilst at the individual level the pastoral implications of 
linking free grace to reconciliation needs special discernment, in the public sphere 
the balance between grace and truth  is essential to the dynamic of liberation. In 
situations where the poor are marginalised and forgotten, in areas where racism 
poisons community relations, or in post-conflict situations like Northern Ireland 
where forgiveness on its own is a ghost-like reality, from another world but with no 
flesh and blood, then the holistic concept of reconciliation is indispensible to 
Christian witness. In holding together moral reality and the grace of forgiveness 
Oman earths the gospel. Oman’s insistence on penitence as the sine qua non of 
justification provides solid ground on which to build enduring, as opposed to 
ephemeral, peace, better relationships and a shared future. In the public arena, 
Oman’s doctrine of reconciliation is not a sticking patch on the running sores of 
history, but a call to earnestness and action in the horizon of God’s universal love. 
Oman’s vision of reconciliation calls attention to how the Kingdom of God may be 
realised in the broken kingdoms of the world. It is a hard road but the only road; 
Oman is no apologist for smooth things.
180
 
Ecology too may learn from Oman’s theology of the material and the spiritual. 
Spirituality divorced from the material can easily become pious and self-righteous 
and materialism divorced from spiritual vision has no direction and no end to serve 
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other than more of the same. Oman would regard the contemporary reverential 
attitude given to market forces as an idolatry of the most damning kind and denial of 
“man’s chief end”.
181
  A renewed sense of the holy and the sacred – as a means to 
right use of the earth as a gift to be shared – would, for Oman, be the only thing that 
can save the planet from the corrosive effects of materialism. Divine love has the 
power to make all things new, beginning with the human heart, but not stopping 
there; the sanctification of humanity is the first fruit of new creation; in the Pauline 
sense, the whole created order waits for the sons and daughters of God to be 
revealed.
182
 Oman’s theology of love meets the needs of the soul, but those needs are 
inseparable from the promise love holds for creation.  
Oman extols the gospel of love in all its creative power and wide reaches. His work 
exhibits the mind of a radical apologist; his cutting and pruning is not the work of 
someone who wishes to diminish Christianity; it is the effort of a thinker who wishes 
to press towards the Christian tradition’s centre and core. Again, it must be 
acknowledged that Oman subjects historical tradition to the cut of his own particular 
pruning tools. The transcendence of love, its mediation through human beings, the 
memory and inspiration of Christ, the freedom to which we are called through grace 
– these operate within the ontology of the ideal and the real, of love and reality. 
Christian faith comes alive in the freedom of persons and presages the freedom of the 
whole creation. 
3.3 A Visionary 
Oman’s work may be regarded as visionary on two fronts: with respect to the 
question that preoccupied him all his life – the question of authority in the Church – 
and the question of secularisation.  
Oman’s central theme of the authority of experience one could argue has been 
begrudgingly accepted by the Church, but more as a necessity than a virtue.  It is an 
aspect of his work that merits being better known in the Church at large; because it 
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brings clarity to the issue of authority, a subject often the source of conflict and 
confusion. For Oman, final authority rests with the voice of God spoken through 
experience to the whole person: to feeling, mind, and conscience. In itself this is not 
all that radical; it makes explicit what in liberal Protestantism is implicit. In fact, all 
traditions have been continually modified in the light of experience. Christianity is 
not a religion of the book, in the absolute sense of Islam. In two millennia Churches 
have changed their teaching on subjects as diverse as usury, slavery, the death 
penalty, cremation, birth control and divorce, never mind wearing hats in Church! 
The Church has affirmed tradition and acted in the light of experience. It is a via 
media that shapes, particularly, the ethos of liberal Christianity and makes it a 
spacious spiritual place for enquiry, for personal conviction, for fellowship without 
uniformity. And, yet, the very spaciousness of liberalism is often the source of 
misunderstanding both from without and within. Those outside Churches often credit 
believers with more faith in their foundation documents than they really have; and 
conservative Christians take the affirmation of authority for the Bible and the creeds 
at face value. The result is a history of internal dispute and external bemusement. 
The most negative effect is the energy expended on internal disputes between liberals 
and conservatives over what the Bible teaches. Oman’s vision of experience as the 
ultimate sphere of revelation is, on the other hand, a dynamic, progressive model of 
faith. It is a model that does not deny the importance of tradition as an element within 
experience; however, it is the existential word spoken at the heart of personal and 
social reality that is magisterial. In Oman’s vocabulary, faith is never static but 
prophetic, a principle that finds expression in the Bible itself. Oman’s vision, in 
effect, regularises what has been the practice within liberal Protestantism since the 
end of heresy trials. Undoubtedly, Oman’s principle of experiential authority would 
be too radical for many to embrace; and, yet, it has been embraced by degrees. The 
Church may not be ready for Oman’s vision; perhaps by definition, vision is that for 
which no one is ready. Meantime, the Church does not sound a trumpet that is clear. 
Liberal Christians decide issues on the basis of the most up-to-date knowledge; for 
example, none would argue that the Genesis creation myth provides an accurate 
scientific explanation of the origins of the universe. Nor do liberal Christians believe 




human sexuality. And yet, to justify liberal attitudes before the bar of theological 
conservatism an amazing amount of time and effort is spent in the quest to find 
scriptural authority for what, in practice, experience has already decided. Modern 
knowledge is as self-authenticating with respect to human sexuality as it is with 
respect to the age of the universe. Reversion to Occam’s razor can only muddy the 
water and give an impression of bibliolatry. Oman’s vision of respect for the 
authority of the past in the light of the greater authority of the present is a vision that 




Oman’s work, if better known, may well speak to secular society also. Oman offers a 
spiritual view of the universe which – without denying the natural world – affirms an 
ultimate immaterial reality, or Mind. It is a philosophy that, when voiced today, 
comes after a long metaphysical silence. Idealism was eclipsed by analytical 
empiricism in the mid-twentieth century and philosophy moved from providing 
theories of meaning to analysis of language. Oman’s spiritual empiricism, predicated 
on values as well as facts, will speak to anyone who finds a purely analytical method 
and materialist ontology unsatisfying. Oman’s religious philosophy, therefore, may 
speak to modernity for the following reasons. First, in Oman’s work the canons of 
the Enlightenment are accepted.  For example, all facts, values and knowledge may 
be questioned and individual autonomy is not subject to any authority save that of 
reality’s witness to itself. There is no substitute, that is, for sincere engagement with 
life. “The help of others is essential”, wrote Oman, but “the authority of others is 
stagnation.”
184
 But, secondly, Oman’s acceptance of the Romantic emphasis on 
individuality places an important caveat on rational triumphalism. People reason not 
in the abstract but in the light of experience: political, cultural, social, religious and 
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 Oman’s theology of personal freedom, therefore, is contextual or 
environmentally conditioned; there is no coercive uniformity in his concept of 
personality. The recognition, by Oman, of the spiritual evolution of personality saves 
his theology from being imperialist, or elitist; it is grounded on the infinite patience 
of love. Oman’s example of “the woman old and poor, in the threadbare gown and 
old fashioned bonnet”, as the one who exhibits “the beauty of holiness” and 
“gentleness of Christ”, illustrates his sensitivity to individuality, and not just an 
abstract concept of the individual. Thirdly, Oman’s is a voice that speaks not from 
above but from along side, and there is a democratic quality about this theological 
vision. If, as Oman argues, knowledge of God is finally dependent upon recognition 
of the image of Christ in one’s neighbour, there can be no self-centred spirituality.
186
 
Oman’s is a theology that, far from marginalising the human, gives the human a 
determinative role in bringing home the reality of God. His theology has within it the 
core values of a liberationist perspective, where praxis supersedes theory. In these 
ways, Oman’s theological vision, though born in another context and couched in 
often inaccessible language, has a contemporary ambience.  
Another feature of Oman’s work with contemporary resonance is its teleological 
pluralism. Though there is one reality behind all phenomena and one point of 
convergence in freedom and love, there is plurality of epistemological perspective. In 
the ascent of the mountain, others “will find the right way to be their own not yours” 
and “you will not shape your course by theirs, but you will hope to meet them farther 
on”.
187
 This pluralism is predicated on Oman’s relegation of historical revelation 
from a position of exclusive authority to that of a milestone on an onward journey. 
As early as 1906, he commented: 
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As an institution embodying ecclesiastical authority, as a visible 
Church, Christianity is only one amongst many temporal things, 
possibly the highest but scarcely the ultimate.
188
 
It was surely a bold assertion to make in New College, Edinburgh, before a United 
Free Church audience; just four years before the World Missionary Conference 
which had a vision of winning the world for Christ within a generation. History has 
proved that prophetic nature of Oman’s pluralistic vision as opposed to a Christian 
imperialism. John Hick is probably the most direct heir to Oman’s vision and, more 
than any other pluralist theologian, he acknowledged Oman as an inspiration for his 
own work. Hick began his theological journey as a student for the ministry of the 
Presbyterian Church in England, in Westminster College, Cambridge. In his early 
monograph, Faith and Knowledge, Hick referred to Oman, saying: 
This account owes much to a philosopher of religion of the last 
generation whose works, perhaps because of their difficulty, do not at 
present receive the attention which they both merit and richly reward.
189
 
Hick adds that he regarded his own essay as “an attempt to work out Oman’s basic 
standpoint in relation to a very different world of contemporary 
philosophy”.
190
Hick’s admiration for Oman’s theological enterprise has been long 
and sustained.
191
Oman lived in a mono-cultural Britain and the benefit of Hick’s 
work is that it takes Oman’s thinking into the practical field of inter-faith 
engagement and study. This is the place that Oman would have wished his ideas to 
be applied and tested, in the light of what Hick calls “the Real”.
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Finally, one further aspect of Oman’s work that may inspire the contemporary seeker 
is his spirituality. Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate the communion of 
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passivity in the mystical way, Oman provides radical piety of value to both those 
outside as well as inside the Church. Oman’s theology of prayer is predicated upon 
the sanctification of the world in God. Prayer is conscious participation in the 
teleological realisation of God’s will of love for all of creation. Essential to the 
dynamic of prayer is a reverent agnosticism. Prayer does not confirm holy certainties 
with respect to the working of the Almighty, save that of love; and even then the 
believer sees in a glass darkly. And, not confirming of holy certainty, the practice of 
prayer challenges prejudice. Prayer is openness to the sacred and the holy, to ever 
new insights into reality. To return to Oman’s mountain analogy, prayer is a toe-hold 
on the steep slope; it is brave and adventurous because it trusts God not only for the 
way ahead, but for inevitable accident and misadventure. In Oman’s theology, 
nothing is outside the love of God. Thus, prayer is the existential realisation of 
reconciliation to God in all things, in light and darkness, in life and in death, in 
terminal illness as in the beauty of autumn leaves.
193
 Oman’s theology of prayer 
offers a spirituality that has peace at its centre, because all things are sustained by 
God, and it has restlessness at its heart because the soul, the world, the Kingdom of 
God is a work in progress. Oman’s theology of prayer will be helpful to those whose 
prayer life may have suffered shipwreck with the collapse of fundamentalist 
convictions, or it may prove helpful to someone who wishes to pray as a citizen of 
the world and who cannot subscribe to the particularity of institutional Christianity.  
At the same time, Oman’s theology of prayer stands in continuity with the piety of 
his roots. The sovereignty of God, the Cross as the highest symbol of divine power 
and need for a personal reconciliation to God’s gracious purposes – these represent a 
line that stretches from the prayer meeting in Victoria Street Congregation to the 
spiritual needs of humanity today. As in all of Oman’s theology, the Cross is primary 
because it is the symbol of the final sovereignty of love. In his own words, “the 
Cross is the symbol of the might which shall transform all things by transforming all 
hearts, the symbol of the everlasting order of conscious freedom in God’s rule of 
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 In summary, prayer is the realisation of the power of love – historically 
revealed in the Cross, universally disclosed, but always theoretical, until 
authenticated in experience. Oman’s theology of prayer is one way whereby his 
visionary perspective may be accessed. 
In the end 
Oman was a radical Christian who never gave his heart away to any particular 
theological system or ideology. His rugged individuality may have been the fruit of 
the road he travelled – from rural, mid-Victorian Orkney via the industrial revolution 
and the Great War to the eve of the Second World War. Oman kept his heart and, 
therefore, his thought was free to interact with the diverse landscapes, literal and 
spiritual, he traversed. His independence of mind may have been nurtured in his 
family experiences; his father, for example, refused the eldership after being elected 
by the congregation. His childhood experience of the numinous may have given him 
an early conviction that God is greater than any articulations of God. In any event, 
Oman brought to historical study a courage that, perhaps, in circumstances other than 
Westminster College, might well have been rewarded with charges of heresy. Oman, 
however, never regarded liberalism, as with Newman, a half-way house to atheism; 
but rather, a liberal mind was to Oman necessary for the quickening of faith, the 
radicalisation of piety and a fuller realisation of the transcendent mystery which 
religious people call God. Oman’s contexts gave birth to the man, but the man 
transcended his contexts in the freedom of love. Oman remains a radical voice 
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